Tuesday, July 7, 2026
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C.A. Sanctions, Then Forgives, Pro Per for Phony Citations
Opinion Recites That Self-Represented Parties Get No Special Treatment but Does Not Explain Lack of Penalty
By a MetNews Staff Writer
Div. Two of the Fourth District Court of Appeal has almost penalized a pro per appellant for filing a brief containing phony citations, apparently the product of artificial intelligence “hallucinations,” but, after ordering payment of $500 by her, declared that “[e]xecution of the sanction is suspended.”
Justice Frank J. Menetrez authored the unpublished opinion, filed Thursday. The underlying dispute having been settled, the sole issue was whether Trina R. Patterson of Rancho Cucamonga should be sanctioned.
“…Patterson’s opening brief contains citations to cases that do not exist, citations to cases that do not stand for the proposition cited, and quotations that do not appear in the authorities cited,” the jurist said, noting:
“Attorneys who have filed briefs containing citations to fabricated legal authority have been sanctioned….Pro se litigants have been warned of the same possible outcome.”
Such a warning came on March 19 in a Court of Appeal opinion from the First District’s Div. Four in Sheerer v. Panas. Explaining why no sanctions were being imposed on the respondent in the appeal from a child-support order, the court said that the party admitted his error and “it would not be in the best interest of the children at the heart of the underlying proceedings.”
Menetrez, by contrast, provided no explanation for letting Patterson off the hook.
Same Standard
He recited that “[s]elf-represented litigants are held to the same standards as attorneys,” noted that Patterson failed to file a response to an order to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed, did not personally appear at a hearing despite being ordered to do so, and asserted at a continued hearing that authority does, in fact exist, for a bizarre proposition she only backed up in her brief by a citation to a nonexistent case.
The justice wrote:
“We issued an order to show cause why Patterson should not be sanctioned for relying on fabricated legal authority in her opening brief. We conclude that Patterson failed to show cause why she should not be sanctioned. We accordingly impose sanctions in the amount of $500, but we suspend execution of the sanction.”
He said the court will dismiss the appeal based on the settlement but is issuing an opinion “for the purpose of providing context for the ruling on the order to show cause.”
Practicing Without License
Menetrez went on to point to the possibility that Patterson has been committing the unlawful practice of law (“UPL”), a misdemeanor. He quoted her as saying in a filing:
“For over 16 years. Appellant has assisted in preparing appellate briefs as a self-represented litigant and for other self-represented litigants without any prior citation errors or sanctions.”
He related that she also acknowledged such activity at oral argument, and wrote:
“It is possible that Patterson’s practice of preparing appellate briefs for self-represented litigants constitutes practicing law without a license….We accordingly refer the matter to the State Bar to conduct any investigation it deems appropriate.”
Its investigations, by a “UPL team,” can lead to a cease-and-desist letter, a court action to shut down operations where they are not terminated, and referring the matter to prosecutorial authorities.
Opening Brief
In her opening brief, Patterson insisted that the model Uniform Commercial Code and California’s version “afford private parties’ lawful procedures to settle disputes without court interference.” She said that where “a party fails to respond to presentments or affidavits”—such as those she served on the defendant—“a legal default occurs,” maintaining:
“Courts have recognized that the administrative process must be exhausted before judicial intervention.”
In support of that supposed rule, she cited Covina Healthcare v. Superior Court (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1241. No such case exists.
Defendant Nuvision Credit Union—which repossessed a car after Patterson failed to make payments—said in its brief:
“Patterson’s appeal rests upon the purported existence of a ‘pre-judicial administrative process’ in which Nuvision’s nonresponse to Patterson’s notices and affidavits supposedly lead to an automatic outcome adverse to Nuvision, and in turn the trial court had some kind of ministerial duty to confirm this outcome in response to Patterson’s petition….Patterson does not cite any case law for the existence of this fictional administrative process, apart from the fictional West Covina Healthcare case.”
Menetrez’s opinion came in Patterson v. Nuvision Credit Union, E085327.
June 23 Opinion
In Patterson v. Digital Federal Credit Union, decided by the Fourth District’s Div. Two on June 23, Menetrez made note of the appellant’s use of artificial intelligence. However, imposition of sanctions was not contemplated in that case (the facts of which closely resembled those in the one decided Thursday).
The opinion did have a stinging effect on the appellant in addition to an affirmance of a judgment dismissing her action after the sustaining of a demurrer without leave to amend. The justice declared:
“Given the frivolous nature of Patterson’s litigation in this case, and given Patterson’s claim that she has a 16-year litigation history, we direct the trial court on remand to consider whether to declare Patterson to be a vexatious litigant within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 391, subdivision (b), and whether to enter a prefiling order against her under Code of Civil Procedure section 391.7.”
He said the trial judge should consider the “opinion in this case” and take a look at four other specified cases.
“We express no opinion on how the trial court should rule,” Menetrez added.
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