Metropolitan News-Enterprise

 

Tuesday, May 19, 2026

 

Page 3

 

Court of Appeal:

Hearing Motions in Limine Does Not Count as Starting Trial

Opinion Says Speedy Trial Rights Were Violated Where No Jurors Were Available Due to New Court Policy Not to Summon Potential Panelists on Mondays

 

By a MetNews Staff Writer

 

The Third District Court of Appeal held yesterday that a defendant’s speedy trial rights were violated where the case was called on the last day of the statutory window and the judge heard multiple motions in limine but put jury selection over for the next day due to a new court policy to not summon potential panelists on Mondays.

Saying that the impossibility of empaneling a jury undermined any assertion that the trial had begun, the court rejected the prosecutors’ contention that hearing the motions in limine and discussing evidentiary as well as instructional matters amounted to a sufficient “commitment of resources” to qualify as a commencement of the proceedings.

Acknowledging that the no-jurors-on-Mondays policy was purportedly adopted by the Siskiyou Superior Court in response to an alleged practice by the local public defender’s office of resolving cases on the day of trial, burning through potential panelists in the rural county, which is home to only approximately 34,000 adults, the court said that the strategy could not suffice as “good cause” for a continuance over the defendant’s objection.

Yesterday’s opinion, authored by Justice Laurie M. Earl and joined in by Justices Ronald B. Robie and Louis Mauro, declares:

“[S]etting the jury trial date on a date that no jury could be empaneled then claiming to start the trial by discussing last minute trial issues and procedures appears to be ‘mere lip service to the fundamental right to a speedy trial’…and constitutes an ‘imaginative way[] to avoid the clear intent of the Legislature as enunciated in the Penal Code.’…This is a practice we refuse to sanction.”

Drunk-Driving Charges

Arguing that his speedy trial rights were violated was Bobby Nuanmanee, who had been charged with misdemeanor violations of driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of Vehicle Code §§23152(a) and (b) on Aug. 30, 2024. He pled not guilty to the charges and, nearly one year later, on Oct. 20, 2025, withdrew a time waiver, asserting his right to proceed to trial.

Penal Code §1382, which sets forth a defendant’s statutory right to a speedy trial in California, provides in relevant part that a criminal defendant who has been charged with a misdemeanor and remains out of custody must be brought to trial within “45 days after the defendant’s arraignment or entry of the plea,” absent “good cause” for any delay.

Both parties agreed that the last day for trial was Monday, Dec. 15, 2025. On that day, Nuanmanee—who was represented by a deputy with the Siskiyou Public Defender’s Office—declared himself ready to proceed.

Siskiyou Superior Court Judge Kendall Hannon heard various motions in limine but put the remainder of the case over to the following day, despite the defendant’s objection, due to no potential jurors being present in the building.

On Dec. 16, he denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss based on §1382, finding that the trial commenced the previous day, when the “wheels…were set in motion,” and that there was good cause for any delay based on the court policy. Nuanmanee filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the Court of Appeal.

Yesterday’s decision grants the petition, declaring:

“Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing respondent superior court to vacate the order of December 16, 2025…denying Nuanmanee’s section 1382 motion to dismiss, and to…issue a new order granting that motion.”

Governing Case Law

Citing case law establishing that a court must have committed its resources to the case, the parties must be ready to proceed, and a panel of prospective jurors must be summoned and sworn in order for a trial to have “commenced” under §1382, Earl said:

“We are not persuaded by the People’s contention that by hearing motions in limine and discussing evidentiary issues and jury instructions the court indicated its readiness to try the case by committing its resources to it….We fail to see how the parties could be ready to proceed to a jury trial in any meaningful way without the availability of a jury.”

Turning to the question of good cause, she recognized that a wide variety of unforeseen events may meet the standard under §1382 but opined:

“Here, it is quite evident that improper court administration was the cause of the delay. As stated in the minute order, ‘The Court[’]s current practice made it unable to bring defendants to trial on 12/15/25.’ The court then found good cause to deny the motion to dismiss and continue the trial based on the fact that it was only a delay of one day and on the observation that ‘[t]he Court[’]s current practice is in play due to the Public Defender’s office continuously resolving cases on day of trial, which burns Jurors and Jury panels being lost and in a small county with a small jury poll, not feasible for the Court.’ ”

Judicial Comments

Saying that Hannon’s comments “blaming the public defender’s office for the court’s policy…are not well taken,” she continued:

“We have found no authority for….the proposition that an office’s practice of resolving cases on the day of trial, even at the expense of losing jury panels, justifies a good cause determination under these circumstances. While we acknowledge that an individual defendant may delay trial for his or her benefit and that delay may constitute good cause, nothing on the record indicates that Nuanmanee himself caused the delay for purposes of case settlement or delayed in any other way to his benefit. Rather, the delay was due to the court’s policy, which was an administrative response to apparent court culture.”

The presiding justice added:

“It is the state’s obligation to resolve the routine logistical difficulties it faces in bringing defendants to trial in a timely manner….Whatever the legitimacy of the court’s policy, it must be reconciled with a defendant’s right to speedy trial. If the last permissible day to bring a no time waiver case to trial falls on a Monday, when it would be impossible to empanel a jury, steps must be taken to bring the defendant to trial before that day or the prosecution risks dismissal.”

The case is Nuanmanee v. Superior Court, C105413.

 

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