Monday, March 2, 2026
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Court of Appeal:
No Error in Holding Parties Responsible for Sibling’s Relapse
Opinion Rejects Assertion That Defendants’ Allegedly False Police Report Was Not Legal Cause of Dead Brother’s Drunken Crash for Purposes of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim
By Kimber Cooley
Div. One of the Fourth District Court of Appeal has held that two brothers were properly held liable for the wrongful death of their sibling after they conspired to place a call to police purportedly indicating that their dead mother may be missing and caused officers to reach out to the decedent, who then broke a 15-year sobriety streak and died after crashing a vehicle into a wall with marijuana and alcohol in his system.
Pointing out that the plaintiff, a fourth brother, had asserted an intentional infliction of emotional damages (“IIED”) claim in connection with the wrongful death lawsuit, Justice Martin N. Buchanan, writing for the court, highlighted that the scope of liability is broader for such torts than it is for simple negligence causes of action and declared:
“[W]e discern no…policy reason to insulate defendants from liability for the harm their intentional conduct factually caused. Over the years, tort law has evolved steadily towards greater protection of mental and emotional health….In recent years, we have also gained a greater appreciation of the severe emotional harm that can be caused by serious forms of bullying….[D]efendants identify no public policy that would support cutting off liability for the harm factually caused by their intentional infliction of emotional distress. We can identify none either.”
Thursday’s opinion, joined in by Acting Presiding Justice Truc T. Do and Justice Jose S. Castillo, affirms a 2024 judgment, saying that “we conclude that [the decedent’s] relapse and death were within the scope of liability for wrongful death based on the IIED claim,” and upholds a jury award of approximately $5.1 million to the decedent’s estate as well as one for $4.3 million to the plaintiff in his individual capacity.
Wrongful Death Complaint
In October 2021, the plaintiff, Todd Fisher, filed a complaint against his brothers, Kent and Bruce “Brittin” Fisher, for the alleged wrongful death of their sibling, Wade Fisher, who died on March 23, 2021. In the pleading, he asserted claims, on his own behalf and as the decedent’s successor in interest, for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence, among other causes of action.
Saying that “Britton and Kent [Fisher] were angry with [Wade Fisher] for cooperating with…Todd Fisher…in litigation surrounding their father’s estate,” he claimed:
“[K]nowing full well that their mother…[had] died of natural causes on October 24, 2020, at the age of 89, following years of ill health, Brittin and Kent called the San Diego Police Department and falsely reported their mother was ‘missing’ and that they suspected she was a possible homicide victim.”
He added:
“One week after the false police report, Wade was heavily intoxicated and drove his motorcycle into a wall in Hawaii, causing his death. Wade had maintained his sobriety for 15 years—until his brothers accused him of killing their mother. The anguish pushed him over the edge and caused his death.”
Testimony at Trial
At the trial, a psychologist, Martin Williams, testified that the decedent “had made all these efforts to maintain a peaceful life” and that the phone call “put him over the edge” and “caused” him to relapse. A jury found that the defendants’ conduct was outrageous and that they had each intended to cause Wade and Todd Fisher emotional distress.
In late 2023, the panel found for the plaintiff on the IIED and negligence causes of action, apportioned 60% of the fault to the decedent, and awarded damages without differentiating between the two claims.
After the defendants moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”), then-San Diego Superior Court Judge Timothy B. Taylor (now an arbitrator) denied the request in February 2024, rejecting their assertion that the decedent was an unforeseeable plaintiff and commenting:
“[D]efendants were well aware of Wade’s struggles with alcoholism; they knew of his retreat to Hawaii to escape his perception they were misusing the probate litigation; and they knew their call to SDPD on false pretenses would come to Wade’s attention.”
Buchanan noted that the “defendants [did] not challenge any of the jury’s liability findings, including that they engaged in outrageous conduct intended to cause emotional distress and that their tortious conduct was a substantial factor in causing harm to Wade” and instead argued only “that their conduct was not the legal cause of Wade’s death as a matter of law because his death was not within the scope of their liability for negligence or IIED.”
He pointed out that “proximate cause involves two elements,” the so-called “but-for” test and a second “legal” prong that focuses largely on public policy considerations. Quoting from the Restatement of Torts, he remarked that “section 33…sets forth a different scope of liability standard for intentional torts” by providing that “[a]n actor who intentionally causes harm is subject to liability for that harm even if it was unlikely to occur.” Saying that “California courts have recognized that the scope of liability is broader for intentional torts than for negligence,” he cited a case involving a self-inflicted death, taken on after a bullying campaign against the decedent, which rejected the defendant’s argument that the suicide was an unforeseeable intervening cause.
Social Host Law
Turning to the defendants’ assertions “[w]ith this background” in mind, Buchanan rejected their attempt to “read into a statute,” which insulates “social hosts” from liability for injuries resulting from the intoxication of their guests, “a sweeping legislative policy that the consumption of alcoholic beverages is always the sole proximate cause of any injuries resulting from intoxication.” He wrote:
“The statute does not reflect any policy limiting the scope of liability for injuries incurred as a result of tortious conduct having nothing to do with the furnishing of alcohol. We therefore conclude that this statute does not supply a policy reason for limiting scope of liability here.”
As to the defendant’s claims that their brother’s death was “too attenuated” from the phone call to hold them responsible for the crash, he commented:
“[T]he important factors for determining scope of liability for an intentional tort are the moral culpability of the defendants,…the seriousness of harm intended and threatened by their acts, and the degree to which their conduct deviated from appropriate care….Because legal cause is ultimately a policy question, we also consider any other policy reasons for or against limiting the scope of liability.”
Defendants Conspired
Addressing the first set of factors, the jurist said:
“[T]he jury found that defendants conspired to make a false police report and intended to cause emotional distress to Wade. Subjecting someone to an unfounded law enforcement inquiry over the ‘disappearance’ of their own deceased mother threatens serious harm. Although there was no evidence defendants intended to cause Wade to relapse and drive drunk, they knew he was a recovering alcoholic, which made a relapse and resulting harm more likely, including potentially self-destructive behavior. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment and the jury’s uncontested findings, the intended and threatened harm were both serious.”
Reasoning that “we discern no other policy reason to insulate defendants from liability for the harm their intentional conduct factually caused,” he remarked:
“In sum, we conclude that Wade’s relapse and death were within the scope of defendants’ liability for wrongful death based on the IIED claim. We therefore need not consider whether Wade’s death was within the scope of liability for the negligence claim.”
Regarding “superseding cause,” he opined that the defense was “abandoned,” as the defendants “have not challenged” a trial court ruling refusing their requested instruction on the matter and failed to adequately raise the question on appeal, saying that “[w]e decline to resurrect this…defense in the form of a policy limitation on the scope of liability.”
In an unpublished portion of the opinion, the justice dispensed with the defendants’ remaining arguments, including challenges to the damages awards. He declared:
“The judgment and the order denying defendants’ motion for JNOV are affirmed.”
The case is Fisher v. Fisher, D083806.
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