No Error in Awarding Support to Domestic-Violence Convict

Monday, August 31, 2026

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Court of Appeal:

No Error in Awarding Support to Domestic-Violence Convict

Opinion Rejects View That Judge Erred in Considering Factors as to Suitability of Alimony in Finding Ex-Wife Had Rebutted Presumption Against Maintenance Payments for Abusers

By Kimber Cooley, associate editor

Div. Eight of this district’s Court of Appeal held Friday that a judge did not abuse her discretion in awarding spousal support to a woman who had previously been convicted of domestic violence against her then-husband despite the existence of a statutory presumption against such payments, rejecting the contention that the jurist conflated the factors applicable to the appropriateness of alimony in general with the analysis relevant to rebuttal.

At issue is the interplay between Family Code §§4325, which creates a presumption against support payments for those convicted of domestic violence within the five years preceding the divorce filing, and 4320, which lists factors a court must consider in ordering alimony, including the “marketable skills of the supported party,” and “periods of unemployment that were incurred…to permit the supported party to devote time to domestic duties.”

Sec. 4325 provides that a “[t]he court may consider documented evidence of a convicted spouse’s history as a victim of domestic violence…perpetrated by the other spouse, or any other factors the court deems just and equitable, as conditions for rebutting this presumption” and that “[t]he rebuttable presumption created in this section may be rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence.”

Wife’s Circumstances

Presiding Justice Maria E. Stratton, writing for the court, disagreed with the husband contention that the trial judge’s consideration of the wife’s circumstances, such as her purported lack of marketability due to time at home with the couple’s children during the couple’s 18-year marriage, in finding that the presumption was rebutted was error because those factors are only relevant after an abuser overcomes the burden placed on her by §4325. The jurist wrote:

“In determining whether the presumption is rebutted, nothing in section 4325…precludes the trial court from considering the relevant factors set forth in section 4320 as ‘any other factors the court deems just and equitable.’ ”

She pointed out that §4230(i) lists “documented evidence of any history of domestic violence…between the parties” as one of the mandatory factors for consideration and opined:

“Subdivision (i) of section 4320 goes hand in hand with section 4325. Section 4325, subdivision (b)’s broad ‘just and equitable’ language permits consideration of the entire marital context. We see no error in the trial court’s interpretation of section 4325.”

Justices John Shepard Wiley Jr. and Matthew Scherb joined in the decision.

Divorce Proceedings

The question arose in divorce proceedings between Scott and Candice Traweek. The couple had married in 2003 and separated on May 12, 2021.

One week later, Candice Traweek filed a petition for dissolution of marriage, and, in June 2021, Scott Traweek initiated a separate action requesting a domestic violence restraining order (“DVRO”) based on a 2020 incident. During the family court proceedings, Candice Traweek admitted that she had pled guilty to misdemeanor domestic-violence charges in 2020 but submitted evidence that indicated that the couple had reconciled after the event.

Following trial, Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Diane M. Goodman issued a statement of decision on Nov. 2, 2023. As to spousal support, she declared:

“This court understands that the public policy behind Family Code Section 4325 is to not further injure the injured spouse by making them support the convicted spouse. However, in this case, [Candice Traweek] did not work the entire marriage and she has no current marketable skills….”

She pointed to evidence submitted that Scott Traweek had “with[held] of funds to pay bills during the marriage” and was “not completely innocent for the arguments during their marriage and clearly isn’t afraid of [his former wife] based on his conduct in reconciling with her after her criminal conviction.”

Goodman ordered Scott Traweek to pay $4,000 per month in spousal support “until October 31, 2029, or upon the death of either party, Candice’s remarriage, or further order of the court.”

Wrong Focus Alleged

On appeal, Scott Traweek argued that Goodman “committed legal error” by focusing on his ex-wife’s “supposed lack of marketable skills and longstanding absence from the workplace,” saying that the §4320 factors “are not meant to apply when there is a presumption under section 4325, at least not until after the presumption is rebutted.”

Saying that “[w]e disagree with Scott’s position and affirm the judgment,” Stratton reasoned:

“Section 4320, subdivision (i), together with section 4325, embody the principle that an award of spousal support to a party who has engaged in domestic violence is disfavored.”

However, she remarked:

“The question on appeal is whether the trial court erred in finding Candice rebutted the section 4325 presumption. We find no error in the trial court’s implementation of section 4325 and conclude that the trial court carefully weighed the evidence and acted within its discretion in finding the presumption rebutted.”

She continued:

“Section 4325 does not automatically bar or prohibit spousal support when the supported party has been convicted of domestic violence against the supporting spouse within the statutory time period; it creates a presumption that can be rebutted….The language of the statute expressly vests the trial court with broad equitable authority in evaluating ‘any other factors’ relevant to its determination to prohibit (or award) spousal support to the restrained spouse.”

Context Matters

The presiding justice said Goodman did not err in carefully considering the context surrounding the ex-wife’s conviction, saying:

“[S]ection 4325 was enacted partly to protect victims of domestic violence from having to financially support their abuser….However, if the protected party (Scott) repeatedly disregards the DVRO in place, voluntarily seeks contact from the restrained party (Candice), and flirts and behaves romantically towards the restrained party, the trial court could reasonably conclude that the equities of this particular case differ substantially from the ordinary domestic violence case. Scott’s conduct subsequent to the issuance of his requested DVRO substantially diminished the weight of the public policy concerns that section 4325 was designed to address.”

Stratton added:

“Scott argues that our affirmance of the underlying judgment would undermine the legislative policy of discouraging domestic violence. We disagree and believe that affirmance actually advances both legislative policies of protecting domestic violence victims and preventing a financially dependent spouse from becoming destitute after a long marriage….[T]he court limited Candice recovery by denying retroactive support and…setting a non-modifiable termination date, demonstrating that it gave meaningful effect to domestic violence considerations while still preventing an inequitable outcome.”

The case is In re Marriage of Traweek, 2026 S.O.S. 2763.

Acting for Candice Traweek were Karen D. Oakman of the Thousand Oaks firm of Clunen & Oakman Law LLP as well as Wendy C. Lascher of the Ventura office of Ferguson, Case, Orr & Paterson LLP. James D. Decker, Griffin R. Schindler, and Christopher M. Jones of the Manhattan Beach-based Decker Law represented Scott Traweek.