Thursday, May 28, 2026

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Court of Appeal:

Fee Award Valid Despite Redaction of Bases for Charges

Opinion Says Award to Husband in Dissolution of Marriage Case Was Proper, Reasoning That Details of Legal Services on Behalf of Wife in Ongoing Proceedings Might Reveal Confidential Information

By a MetNews Staff Writer

Div. Two of the First District Court of Appeal has affirmed an order to a woman who is suing for a divorce to pay $336,438 in attorney fees and costs already incurred by her husband, rejecting her contention that the reasonableness of the past bills for services cannot be gauged because all supporting information has been blotted out in the documents he provided.

The total award to the husband, Brian Miner, was $371,438.55 which included an award of future attorney fees, crediting $15,000 previously paid to him by his wife, Esther Khym. Only the previously incurred fees and costs were in contention.

Tuesday’s unpublished opinion by Justice Tara M. Desautels affirms an order by San Mateo Superior Court Judge Chinhayi Cadet. The award was made under Family Code §2030 which provides that “[i]n a proceeding for dissolution of marriage… the court shall ensure that each party has access to legal representation” and may order one party to pay the other party “whatever amount is reasonably necessary for attorney’s fees and for the cost of maintaining or defending the proceeding during the pendency of the proceeding.”

Largely as the result of receiving monies from her father’s trust, Khym had assets of $8.7 million.

‘Devoid’ of Information

Khym protested in her opening brief on appeal:

“Brian submitted billing statements that redacted every single billing entry, rendering them devoid of any meaningful detail….His declarations fail to describe the nature of the fees incurred, the reasons they were incurred, or why they were reasonably necessary….Moreover, Brian’s comments at the hearing provided no additional explanation or evidence regarding the reasonableness of the fees….This lack of evidence leaves the reasonableness of the fees unsupported.”

Desautels wrote:

“While Miner s redactions no doubt limited the court’s ability to conduct a line item review, we cannot say the redactions rendered the invoices insubstantial evidence under the circumstances.”

Supreme Court Decision

Citing the California Supreme Court’s 2016 decision in Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors v. Superior Court, she said the state’s high court “has recognized, ‘in active and ongoing litigation,’ attorney billing invoices may contain privileged information that is protected from disclosure.”

That case dealt with disclosability under the California Public Records Act of invoices to the county from outside legal counsel.

“Thus,” Desautels continued, “while redactions may be inappropriate when seeking postjudgment attorney’s fees, the current circumstances are distinguishable given the ongoing litigation.”

The justice added in a footnote:

“Of note, California Rules of Court, rule 5.427, which governs attorney’s fee requests under section 2030, does not require submission of billing invoices.”

Wife’s Fees

Khym also argued that Cadet erred in taking into account that her husband had incurred fees and costs in a lesser amount than the approximately $570,000 she had spent. She maintained:

“By emphasizing the disparity in fees between Brian and Esther, the court improperly shifted the focus from whether Brian’s fees were reasonable under the law to a superficial comparison of expenditures.

“This approach risks creating a vicious circle: a party who engages in overlitigation, bad faith conduct, or inefficiency can drive up the other side’s fees, which then provokes further responses and increased litigation from the first party. The result is a cycle of escalating fees that bears little connection to the reasonableness of the fees incurred. Allowing a mere fee comparison to justify an award rewards this cycle and undermines the purpose of fee-shifting statutes, which aim to ensure fairness, not incentivize excessive litigation.”

Desautels responded:

“Since we conclude the billing invoices and declarations constitute substantial evidence, we reject Khym’s argument that the court improperly considered the amount of her attorney’s fees. Unlike prevailing party attorney’s fees, the purpose of section 2030 is to level the playing field…. Here, we see no error in the court’s consideration of the parties’ respective litigation fees and costs as an overall check on reasonableness of the award or in direct response to Khym’s own claim that Miner engaged in overlitigation.”

The case is In re Marriage of Khym and Miner, A172209.