Tuesday, May 5, 2026
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Resentencing Might Be Appropriate, or Not, in Case of Slaying of Unintended Victim—C.A.
Justices Say Trial Judge Gave Faulty Reason for Denying Petition But Notes Possible Valid Basis, to Be Considered on Remand
By a MetNews Staff Writer
Div. Three of the Fourth District’s Court of Appeal has held that in a case with “very unusual facts,” it must reverse an order denying a bid for resentencing sought by a man convicted of the second-degree murder of his mother, declaring that the judge supplied a legally faulty reason for her ruling—but, in remanding for further proceedings, pointed to what would potentially be a valid basis for denying the petition.
Justice Nathan Scott authored an unpublished opinion, filed Friday, calling for consideration of the defendant’s youth at the time of his offense, but also saying that if the trial court, in taking a second look at the matter, makes a finding of implied malice, denial of relief would be justified.
The appellant is inmate Jose Alonso Najera who, in 1999, at age 19, wanted his father killed and commissioned a friend, Gerald Thomas Johnson, to do the deed. While the assailant was fatally stabbing the father, Najera’s mother, who had a separate bedroom, entered the room and Johnson proceeded to bludgeon her to death.
Najera was convicted by a jury on June 1, 2010, of the first-degree murder of his father and the second-degree murder of his mother. On Aug, 6, 2010, he was sentenced to consecutive terms of life imprisonment without possibility of parole, as to the murder of his father, and 15 years to life as to the killing of his mother, according to court records.
Following legislative changes narrowing circumstances where a person can be held criminally liable for a killing by another, he sought a resentencing as to both homicides under Penal Code §1172.6 which authorizes relief where the defendant could not be convicted of murder under the current statutes.
Trial Court’s Conclusion
Orange Superior Court Judge Sheila F. Hanson rejected out of hand Najera’s petition for resentencing in connection with the killing of his father, but conducted an evidentiary hearing relating to his mother’s slaying. Ultimately, she found Najera ineligible for relief because, as she viewed it, he intended that his mother be killed.
Under Penal Code §189(e)(2), a person who was not the “actual killer” may be found guilty of murder where he or she “with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree.”
Hanson erred in her analysis, Scott said, explaining:
“In our view, Najera’s acquittal of first degree murder as to the mother precluded a finding that he intended to kill her. First degree murder generally requires a premeditated and deliberate intent to kill….Second degree murder requires either an intent to kill without premeditation and deliberation or implied malice—conscious disregard for human life.”
Youth, Implied Malice
The jurist made note of Najera’s youth at the time of the killings, but also the possibility of a finding on remand of implied malice which would mean that the defendant would, under present law, be guilty of second-degree murder. Scott wrote:
“Najera’s conduct before the murders—stealing from his parents, squandering the money, and concealing his academic status while planning to forge a transcript—is consistent with youth-related impetuousness.
“In this context, a factfinder may well doubt that Najera appreciated the risk his plan posed to his mother’s life, even if that risk would be apparent to a more mature adult. Therefore, a reasonable probability exists that the trial court would have granted relief as to the mother absent the error.”
He continued:
“At the same time, the evidence does not foreclose a finding of implied malice.”
Penal Code §187(a) defines murder as “the unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought.” Sec. 188(a) elaborates that “malice may be express or implied,” specifying that “[m]alice is implied when no considerable provocation appears, or when the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.”
Scott said:
“A reasonable factfinder could conclude that arranging a stabbing in a shared home created an obvious and grave risk to the mother’s life and that Najera. although young, appreciated and disregarded that risk.”
The case is People v. Najera, G064808.
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