Wednesday, September 30, 2026
Page 3
Court of Appeal:
Civil Contempt Statute Does Not Conflict With Family Code
Opinion Says Code of Civil Procedure Section Providing for Fees Only to Successful Complainants Does Not Gut Judicial Authority to Award Litigation Costs to Contemner as Sanction for Delaying Resolution
By a MetNews Staff Writer
Div. One of the Fourth District Court of Appeal has affirmed an order awarding $50,000 in sanctions to a husband who successfully defeated his wife’s attempt to have him found guilty of contempt in Family Court, rejecting the view that the award was invalid under a Code of Civil Procedure section that limits recovery of litigation costs associated with contempt proceedings to a successful complaining party.
The award was issued to Gautam Arora against his then-wife, Neha Arora, under Family Code §271—which provides for the recovery of attorney fees as a sanction for “any conduct” that “frustrates the policy” favoring settlement and reduced costs—based on findings that the contempt proceedings were predicated on issues that were already resolved in earlier litigation.
Neha Arora objected to the order based on Code of Civil Procedure §1218(a), which specifies:
“[A] person who is subject to a court order as a party to the action…who is adjudged guilty of contempt for violating that court order may be ordered to pay to the party initiating the contempt proceeding the reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred by this party in connection with the contempt proceeding.”
No Conflict
Justice Eran Marie Bermúdez authored Monday’s unpublished opinion, rejecting the view that the family-court order violated the terms of §1218. She wrote:
“Because Family Code section 271 sanctions are entirely unrelated to whether a party prevails, and neither rewards a prevailing party nor punishes a losing party, they do not interfere with the purposes of Code of Civil Procedure section 1218, subdivision (a)’s unilateral fee provision. Instead, each provision can be applied concurrently and may potentially come into play at different stages of the often-protracted litigation in family law cases….”
The question arose in divorce proceedings in which the parties filed cross-petitions for dissolution of their marriage and dueling requests for domestic violence temporary restraining orders (“DVTRO”) in June 2022. In 2023, San Diego Superior Court Judge Sharon L. Kalemkiarian ruled in favor of a permanent restraining order protecting Neha Arora, who alleged that Gautam Arora had on multiple occasions violated the terms of an earlier-issued DVTRO.
Affidavit of Contempt
A few days after the permanent order was entered, Neha Arora filed an affidavit of contempt based on the same violations of the DVTRO that she asserted during the earlier proceedings. After Kalemkiarian found Gautam Arora not guilty in 2024, Neha Arora moved for sanctions and sought a subpoena for certain communications related to one of the alleged restraining-order violations.
In January 2025, he responded by moving for sanctions of “no less than $200,000” under §271, noting that he had incurred significant legal fees “because of [his wife’s] insistence on re-litigating the same issues, multiple times.” Gautam Arora submitted an affidavit in support of his request, detailing costs associated with defending against the contempt action in addition to litigating the subpoena and sanctions issues.
Kalemkiarian rejected Neha Arora’s assertion that §1218 barred his request, saying that the motion for sanctions “may be related to contempt” but that the jurist was “look[ing] at the broader picture” under §271. On May 23, 2025, she issued the sanctions “for conduct which has impeded resolution of issues in the case, including the bringing of the contempt action.”
Reward for Prevailing
Bermúdez wrote:
“Family Code section 271 sanctions do not reward a party for prevailing at any stage of a family law litigation….[T]hey are intended to encourage efficiency in family matters by punishing bad faith behavior through application of sanctions for such conduct. In contrast, the unilateral fee provision of Code of Civil Procedure section 1218, subdivision (a) functions to reward prevailing complainants for winning a contempt claim and protects them from having to pay attorney fees to the contemner if they do not prevail. Because Family Code section 271 does not award fees to contemners for prevailing in a contempt action, there is simply no direct, irreconcilable conflict between Family Code section 271 and Code of Civil Procedure section 1218.”
She continued:
“[I]t is entirely possible that a party could pursue and win a contempt action in the context of family law litigation, entitling the prevailing complainant to fees, yet still be subject to sanctions under section 271 later in the suit related to those very same contempt proceedings. The result, in such a scenario, is not judicial imposition of reciprocal fees for the contempt action, but a furthering of the public policy of each statute: only a prevailing complainant may recover costs for prosecuting a contempt—they are still protected if their claim fails—but that complainant may be subject to some level of sanctions if the pursuit was made in bad faith.”
Rejecting Neha Arora’s contention that awarding attorney fees related to the contempt proceedings violated §1218, she remarked:
“Family Code section 271 sanctions cannot be characterized in this manner because they are not awarded when a contemner prevails in a contempt proceeding. Rather, they are awarded when the offending party exhibits obstreperous conduct that frustrates settlement and increases litigation costs.”
The case is Arora v. Arora, D086321.
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