Metropolitan News-Enterprise

 

Friday, January 2, 2026

 

Page 3

 

Court of Appeal:

Resentencing Need Not Result in ‘Meaningful Modification’

Opinion Says Uncodified Legislative Note Calling for Reconsideration to Result in Practical Change Is Not Binding on Courts, No Error in Reducing Sentence from 369 to 225 Years in Prison

 

By Kimber Cooley, associate editor

 

Div. One of this district’s Court of Appeal has held that resentencing initiated under the catchall provision allowing for reconsideration of a term of imprisonment based on any legislative changes need not result in a “meaningful modification” of the sentence, rejecting the defendant’s assertion that a trial judge abused his discretion in reducing his sentence from 369 to 225 years to life in prison because the reduction does not carry any practical weight. 

At issue is Penal Code §1172.1, which was amended as of Jan. 1, 2024 to provide that a trial court “may…recall the sentence and commitment previously ordered and resentence the defendant in the same manner as if they had not previously been sentenced” upon its own motion or based on “the recommendation of [the secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation].”

Under the statutory scheme, the new sentence must be “no greater than the initial” one, and the court “shall apply…any changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion” as well as consider postconviction factors and changes in circumstances such as age and diminished physical condition. If the proceedings are prompted by a recommendation by the secretary, a presumption in favor of resentencing applies.

A legislative statement of intent attached to the uncodified portion of the bill proposing the amendment specifies that “[i]t is the intent of the Legislature that…the resentencing result in a meaningful modification,” which is defined as an actual alteration in circumstances, such as an earlier release or a newly acquired right to review by the Board of Parole Hearings.

Justice Helen I. Bendix authored Tuesday’s opinion, joined in by Presiding Justice Frances Rothschild and Justice Michelle C. Kim, saying:

“We…cannot ignore that the Legislature could have, but did not, include the statement of intent in the operative text of section 1172.1. Defendant is asking us to read into the statute language the Legislature expressly relegated to an uncodified portion of the enacting legislation. This [violates established rules of statutory construction].”

String of Robberies

Asserting error in his modified sentence was James Brammer, who was sentenced to more than 300 years to life in prison after a jury convicted him of 13 counts of robbery in 2012, crimes he committed at 57 years old while he was on parole for another series of robberies. In imposing the sentence, the trial court found that he had suffered three prior strike convictions and imposed additional time for having served prison time under a now-defunct enhancement.

In December 2022, the secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation sent a letter to the Los Angeles Superior Court recommending that Brammer be resentenced based on legislative changes that authorize a trial judge to strike prior serious felony convictions or the prison-prior enhancements in the interests of justice.

The letter cited Brammer’s conduct in prison, which includes three violations as well as positive factors such as a grade report showing his performance in college courses to be “excellent.” Counsel for the defendant was appointed and requested a time-served sentence.

At a Feb. 8, 2024 resentencing hearing, Los Angeles Superior Court Judge David W. Stuart struck various enhancements but left the Three Strikes sentence in place, saying:

“[I]t wasn’t a close call back in 2013 when [defendant] was sentenced, and it’s still not a close call on the [Three Strikes] issue. He served a…18-year sentence for a string of robberies, [and] was on parole when he committed an even longer string of robberies in our current case….

“And as far as aging out of being a risk to commit future crimes, [defendant] was 57, I believe, when the current crimes were committed, so for all those reasons, the [motion to strike the strikes] is denied.”

Do Not Confer Power

Bendix said:

“Uncodified statements of intent ‘do not confer power, determine rights, or enlarge the scope of a measure,’ although they ‘properly may be utilized as an aid in construing a statute.’…That said, ‘[i]f the statutory language contains no ambiguity, the Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the statute governs,’ with no need for ‘judicial construction.’ ”

Pointing out that the statute provides a court with discretion to resentence, she opined:

“[T]he plain language of section 1172.1 does not require the trial court to recall a defendant’s sentence at all, much less reduce it by any particular amount. Rather, the statute states the court ‘may’ recall the sentence, and ‘may’ ‘[r]educe a defendant’s term of imprisonment.’ ”

The defendant acknowledged that uncodified sections have “no independent power” but asserted that the court should apply the spirit behind the statement of intent to prevent an “absurd’ result, arguing that “the Secretary did not go to the trouble of issuing a recall recommendation just to turn an elderly inmate’s three-century sentence into a two-century sentence.”

Addressing this contention, the jurist wrote:

“[The secretary’s] recommendation allowed defendant to obtain counsel and seek reconsideration of his original sentence in light of changes in the law and defendant’s postconviction history. That the reconsideration did not turn out as defendant hoped did not make the…recommendation meaningless—it provided defendant with a chance at resentencing he otherwise would not have had.”

As to Brammer’s contention that his new sentence is substantively unreasonable because punishment is not listed in §1172.1 as one of the factors to be considered at resentencing, she remarked:

“We reject defendant’s argument that punishment is not a proper consideration under section 1172.1 merely because it is not expressly listed among the factors courts ‘shall’ consider.”

The case is People v. Brammer, 2025 S.O.S. B336058.

The California Supreme Court is likely to have the final say on the issue, having granted review of last year’s unpublished decision by the Fifth District Court of Appeal in People v. Andrews, in which that court came to the same conclusion as Div. One. The high court framed the issues at stake as including whether “the trial court abuse[d] its discretion by resentencing defendant to the same effective term.”

 

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