Friday, March 20, 2026
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Court of Appeal:
Default Judgment on Vague Divorce Petition Rightly Tossed
Opinion in Marital Dissolution Case Rejects Assertion That Family Code Section Listing Exclusive Grounds for Vacatur Precludes Application of Code of Civil Procedure Rule That Relief May Not Exceed Pleading
By Kimber Cooley, associate editor
Div. Four of the First District Court of Appeal has held that a Code of Civil Procedure section dictating that court-ordered relief is limited to the demands of the pleading may provide a basis for setting aside a default judgment as to the division of assets in divorce proceedings initiated by a petition which listed the property at stake as “[t]o be determined.”
Rejecting the view that because Family Code §2122 sets forth six exclusive grounds for setting aside a judgment, including actual fraud, perjury, duress, mental incapacity, mistake, and failure to comply with disclosure rules, no other basis exists for vacatur in dissolution proceedings, Justice Jon B. Streeter, writing for the court, declared:
“Obviously,…the existence of exclusive statutory grounds for vacatur in certain cases cannot preclude constitutional grounds for the same relief. Code of Civil Procedure [§580(a)],…always serves as a constitutional backstop. Under[that section], no default judgment may grant relief to the plaintiff in excess of that which is demanded in the complaint….The primary purpose…is to ensure compliance with minimum due process guarantee[s]….So that defaulting parties may make an informed decision about whether to appear and defend, [§580(a)] requires that they be given adequate notice of the maximum judgment that may be assessed against them.”
Presiding Justice Tracie L. Brown and Mendocino Superior Court Judge Ann Moorman, sitting by assignment, joined in Wednesday’s opinion.
Failed to Respond
Seeking relief from the default judgment was James Jenkins, who claimed that he failed to respond to his wife’s petition for dissolution for over a year because he was allegedly “struggling emotionally and financially.”
The petition had been filed on Jan. 13, 2021 by Katia Jenkins, who submitted a standard form pleading and responded, “[t]o be determined,” in a section asking for a listing of separate and community property. Although the filing was served on James Jenkins that April, he failed to respond.
In October 2021, Katia Jenkins requested entry of default and filed a motion seeking an order bifurcating the issue of dissolution from support issues and a decree of marital termination. She submitted new information along with her requests, including income information and a property declaration that included the Walnut Creek family home, for which she proposed an even split of the value, along with information about other assets.
James Jenkins was notified of a hearing on a “request for order,” but the notice included the incorrect date.
On Jan. 24, 2022, the court addressed not only the bifurcation and termination issues but also the appropriateness of a default judgment, a topic that was not on the court’s calendar.
Default Judgment
Contra Costa Superior Court Judge Wendy McGuire Coats granted the request for default judgment, using a form that had been provided informally to the jurist before the hearing based on ex parte communications. The order called for awarding the house to Katia Jenkins as her separate property, subject to equalizing payments, and set forth a division of the other assets.
On Jan. 23, 2023, James Jenkins moved to set aside the judgment based on §580(a), §2122, and Family Code §2121, which specifies that “ the court may…relieve a spouse from a judgment…adjudicating…division of property, after the six-month time limit…has run” if “the grounds for relief materially affected…the outcome and…the moving party would materially benefit.”
He claimed that he was unaware that a default judgment had been entered against him until a May 2022 hearing regarding title issues on the home, which he says was originally gifted to him as separate property by his parents.
The request for vacatur was assigned to Contra Costa Superior Court Judge Ayana K. Young, who granted the request in October 2023, after finding that James Jenkins was not provided “proper notice” of the proceeding on Jan. 24, 2022 and that the order concerning the division of property “went beyond the petition.”
Statutory Interplay
Addressing the interplay between §580(a) and §2122, Streeter opined:
“Katia’s primary argument before us—her contention that Family Code sections 2121 and 2122 govern here exclusively, and that Code of Civil Procedure section 580 has no application—is founded on a false premise: She assumes only one of these two sources of authority may apply….But as James points out, the Family Code itself presupposes that the Code of Civil Procedure applies to family law cases….We conclude he is right and reject Katia’s argument to the contrary.”
He continued:
“James is also correct that the boxes checked in Katia’s pro se petition…left everything pertaining to property division open-ended, listing it all as ‘TBD.’ Because the default judgment purported to divide assets that had never been identified, we agree that it awarded relief exceeding the relief sought in the petition, justifying a set-aside order under Code of Civil Procedure section 580.”
Saying that, “[w]ithout any specifics as to the relief sought, James was put on notice of nothing more than the prospect that a court would dissolve his marriage,” the jurist remarked that “Katia’s place-holder style petition failed to alert him to the property division issues at stake in the case, depriving him of the information necessary to make an informed decision about whether to appear and defend.”
He added:
“Even granting that notice in a dissolution action ‘sufficient to support a default judgment dividing the community’s property (including any equalizing payment necessary to achieve an equal division) may be provided by checking the appropriate boxes on a form petition and listing the property to be divided in the petition’…, in this case Katia listed nothing.”
Streeter acknowledged that “there is case law suggesting that, due to the informal, form-based pleading approach litigants use in marital dissolution cases, the level of pleading specificity required by Code of Civil Procedure section 580 may not be necessary in this context,” but said:
“We think it would raise due process questions to read [this jurisprudence] so broadly as to permit the entry of a default judgment adjudicating property division issues based on a form dissolution petition that does no more than mark ‘To be determined’ next to boxes asking for identification of the property to be divided.”
Adding that §§2121 and 2122 provide “an equally serviceable alternate ground for affirmance of the family court’s set-aside order,” reasoning:
“[T]he family court’s finding that…James Jenkins, lacked notice of the default judgment proceedings pending against him warrants vacatur of the judgment under Family Code sections 2121 and 2122 on grounds of mistake.”
He declared:
“An order shall issue directing Katia to amend her dissolution petition to identify all assets for division….James shall be permitted to file an answer to the petition as so amended; and the case shall proceed in the normal course from there.”
The case is In re Marriage of Jenkins, A169217.
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