Friday, July 24, 2026
Page 3
Ninth Circuit:
Search Valid Where Trailer Seemed to Be Parolee’s Abode
Majority, Dissenter Agree That Correctness of Suppression of Evidence Was Proper Turns on Whether Seizure Took Place at What Was Reasonably Thought to Be Subject’s ‘Residence’; Facts Differently Viewed
By a MetNews Staff Writer
The Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, in a 2-1 decision interpreting California law, yesterday reversed an order suppressing evidence found in a trailer and pickup truck, saying that officers reasonably believed that the vehicles belonged to, or were under the control of, a man who was on parole, a condition of which was submitting to warrantless searches of his residence or property under his control.
Viewing the facts differently, Circuit Judge Richard Paez dissented, saying that officers should have realized that the suspect, Binisio Nicolas Pereda, was merely an overnight guest in the trailer.
The majority was comprised of Circuit Judges Patrick J. Bumatay and Consuelo M. Callahan. Their opinion overturns an order by District Court Judge Monica Ramirez Almadani.
Bumatay wrote that “[o]ne of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement” under the Fourth Amendment “is the so-called parolee exception.” He noted that a condition of Pereda’s post-release community supervision—a form of parole under California law—was submitting to warrantless searches of his “residence.”
The jurist declared:
“Considering the whole picture, the officers had ample probable cause to believe that the trailer was Pereda’s residence.”
The majority and the dissenter were in accord with the observation of the government, in its opening brief on appeal, that the case turns on “whether officers had probable cause to believe defendant was residing in the trailer.”
Known Drug Dealer
Pereda was sentenced in 2016, in state court, to 14 years in prison for various offenses including assault likely to produce great bodily injury and possession of a firearm as a felon. He was a known drug dealer.
In 2022, he was granted a early release, two provisos being that he wear a GPS ankle monitoring device and not travel more than 50 miles from his residence without permission.
His stated residence was with his parents in Lompoc, a city on Santa Barbara County. Yet, the GPS device showed he was making late-night trips to Goleta, also in Santa Barbara County, 54 miles away, and officers suspected he had returned to drug-dealing.
There were also indication that he was residing in Goleta. Conducting a compliance check in Goleta, officers found drugs and drug paraphernalia in the cab of the truck, and Pereda was arrested.
District Court Ruling
In suppressing the evidence, Almadani said:
“Caselaw stresses that mere physical presence is not equivalent to residence….That the officers had evidence that Pereda was in the trailer does not mean that they had probable cause to believe he resided there. It is notable that the officers were totally unaware of the trailer and had no idea how long it had been parked there prior to the compliance check. In other words, all of the officers’ observations related to the trailer were made contemporaneous to the compliance check, not over a duration where Pereda could be seen going about everyday living from the trailer….
“No one identified the trailer as Pereda’s residence prior to the search.”
The government appealed, arguing:
“Because officers knew defendant’s GPS location had clustered around the trailer overnight for several of the prior eight days, saw that the trailer was being used as a residence, saw defendant’s truck parked next to the trailer, found defendant sleeping inside the trailer, and confirmed with a resident that defendant was in the trailer before searching it—among several other facts—the officers had ample probable cause of residence.”
Bumatay’s Opinion
Bumatay, in his opinion reversing the suppression order, said:
“First, before the search, officers knew that Pereda was likely not living at his reported address in Lompoc. California. Instead, for roughly three months, officers believed that Pereda had consistently stayed at the Goleta address.
“Second, they also knew that Pereda’s former probation officer conducted home visits at the Goleta address and admonished him for not living in Lompoc.
“Third, GPS data placed him just outside the Goleta address over a prolonged period. GPS data showed that Pereda’s location clustered around the exact spot that officers found the trailer for at least eight days before the search, including overnight….
“Fourth, the officers’ observation on the day of the search reinforced their belief that Pereda lived in the trailer. They first knocked on the door of the house at the Goleta address and asked for Pereda. The resident, Pereda’s girlfriend’s mother, told them that they would find Pereda in the trailer. When they approached the trailer, they saw that it had the markings of a residence….
“Fifth, the officers’ interactions with Pereda the morning of the search validated their beliefs that he resided in the trailer. After knocking on the trailer door. Pereda’s girlfriend falsely stated that he was not there, suggesting that she knew he was not supposed to be living there. When she opened the door, she was only partially clothed, indicating that they were both sleeping there. Finally, the officers heard Pereda’s voice from inside the trailer.”
These facts, Bumatay reasoned, pointed to a “ ‘fair probability’ that the trailer was Pereda’s residence,” justifying the search.
He also said that the trailer is a “vehicle” under California law and, as such, was personal property under the parolee’s control, subject to a warrantless search.
Paez’s Dissent
Dissenting, Paez contended that “the majority ignores the analytical approach to California parolee cases that we have adopted in our case law and degrades the Fourth Amendment protections it affords to non-parolees.” He explained:
“The guiding factors we employ to analyze probable cause in this context are prompted by California’s parole search conditions. Unlike in other suppression cases, if the parole search conditions are not met. the search is not lawful.”
The dissenter said that Pereda had agreed to warrantless searches of his “residence,” but that “the officers lacked probable cause to believe that the trailer was Pereda’s residence.”
Paez commented:
“It is worth noting that our case law does not ask for much. The government would not be here today if any officer on the scene had simply asked Pereda, his girlfriend, or his girlfriend’s parents ‘who lives here,’ ‘whose truck is this,.’ or ‘who has the keys to the trailer or truck?’ Even ‘I am going to search your trailer.’ or ‘I am going to search your truck,’ directed to Pereda without any denial from him, might have been enough….The officers could have engaged in any in-person surveillance of Pereda using the trailer as his residence prior to the day of the search. Similarly, in mere minutes before the search, they could have examined the permit in the trailer’s window or ran a registration check on the trailer or truck. I agree with the district court that ‘[t]he officers’ failure to do so reflects a rush to judgment, not reasoned investigation,’ warranting suppression.”
Third Party Affected
As a side note, the jurist remarked that the Fourth Amendment “recognizes that merely inviting a parolee to one’s home or parking next to a parolee’s vehicle should not subject innocent third parties to intrusive searches,” elaborating in a footnote:
“Our concern for third parties is well-demonstrated by the instant case. Pereda’s girlfriend was forced to exit the trailer and walk down the street in her underwear, while her belongings in the trailer were indiscriminately searched.”
Bumatay is an appointee of Republican President Donald Trump; Callahan was placed on the bench by Republican President George W. Bush; Paez was chosen by Democratic President Bill Clinton. Almadani was selected for the District Court by Democratic President Joseph Biden.
The case is U.S. v. Pereda, 25-4461.
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