Tuesday, May 12, 2026
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C.A.: 23-Year-Old Sentenced to LWOP Might Be Eligible for Parole Review as Youthful Offender
Opinion Declines to Tackle Whether 2024 Decision by Other District Holding That ‘Youthful’ Adults Facing Life Are Entitled to Review Was Correctly Decided, Says Trial Court Must First Decide if Case Would Even Apply
By a MetNews Staff Writer
The Third District Court of Appeal has held that a defendant convicted of a special circumstances murder that was committed when he was 23 years old was wrongly denied the opportunity to make a record of mitigating evidence related to his age for purposes of future parole proceedings under a Penal Code section applicable to “youthful offenders” that specifically excludes adult perpetrators who were sentenced to determinate life sentences.
At issue is Penal Code §3051, enacted in 2013, which provides for “a hearing by the Board of Parole Hearings for the purpose of reviewing the parole suitability of any prisoner who was 25 years of age or younger…at the time of the controlling offense.” Defendants sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for murders committed before their 18th birthday are eligible for consideration after 24 years in prison.
However, subdivision (h) excludes from eligibility those defendants who are “sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for a controlling offense that was committed after the person had attained 18 years of age.”
Friday’s unpublished opinion follows other jurisprudence addressing the applicability of §3051 to youthful adults facing determinate life sentences. In the March 2024 People v. Hardin decision, the California Supreme Court rejected a defendant’s argument that the Equal Protection Clause demands that those who commit murder between the ages of 18 and 25 be eligible for parole on the same terms as those who kill before they reach the age of majority.
Narrower Challenge
A few months later, in September 2024, Div. Four of the First District Court of Appeal issued an opinion in People v. Briscoe, which accepted a narrower equal protection challenge.
In the Briscoe case, a defendant, who was 21 years old at the time of the crime, successfully argued that treating those convicted of both felony murder and an accompanying special circumstance, found at Penal Code §190.2(d), that incorporates the same culpability standard as the substantive offense differently from those convicted of the crime without the death-qualifying enhancement violates the Equal Protection Clause.
After Briscoe was decided, Gary Ulukivaiola renewed a request for a so-called “Franklin hearing,” named after the 2016 California Supreme Court decision in People v. Franklin, to make a record of mitigating evidence related to his youth at the time of his underlying crime, a 2004 robbery-turned-homicide for which he was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole in 2007 based on a felony-murder special circumstance set forth at §190.2(a)(17).
That section applies to murders “committed while the defendant was engaged in…the commission” of a robbery if the accused was the actual killer or a “major participant” who acted with reckless indifference to human life.
Request Denied
On December 30, 2024, Sacramento Superior Court Judge Steve White denied Ulukivaiola’s request for a Franklin hearing, declaring:
“The court declines to follow the ruling in Briscoe and will follow the mandate of the Supreme Court in Hardin.”
Acting Presiding Justice Ronald B. Robie authored Friday’s opinion, joined in by Justices Peter A. Krause and Shama Mesiwala, reversing the order and saying:
“The court in [Briscoe] concluded…section 3051 violates equal protection as applied to youth offenders who were convicted as a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life. Defendant may have been so convicted and therefore might be entitled to relief under section 3051. The trial court consequently erred in summarily denying defendant’s motion. Without taking a position on the correctness of Briscoe, we remand with directions to allow defendant the opportunity to demonstrate his eligibility for a Franklin hearing.”
Robie acknowledged that Ulukivaiola’s judgment of conviction was upheld on appeal in 2008 after the Third District recited that he was the one who fired the final, fatal shot to the chest. However, he opined:
“But, as our Supreme Court has cautioned, while appellate opinions are generally considered to be part of the record of conviction, ‘the probative value of an appellate opinion is case specific….’….And the relevant statement here was in the factual summary of our prior opinion and not a finding necessary to that decision….Thus, based on the record before us, defendant could have been convicted under the same standards as the defendant in Briscoe and Briscoe was not necessarily foreclosed by Hardin. The trial court therefore incorrectly summarily denied defendant’s motion based on Hardin alone.”
Acknowledging that the lawyers with the Attorney General’s Office argued that “Briscoe’s as-applied equal protection analysis on this issue was incorrect,” the jurist responded:
“[W]e need not conclusively determine whether Briscoe was properly decided because the trial court never determined whether Briscoe could even apply to defendant.”
He continued:
“Because defendant may have been convicted as a major participant who acted with reckless indifference, we conclude the trial court erred in summarily denying his motion for a Franklin hearing under Hardin. However, we decline to determine in the first instance defendant’s eligibility for a Franklin hearing and remand the matter to allow defendant to establish he is entitled to a Franklin hearing. We express no opinion as to what the trial court’s decision should ultimately be in that regard.”
The case is People v. Ulukivaiola, C102886.
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