Tuesday, October 9, 2001
Page 7
PERSPECTIVES (Column)
Yaffe Orders Man Not to Pursue Case Slated for Trial Next Day in Another Courtroom
By ROGER M. GRACE
Within this megalopolis is what is akin to a small town, and the paths of the townsfolk are bound to cross time and again. I’m referring to the “legal community.” Among the townsfolk are Los Angeles Superior Court Judges David P. Yaffe and Brett C. Klein and attorney Richard L. Knickerbocker. While it is hardly astonishing that all three played respective roles in a case in 1990 as well as doing so now in a case pending in the Superior Court, there is an irony to the fact that a key issue in the two unrelated cases is the same.
The two jurists happened to encounter each other two years ago. Klein presided over a court trial in a civil case; Yaffe and his wife were the defendants, and lost. Whether there is any connection between Klein’s 1999 judgment against the Yaffes and a judicial action Yaffe took last month which entailed a lack of deference to Klein is subject to conjecture.
The correctness of Yaffe’s judicial action last month is, I submit, not a matter of conjecture; it was wrong.
•It’s Nov. 28, 1990. Div. Two of this district’s Court of Appeal files an opinion in Regents of University of California v. Superior Court, 225 Cal.App.3d 972. The author of the opinion is Klein, a Los Angeles Municipal Court judge sitting on assignment. Klein’s opinion denies a writ petition by UC challenging rulings made by Yaffe. Klein’s decision marks a victory for the plaintiff’s attorney, Knickerbocker.
Knickerbocker’s client had sued to secure a determination that a statute which barred treatment of illegal aliens as “residents” for tuition purposes was enforceable. Five years earlier, the Alameda Superior Court had held to the contrary, finding it unconstitutional. Although, under Art. III, §3.5, a state agency may refuse to abide by a statute only if it was invalidated by an appellate court, UC had chosen to disregard the statute.
In light of the now-final judgment in Alameda, UC wanted the Los Angeles action dismissed or to be transferred to Alameda.
Klein’s opinion recognized “the well-established principle that one court of the state may not interfere with another court’s exercise of its own jurisdiction.” It also noted “the rule of priority of jurisdiction: where several courts have concurrent jurisdiction over a certain type of proceeding, the first one to assume and exercise such jurisdiction in a particular case acquires an exclusive jurisdiction.”
The opinion went on, however, to enumerate reasons why these principles were inapplicable. Among the reasons was that Knickerbocker’s client had not been a party to the Alameda action, and “could participate in the Alameda case only by the bizarre procedure of requesting leave to intervene in order to petition to vacate the judgment.” (The opinion proceeded to find the statute constitutional.)
•It’s now Oct. 20, 1999. Yaffe and his wife are defendants in a Los Angeles Municipal Court action brought by a contractor in connection with work done on the Yaffes’ home. Klein is the judge. He awards judgment in favor of the contractor for $11,406.51, as well as attorney fees, pursuant to a contractual provision, and costs. The attorney fees are subsequently set at $35,000, and the total amount the Yaffes are obliged to pay is $47,327.46.
This is the case I discussed here June 4. The Yaffes withheld payment because they blamed the contractor for discoloration of grout. The Yaffes’ lawyer (who did not receive full payment, either), said in an interview that the case “was decided that way for other than—well, you can ask Judge Klein.” He refused to elaborate. Klein declined comment. The remark implied a notion on the part of the Yaffe camp that the judgment was the product of an ulterior motive harbored by Klein.
•We now jump ahead to 2001. July 25: William Safarian brings an action in unlawful detainer in the Los Angeles Superior Court. Trial is set for Sept. 11 in Div. 77. The judge who presides there is Klein. Sept. 7: Sam Abazari brings an action against Safarian to quiet title to the real property that is the subject of the unlawful detainer action. (He is not a party to the UD action and does not seek to intervene in it.) Sept. 10: Abazari makes an ex parte motion for a temporary restraining order to block Safarian from pursuing his UD action and for an order to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue. Representing Abazari is Knickerbocker. And issuing the TRO and the OSC is Yaffe.
How can one Superior Court judge interfere with a proceeding in the courtroom of another Superior Court judge? The answer is: by ignoring the law. Yaffe tends to do that when the law stands as an impediment to his exercise of powers.
Perhaps Yaffe does not recognize that Klein, though presently handling limited jurisdiction cases, happens to be a judge of the same court as he. Trial court unification took place in this county on Jan. 22, 2000.
The Appellate Division of the Superior Court may reverse judgments made in limited jurisdiction cases, and may issue writs directed to courts handling such cases. But neither the constitutional amendments relating to unified courts, effected in 1998 by Proposition 220, nor the statutory changes that ensued renders courtrooms handling limited jurisdiction cases subservient to any Superior Court department other than the Appellate Division.
I find it interesting that the TRO prepared by Knickerbocker and signed by Yaffe restrained Safarian from pursuing the UD action in “LAMC Case No. 01U16228.” There are some who just won’t accept the fact that LAMC (Los Angeles Municipal Court) no longer exists. Although a civil case involving less than $25,000 is, under Code of Civil Procedure §85, a “limited civil case,” it remains that the case is a Superior Court case, presided over by a full-fledged Superior Court judge.
In his memorandum of points and authorities in support of the TRO, Knickerbocker represented: “In cases where, as here, a quiet title action is currently pending, the court may stay the unlawful detainer until trial of the related civil action or consolidate the actions. Assunction v. Superior Court, 108 Cal App 3d 141, 146-147 (1980); Wilson v. Gentile, 8 Cal. App. 4th 759, 761 (1992).” These were pre-unification cases, each involving the transfer of a UD case to the Superior Court. Neither case entailed an order by a Superior Court judge restraining a party from pursuing an action in the courtroom of another Superior Court judge.
Klein’s 1990 opinion in Regents v. Superior Court recites the general rules that one judge may not interfere with proceedings in another judge’s courtroom and that the first court to gain jurisdiction over a matter retains jurisdiction. The various circumstances present in that case which rendered the rules inapplicable were not present in the case in which Yaffe issued a TRO on Sept. 10.
The rules recited by Klein are well grounded in case law. For example, the California Supreme Court in 1939 said in Williams v. Superior Court in and for Los Angeles County, 14 Cal.2d 656:
“[I]t has been held that jurisdiction is vested by the Constitution in the court and not in any particular judge or department thereof; and that whether sitting separately or together, the judges hold but one and the same court….It follows, therefore, that where a proceeding has been duly assigned for hearing and determination to one department of the superior court by the presiding judge of said court in conformity with the rules thereof, and the proceeding so assigned has not been finally disposed of therein or legally removed therefrom, it is beyond the jurisdictional authority of another department of the same court to interfere with the exercise of the power of the department to which the proceeding has been so assigned.”
The following year, the high court, in Browne v. Superior Court in and for City and County of San Francisco, 16 Cal.2d 593—a case cited by Klein in Regents—made note of “the familiar proposition that where several courts have concurrent jurisdiction over a certain type of proceeding, the first one to assume and exercise such jurisdiction in a particular case acquires an exclusive jurisdiction.” It continued: “Thereafter another court, though it might originally have taken jurisdiction, is wholly without power to interfere, and may be restrained by prohibition.”
The Court of Appeal for this district held in 1986 in Ford v. Superior Court, 188 Cal.App.3d 737:
“One department of the superior court cannot enjoin, restrain, or otherwise interfere with the judicial act of another department of the superior court. Even between superior courts of different counties, having coequal jurisdiction over a matter, the first court of equal dignity to assume and exercise jurisdiction over a matter acquires exclusive jurisdiction.”
The Fourth District Court of Appeal in 1991 embraced the observation by Witkin that “[i]f the principle of priority of jurisdiction over an assigned case...is applicable to ordinary departments, it must be even more true of departments exercising distinct subject matter jurisdiction.” That case was Slone v. Inyo County Juvenile Court, 230 Cal.App.3d 263; it was cited with approval by this district in 1995 in Glade v. Glade, 38 Cal.App.4th 1441.
The long and the short of it is that Yaffe had no business restraining Safarian from pursuing an action assigned to another judge. In essence, he locked the door to Klein’s courtroom. And Yaffe’s cohort, Dzintra Janavs, has kept it locked. She issued a preliminary injunction on Oct. 1.
Safarian’s lawyer, Wayne Abb, says a writ will not be sought in the Court of Appeal. “The client doesn’t want to incur the expense,” he explains.
The North Hollywood attorney adds that Janavs has ordered Abazari to post a $25,000 bond and to make the mortgage payments, so that the injunction “doesn’t harm that much.” Harmful or not, Yaffe committed an interference with the calendar of another judge.
Abb says he pointed out to both Yaffe and Janavs that it was impermissible to interfere with proceedings in Klein’s courtroom. He reports that Janavs responded “that she was enjoining the parties, not the court.” Indeed, it was argued by Knickerbocker in his reply to opposition to the preliminary injunction that “[t]his action does not seek to enjoin a judicial proceeding.”
This only addresses a potential statutory impediment to the relief Knickerbocker sought. Two statutes—Civil Code §3423(a) and Code of Civil Procedure §526(b)(1)—generally bar issuance of an injunction to “stay a judicial proceeding pending at the commencement of the action in which the injunction is demanded.” It is arguable that those statutes don’t apply where the proceeding is not directly enjoined, but rather, a party is restrained from prosecuting the pending case. Even if such a distinction is accepted, it means only that the statutory bar on enjoining a proceeding is inapplicable. Nonetheless, the cases cited above, and cases to like effect, do apply—and the command of the cases is broader than that of the statutes. What the cases proscribe is any “interference” by one judge with cases before another judge. Williams says that one department may not “interfere with the exercise of the power” of another department. Browne says one judge lacks the “power to interfere” with proceedings before another judge. Ford declares that “[o]ne department of the superior court cannot…interfere with the judicial act of another department of the superior court.”
It cannot be doubted that Yaffe interfered with proceedings in Klein’s courtroom when, on Sept. 10, he issued the TRO. Though he did not directly enjoin the conducting of the scheduled UD trial the following day, he created a situation where, as a practical matter, that trial could not proceed. Theoretically, Klein, who was not subject to any legal restraint, could have tried the matter, and the plaintiff could have presented his case. Inevitably, however, this would have resulted in Samarian being found in contempt by Yaffe and possibly jailed, and his attorney likely being disciplined by the State Bar for aiding his client in committing the contempt. Issuance of the TRO plainly constituted an “interference,” and the preliminary injuction perpetrated that interference.
What horrible consequences would have ensued had Yaffe not issued the TRO? On the morning of Sept. 11 (or on a subsequent date if Klein’s courtroom was closed that morning in light of the terrorist attacks), the UD case would have been called. I assume the pendency of the action to clear title would have been brought to the judge’s attention. Perhaps Klein would have inquired if a notice of related case had been filed in Dept. One and, if it had not been, he would have probably directed that such be done. He might have continued the matter or stayed proceedings in expectation that the UD case and the clear-title actions would be coordinated. Or he might have stayed proceedings in his courtroom pending resolution of the issue of title in another courtroom. No harm.
On the other hand, Klein might have simply proceeded to try the case. If so, he presumably would have considered supporting and contravening evidence relating to the affirmative defense raised by the tenants that Safarian lacked ownership. The judgment rendered by Klein would have determined whether the tenants could remain in possession; it would not, however, have affected title. Under case law, parties cannot obtain a dispositive judicial declaration in an unlawful detainer action as to ownership. The action to clear title would thus in no way have been affected by a judgment in the UD case. No harm.
In the event Klein had wished to proceed but a party believed the UD case should have been joined with the quiet-title action, it may be assumed that Klein would have continued the matter to permit the party to seek a writ in the Appellate Division. Under Art. VI, §10 of the state Constitution and Code of Civil Procedure §1085, it’s the Appellate Division—not Yaffe’s writs and receivers court—that may intercede in limited jurisdiction cases.
There was no justification for Yaffe to take the rash action of blocking a case from being tried in a courtroom one floor down. In so doing, he spurned the dictates of case law, and stepped on the toes of a colleague. Whether his toe-stepping was spurred by Klein having ruled against him and his wife, or whether Yaffe would have issued a TRO no matter who the other judge was, is something only Yaffe knows.
Copyright 2001, Metropolitan News Company