Metropolitan News-Enterprise

 

Monday, March 30, 2026

 

Page 3

 

Court of Appeal:

Sheriff Oversight Groups Possess Statutory Subpoena Power

Opinion Says That While Decision to Create Commission Is Within Discretion of County, Statute Provides That, Once Established, Such Committees Hold Authority to Summon

 

By a MetNews Staff Writer

 

Div. Five of the First District Court of Appeal has held that a trial judge erred in finding that a civilian group charged with overseeing the Sonoma County Sheriff’s Department lacked authority to subpoena certain records from employees of the agency, rejecting an assertion that the power to require production of the requested documents may be withheld at the whim of the locality that creates the entity.

Acknowledging that California gives counties discretion over whether to establish such a civilian oversight committee, the court said that such groups are statutorily infused with a non-revocable subpoena power once created.

At issue is Government Code §25303.7, which provides:

“A county may create a sheriff oversight board, either by action of the board of supervisors or through a vote of county residents, comprised of civilians to assist the board of supervisors with its duties…that relate to the sheriff.”

Subdivision (b) specifies that “[t]he chair of the sheriff oversight board shall issue a subpoena …whenever the board deems it necessary or important to examine” an “officer of the county in relation to the discharge of their official duties on behalf of the sheriff’s department,” any other witness with information falling under the jurisdiction of the entity, or “any…documents…relating to the affairs” of the law enforcement agency.

Justice Mark B. Simons authored Thursday’s opinion, joined in by Presiding Justice Teri L. Jackson and Justice Danny Y. Chou, saying:

“The Sheriff argues that ‘[i]t defies logic and law to argue that a county creating an oversight board/inspector general is now required to confer that entity with broad subpoena powers.’ We disagree. The legislative history indicates a strong legislative concern with ensuring adequate oversight of sheriffs….and a determination that subpoena power is a necessary component of this oversight.”

Response to Subpoenas

The question arose after Sonoma County Sheriff’s Department employees did not respond to subpoenas served on them in April 2024 by the chair of the locality’s Independent Office of Law Enforcement Review and Outreach (“IOLERO”) as part of an investigation into statements made by an alleged whistleblower. The group was created by the county’s board of supervisors in 2016 to take over oversight responsibilities relating to the law enforcement agency.

IOLERO alleged that it needed personnel records for two employees to substantiate or undermine claims made in the whistleblower complaint. The agency refused to comply, challenging the authority of the group to summon the records.

That July, IOLERO filed a complaint to compel compliance with the subpoenas pursuant to an enforcement provision of §25303.7. On Sept. 19, 2024, then-Sonoma Superior Court Judge Bradford DeMeo (now serving as an arbitrator) sided with the Sheriff’s Department and denied the request.

Saying that DeMeo’s order “was substantively one declining to order the subpoenaed parties to comply with the Independent Office’s subpoenas,” Simons opined that the decree “is therefore appealable.”

Plain Language

Looking to the plain terms of §25303.7, the jurist said:

“The statute uses the term ‘may’ when setting forth a county’s ability to create the identified sheriff oversight entities, but uses the term ‘shall’ when describing the entities’ subpoena powers….Thus, the plain language of the statute indicates that counties have the discretion to create sheriff oversight entities but, once created, section 25303.7 grants those entities subpoena power.”

Acknowledging that, “in…parts of the legislative history, there is equivocal language” concerning whether the Legislature intended to leave the question of subpoena power up to the localities that create the oversight committees, Simons pointed out that “[t]he language of section 25303.7 stands in contrast to that of statutes governing other county entities that clearly provide these entities only have subpoena power if the county so provides.” He remarked:

“We…do not find the…statements in the legislative reports to be dispositive of the issue, particularly in light of the statutory language discussed above.”

Constraint on Power

Addressing the department’s concern that interpreting the section to mandate subpoena powers to the oversight committees would constrain a county’s ability to control the entities it creates, Simons wrote:

“We need not and do not decide whether a sheriff oversight entity with limited authority—i.e., over only certain aspects of the sheriff’s department—is granted subpoena power only to the extent of that authority under section 25303.7. We assume, without deciding, that if a county created a sheriff oversight entity that did not have jurisdiction over whistleblower complaints, section 25303.7 would not confer upon that entity subpoena power with respect to whistleblower complaints. Such a case is not before us….”

Turning to whether the IOLERO qualifies as an “sheriff oversight board” within the meaning of §25303.7, he rejected the view that the title of the group should be given any controlling weight and declared:

“[T]he Independent Office is a sheriff oversight entity for purposes of section 25303.7 and is accordingly granted subpoena power, pursuant to the terms of that statute, for subpoenas issued after section 25303.7’s effective date.”

In an unpublished portion of the opinion, the justice noted that an amendment to the section was enacted during the pendency of the appeal to provide covered entities with authority to access peace officer personnel records, documents that were previously protected from disclosure.

The case is Independent Office of Law Enforcement Review and Outreach v. Sonoma County Sheriff’s Office, 2026 S.O.S. 860.

Tension between oversight committees and the counties that create them is not uncommon. Last year, Los Angeles County’s Office of County Counsel issued a press release lambasting the Civilian Oversight Commission for having “lost its focus” and engaging in “grandstanding” after the group filed an amicus brief concerning a case involving former Los Angeles County Assistant District Attorney Diana Teran.

Teran, who served as an advisor to former Los Angeles County District Attorney George Gascón, faced criminal charges relating to accusations that she violated state hacking laws by sending public court records relating to lawsuits asserting misconduct by sheriff’s deputies to a colleague as part of a purported effort to track problem officers.

Prosecutors argued that Teran only knew about the records because she had access to confidential files when she worked at the Sheriff’s Department three years earlier. After Teran petitioned for writ review following the preliminary hearing, the commission urged this district’s Court of Appeal to block the prosecution, citing concerns that the case would have a chilling effect on the cooperation between law enforcement and oversight boards.

In the March 2025 press release, the County Counsel’s Office objected to the commission’s having acted on its own accord in submitting the brief, asserting:

“The dispute comes down to a simple fact: the [commission]—like every other advisory commission created by the Board of Supervisors and all County departments—is not allowed to act independently of the Board of Supervisors.”

The turmoil led one of the proponents of the brief, former Commissioner Sean Kennedy, to resign after he received a letter from county attorneys purportedly threatening legal action relating to the filing.

The criminal case against Teran was dropped at the direction of this district’s Court of Appeal last June.

 

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