Monday, August 31, 2026
Page 1
C.A. Says Carjacker’s Gashed Head, Repeating Self, Not Enough for ‘Unconsciousness’ Defense
Opinion Distinguishes Case Finding Court Was Obligated to Instruct on Principle Where Woman, on Medicine With Possible Mind-Altering Side Effects, Shot Husband in Daze With Eyes Open
By a MetNews Staff Writer
Div. Eight of this district’s Court of Appeal has affirmed the conviction of a man who was accused of committing a carjacking that occurred just after he crashed his own vehicle into a freeway barrier, rejecting his contention that a judge erred in failing to instruct on an “unconsciousness” defense based on witness testimony indicating that the suspect had a gash to his head, was repeating himself, and had insisted the victim’s car was his own.
At issue is the scope of Penal Code §26 which provides that “[a]ll persons are capable of committing crimes except those belonging to the following classes,” and lists children, mentally incapacitated individuals, and “[p]ersons who committed the act charged without being conscious thereof,” among the enumerated exceptions.
Justice Victor Viramontes authored Thursday’s unpublished opinion, joined in by Presiding Justice Maria E. Stratton and Justice John Shepard Wiley Jr., saying:
“Although [the victim] testified that [the defendant] appeared dazed or concussed, no witnesses testified that [the suspect] was unconscious at any time leading up to or during the carjacking. And while defense counsel argued to the jury that [his client] lacked the intent to steal Valdez’s car because he likely was concussed and confused…, counsel never argued that Norton was unconscious. Thus, the court was obligated to give an instruction on unconsciousness only if substantial evidence supported it….[T]here was insufficient evidence to support such an instruction.”
2015 Case
The defendant cited the 2015 Court of Appeal decision by Div. Three of the Fourth District in People v. Gana, which found that a court was obligated to advise the jury on the topic where evidence revealed that the defendant had shot her husband, with her eyes open, while on medication with possible mind-altering side effects and appearing to be in a daze.
That court looked to medical testimony establishing that the woman was depressed and that the cancer-treatment drugs she had been prescribed could cause a state of delirium and said:
“[T]here was other evidence that justified giving unconsciousness instructions. [Her son] testified defendant’s eyes were wide open and her face lacked emotion when she shot his father. A deputy sheriff also described her as having ‘a thousand mile stare’ and paramedics said she remained silent when asked a series of standard questions.”
Ultimately, the court found the error to be non-prejudicial in light of other factors.
Seeking to overturn his conviction was Willie Norton, who flipped his car on a Los Angeles area freeway in September 2022 and then got into the driver’s side of a witness’ vehicle after that party, Raul Valdez, had pulled over to investigate. After discovering Norton had gotten into the driver’s side of his car, Valdez rushed over and observed that Norton had a gash to his head, kept repeating that “this is my car,” and appeared dazed or concussed.
Norton then pushed Valdez’s shoulder away before the victim, who later said that he wanted to avoid a freeway confrontation, asked if he could retrieve his phone and backpack. Norton returned his items before driving off in the vehicle.
Unconsciousness Defense
Viramontes noted that “Norton contends that the trial court prejudicially erred when it did not instruct on unconsciousness as a defense to carjacking,” pointing out that the state is a complete defense to criminal charges and “can result from ‘somnambulism, a blow on the head, or similar cause.’ ”
Rejecting the view that Valdez’s testimony established that the instruction was mandated, the jurist noted that Norton had engaged in complicated and purposeful actions that undermine his assertion of unconsciousness. He wrote:
“Immediately after he crashed his car, Norton was able to engage in the following conduct: (1) exit his car, run across the freeway, and locate Valdez’s car; (2) enter the driver’s seat of Valdez’s car and press the ignition button to start the car’s engine; (3) recognize that Valdez was trying to regain possession of the car and push Valdez away from the car…; (4) restart the car’s engine after pushing Valdez…; (5) respond to Valdez’s request to return Valdez’s personal belongings…; and (6) drive the car over 40 miles from the scene of the altercation to his home….”
He commented that “Norton’s reliance on People v. Gana…is misplaced” and remarked:
“Here, there was scant evidence addressing Norton’s mental condition leading up to and during the carjacking. Norton did not testify that he was unconscious during, or could not otherwise remember the events surrounding, the carjacking. While Norton repeatedly stated that Valdez’s car was his (Norton’s) car, that evidence suggests, at most, that Norton was confused about whose car he was trying to take, not that he was unaware of his actions.”
Head Injury
The jurist continued:
“[A]lthough Valdez testified that Norton had a cut on his head and appeared to be concussed or dazed, Valdez did not testify that Norton appeared to be unconscious or otherwise unaware of his actions leading up to and during the carjacking. In any event, Valdez later testified that he had no medical training or expertise ‘with respect to evaluating head injuries’ and that he simply ‘made an assumption that [Norton] might have a concussion.’ No doctors or other medical experts testified that Norton suffered a head injury before the carjacking or that he otherwise exhibited any signs of being unconscious when he took Valdez’s car.”
As to the defendant’s assertion that the evidence did not support that he had the required intent to permanently or temporarily deprive the victim of the vehicle, he wrote:
“Norton argues that the evidence more strongly supports a finding that he did not intend to steal Valdez’s car because he was confused, and likely concussed, following the crash and believed that he was trying to drive away in his own car….Norton made this same argument to the jury, however, and the jury rejected it….We cannot second guess that finding simply because there also was evidence to support a contrary finding.”
The case is People v. Norton, B338198.
Copyright 2026, Metropolitan News Company