Monday, April 27, 2026
Page 4
Court of Appeal:
Youth Offender Parole Law Survives Constitutional Challenge
Opinion Says Rape Victim Failed to Show That Legislation Violates State Constitution as Applied to Sex Offenders By Mandating Early Review in Contradiction to Voter-Approved Measure Requiring Longer Sentences
By a MetNews Staff Writer
Div. Seven of this district’s Court of Appeal has held that Penal Code §3051, which requires defendants convicted of crimes that were committed before the age of 26 to be granted “youth offender parole hearings” after 14 years of incarceration on determinate sentences, does not run afoul of the California Constitution as applied to certain sex offenders based on the fact that an earlier voter-approved measure calls for longer sentences for violent predators.
At issue is the interplay between Article II, §10(c) of the state Constitution, which provides that “[t]he Legislature may amend or repeal an initiative statute by another statute that becomes effective only when approved by the electors unless the initiative statute permits amendment or repeal without the electors’ approval,” and changes to Penal Code §667.6, which were adopted following voter approval of Proposition 83 in November 2006.
The initiative largely restates §667.6, which already authorized, in subsection (c), the imposition a “full separate, and consecutive term” for each conviction of an enumerated sex offense and, in subdivision (d), demanded such a term if the offenses “involve separate victims or…separate occasions.” Proposition 83 proposed moving the list of qualifying forcible sex offenses to a new subdivision (e) and adds two new crimes to the catalog.
In Thursday’s opinion, written by Justice Gail Ruderman Feuer, the court concluded that the changes to §667.6 amount to mere technical reenactments and do not qualify as substantive sentencing modifications triggering the protections of Article II, §10(c).
Presiding Justice Gonzalo Martinez and Justice John L. Segal joined in the opinion.
Rape Victim
Asserting the constitutional violation was a party identified as “Jessica M.,” the victim of a 2008 rape who brought the challenge after the perpetrator of the crime against her, Sergio Linares, was scheduled for a renewed youth offender parole hearing after completing 14 years in prison. He was 25 at the time he committed the multiple sex offenses and was sentenced to an aggregate, determinate term of 60 years imprisonment.
In September 2024, Jessica M. and Crime Survivors, Inc., a nonprofit advocacy group, filed a petition for a writ of mandate, seeking an order directing the Board of Parole Hearings and the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to terminate Linares’s youth offender parole proceeding and refrain from enforcing section 3051 as to any California prisoners who were sentenced to full, consecutive terms under section 667.6, subdivisions (c) or (d).
Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Stephen I. Goorvitch (now a nominee for a Court of Appeal seat on this district’s Div. Two) assumed, without deciding, that Jessica M. has standing and denied the petition on Jan. 25, 2025.
Thursday’s decision declares that “Jessica has standing because she has a beneficial interest in whether Linares is eligible for early parole under section 3051, in light of amendments to the California Constitution made by the Victims’ Bill of Rights Act of 2008, commonly known as Marsy’s Law,” but otherwise affirms the denial.
Increase Penalties
Feuer acknowledged that the Voter Information Guide for Proposition 83 indicates that the measure would “[i]ncrease[s] penalties for [s]ex [o]ffenses” by “broaden[ing] the definition of certain sex offenses,” and so “provid[ing] for longer penalties for specified” crimes. However, she reasoned:
“Proposition 83’s most prominent change to section 667.6 was its removal of the list of qualifying forcible sex offenses found in each of subdivisions (a), (c), and (d), and its placement of the qualifying offenses into a new subdivision (e), which was then incorporated by reference into the existing provisions….The list of qualifying offenses was also expanded….”
The proposition includes a clause requiring a two-thirds vote from both houses of the Legislature on any proposed changes to the scheme, a threshold not achieved for §3051, which was adopted in 2014 to apply to juveniles and amended in 2017 to include all offenders under the age of 26.
The jurist cited the California Supreme Court 2018 decision in County of San Diego v. Commission on State Mandates, which declares:
“When technical reenactments are required…—yet involve no substantive change in a given statutory provision—the Legislature in most cases retains the power to amend the restated provision through the ordinary legislative process. This conclusion applies unless the provision is integral to accomplishing the electorate’s goals in enacting the initiative or other indicia support the conclusion that voters reasonably intended to limit the Legislature’s ability to amend that part of the statute.”
Addressing the petitioners’ assertion that Proposition 83 proposed substantive changes to subdivisions (c) and (d) by expanding the scope of qualifying offenses listed in subdivision (e), she wrote:
“Although Proposition 83 applied the existing sentencing scheme for forcible sex offenders to additional offenses…these are not substantive changes to the sentencing scheme…That is, for every forcible sex offense covered…, Proposition 83 did not change the standard for whether a trial court is authorized to impose a consecutive full-term sentence (subdivision (c)) or mandated to impose a consecutive full-term sentence (subdivision (d)).”
Expansion of Scope
She added:
“Because the expansion of the scope of the sentencing scheme to include additional offenses was not a substantive change to the statutory requirements for sentencing sex offenders, there was no constitutional prohibition on further changes to the sentencing scheme.”
As to the argument that, even if the measure only provides a technical restatement of §667.6, the inclusion was “integral to the electorate’s goals” in voting for the measure, Feuer remarked:
“[T]he fact Proposition 83 was intended, among other things, to increase punishment for aggravated sexual assaults does not show that restatement of section 667.6’s existing sentencing scheme was integral to the initiative. Indeed, the narrowness of the substantive changes to section 667.6 as a whole—adding two forcible sex offenses…to the list of qualifying offenses…—shows it was not.”
The case is Jessica M. v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 2026 S.O.S. 1117.
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