Thursday, September 17, 2026
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C.A. Affirms Attempted Murder Conviction in Case Involving ‘Drunken’ Attack on Officer
Opinion Rejects View That Judge Erred by Instructing Jury That Voluntary Intoxication Is ‘Only’ Relevant to Intent to Kill When Premeditation, Deliberation Also at Issue
By a MetNews Staff Writer
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CHARLES AMMONS defendant |
Div. Six of this district’s Court of Appeal yesterday rejected the contention of a defendant, who was accused of attempted murder for trying to shoot a Pismo Beach Police officer with a misloaded firearm, that a trial judge erred by instructing the jury that it could consider evidence of the suspect’s voluntary intoxication “only” in deciding whether he had acted with the intent to kill when the issue was also relevant to allegations of premeditation and deliberation.
The question arose after Pismo Beach Police Officer Christopher Siglin conducted a traffic stop on April 15, 2022 after observing a white van make an illegal turn. He contacted the driver, Charles Ammons, who refused to turn off the ignition as requested.
As Siglin opened the driver’s side door, Ammons swung a handgun toward the officer, and the two wrestled over the firearm. During the struggle, the weapon was pointed at Siglin’s face from about 12 inches away.
Video footage from Siglin’s body-worn camera recorded a “clicking” sound and showed Ammons pulling the trigger on the firearm. Eventually, the officer was able to subdue the defendant and secure the weapon, which was later determined to be a .40 caliber semi-automatic pistol that contained a magazine with bullets that had been inserted backwards.
Blood-Alcohol Content
Post-arrest testing revealed that Ammons’ blood-alcohol content was 0.21%, well above the legal limit for operating a vehicle. At his trial, San Luis Obispo Superior Court Judge Crystal Seiler advised the jury on voluntary intoxication using the Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instruction (“CALCRIM”) 3426, which provides:
“You may consider evidence, if any, of the defendant’s voluntary intoxication only in a limited way. You may consider that evidence only in deciding whether the defendant acted…with [the specific intent to kill].”
After a jury returned a guilty verdict on the attempted murder charge and found true allegations that the defendant acted with premeditation and deliberation, Seiler sentenced him to more than 15 years to life in prison.
Justice Kenneth Yegan, writing for the court, remarked:
“[Ammons] contends the trial court erred when it instructed the jury, in terms of CALCRIM No. 3426, that it could ‘consider [evidence of appellant’s voluntary intoxication] only in deciding whether [appellant] acted with the intent to kill Siglin and the knowledge that Siglin was a peace officer.’ He argues that the trial court erred by precluding the jury from also considering his intoxication in deciding whether he premeditated and deliberated.”
Voluntary Intoxication
Yegan acknowledged that voluntary drunkenness is relevant to premeditation and deliberation as well as to whether the assailant possessed the specific intent to kill. However, he cited the 1997 California Supreme Court decision in People v. Castillo, which rejected a similar argument by a defendant who challenged the use of an older version of a form intoxication instruction that did not include the word “only.”
That advisement specified:
“If the evidence shows that a defendant was intoxicated at the time of the alleged crime, you should consider that fact in determining whether or not such defendant had such specific intent or mental state.”
The court in Castillo opined:
“No reasonable juror would understand the instructions to permit the jury to consider intoxication in determining whether defendant specifically intended to kill but to prohibit it from considering that same intoxication in determining whether he premeditated and deliberated. Premeditation and deliberation are clearly mental states; no reasonable juror would assume otherwise.”
Same Reasoning
Finding that the same reasoning applies to the case before the court, Yegan wrote that “[t]he instructions” given by Seiler, when “read as a whole, allowed the jury to consider voluntary intoxication in connection with premeditation and deliberation.”
He added:
“Moreover, because the instruction on voluntary intoxication is a pinpoint instruction, it was appellant’s responsibility to request any modifications or clarifications he required….His election not to do so forfeits the contention that the instruction did not sufficiently connect voluntary intoxication to the concepts of premeditation and deliberation.”
As to the defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the jurist remarked:
“Here, the jury’s verdict establishes that it found appellant formed the specific intent to kill Siglin and that his voluntary intoxication did not prevent him from doing so. There is no reasonable probability the jury would have reached a different result had the voluntary intoxication instruction specifically mentioned premeditation and deliberation. To reach a more favorable result on that issue, the jury would have to find that appellant was sober enough to form the intent to kill Siglin but simultaneously too intoxicated to premeditate and deliberate that killing. No rational jury could reach that conclusion, especially after reviewing the body camera video of the incident.”
In a footnote to the court’s recitation of the facts, Yegan added:
“We parenthetically comment on appellant’s lack of even a rudimentary knowledge of firearms. The fact that he loaded the magazine with bullets facing backwards is the only reason Siglin was not murdered.”
The case is People v. Ammons, B343669.
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