Wednesday, September 16, 2026
Page 4
Court of Appeal:
Bar to Relief Sought Did Not Justify Discharge of Counsel
Opinion Says It Was Structural Error to Relieve Attorney, Who Was Appointed to Handle Post-Judgment Petition Seeking Hearing for Which Client Was Statutorily Ineligible, Without First Informing Defendant, Drawing Dissent
By Kimber Cooley, associate editor
A divided panel of Div. Two of the Fourth District Court of Appeal has held that it was structural error for a judge to grant an attorney’s request to be relieved from his post-judgment appointment, and to take a motion off calendar, without first giving notice to the defendant even if the lawyer correctly pointed out to the court that his client is statutorily ineligible for the relief he sought.
The question arose after Jose Guadalupe Flores Jr. was sentenced to two consecutive terms of life without the possibility of parole in 2001 for multiple counts of premediated murder, among other charges, relating to a 1994 shooting outside a Riverside liquor store that occurred when the defendant was 20 years old.
In August 2022, Flores submitted a motion under the 2016 California Supreme Court decision of People v. Franklin and its progeny, which hold that a defendant who commits a crime before his 26th birthday is entitled to seek evidence-preservation as to whether he might qualify for early release via a “youth offender parole hearing” under Penal Code §3051 even if the judgment of conviction is final.
Sec. 3051, which was enacted in 2013, provides that such youth-offender parole hearings are unavailable in “cases in which an individual is sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for a controlling offense that was committed after the person had attained 18 years of age.”
Denial of Notice
Justice Richard T. Fields authored the majority opinion, joined in by Acting Presiding Justice Carol D. Codrington, saying:
“The denial of notice and an opportunity to respond deprived defendant of the opportunity to make a record regarding his appointed counsel’s request to be relieved. Had defendant been given the opportunity to respond, he may well have made an offer of proof to clarify the basis of his Franklin motion, consented to the request to be relieved but requested appointment of substitute counsel, or indicated a desire to proceed with the hearing on his Franklin motion in pro per. Any one of these possibilities would influence an analysis of prejudice with respect to the order relieving counsel. Because we cannot fairly assess what the outcome might have been in the absence of error, reversal of the order relieving counsel is required.”
Dissenting, Justice Frank J. Menetrez pointed out that “[t]he only pending proceeding as to Flores was his request for a hearing” under Franklin and that “Flores is ineligible for such a hearing, because he is serving a sentence of life without the possibility of parole and is consequently ineligible for youth offender parole under Penal Code section 3051.” Under those circumstances, the jurist opined:
“[T]he alleged error in relieving counsel without prior notice to defendant…is not structural and is harmless under any standard.”
Counsel Appointed
On March 15, 2024, Riverside Superior Court Judge John D. Malloy appointed counsel to represent Flores and set a hearing to decide whether Flores was entitled to a full hearing on the issue of evidence preservation, saying that “[i]t appears, at least on its face, [defendant] was 20 years old at the time” and “would fit within the provisions of Franklin.” The name of the attorney or office appointed is not available on the superior court website.
A few months later, the appointed lawyer filed a request to be relieved and to have the motion taken off calendar, citing the 2024 Supreme Court decision in People v. Hardin, which held that the exclusion in §3051 for prisoners serving terms for life without the possibility of parole passes constitutional muster. Retired Riverside Superior Court Judge David A. Gunn, ostensibly sitting by assignment, granted both requests on Aug. 9, 2024.
Fields recognized that Flores appears to be statutorily ineligible for the relief for which he sought legal representation and that the Hardin decision foreclosed any facial challenge to §3051. However, he said:
“While the California Supreme Court has concluded that section 3051’s ‘exclusion of offenders who are serving sentences of life in prison without the possibility of parole for a crime committed after the age of 18 from youth offender parole eligibility’ is not facially unconstitutional, it expressly left the door open to…‘as-applied challenges based on particular special circumstances or the factual circumstances of individual cases.’ ”
He added:
“Hardin is not authority for the proposition that we can categorically deem all claims brought by persons who are statutorily ineligible for a youth offender parole eligibility hearing without merit even without an examination of the basis and nature of the claim asserted.”
Continuation of Services
The jurist noted that Code of Civil Procedure §§284 and 285 provide that a criminal attorney is generally required to continue with his services until he is released by the client or relieved by the court upon notice to the defendant. He wrote:
“The trial court conducted a hearing and granted the request the day after it was filed. There is nothing in the record to show that defendant received any notice of appointed counsel’s request to be relieved. Nor was defendant present at the hearing. Such a procedure clearly violated defendant’s right to due process.”
He also took issue with the fact that two different judges touched on the issue, saying:
“[T]he question of whether defendant had established a prima facie showing sufficient to entitle him to appointment of counsel was already considered and decided by the first judge. Even if that determination was erroneous, the second judge could not relieve counsel by purportedly reviewing the sufficiency of defendant’s prima facie showing anew and determining that it was inadequate to warrant appointment of counsel. Doing so would have constituted an impermissible reconsideration.”
Acknowledging that the notice “issue normally arises” in this context after a defendant seeks “to discharge or substitute counsel when disagreements” between the attorney and the client arise, he said:
“But the principle [that notice is required] is equally applicable here. If a trial court cannot presume that a defendant’s contentions are unmeritorious and must give the defendant an opportunity to present argument and evidence when the defendant raises the prospect of a disagreement with appointed counsel, the trial court should not be able to make that same presumption against a defendant merely because the disagreement is first raised by appointed counsel.”
Menetrez’s View
Menetrez wrote:
“Flores points out that although the categorical exclusion of defendants serving life without parole does not facially violate equal protection…, as-applied equal protection challenges are still possible….But Flores has never explained how he might be able to present a colorable as-applied challenge. He was sentenced to life without parole because the multiple-murder special-circumstance allegation was found true, and the allegation was found true because he was convicted of two murders—he shot the two victims dead because he thought that a member of their group had insulted him.”
He added:
“Flores has not attempted to show that exclusion from youth offender parole of defendants serving life without parole for the multiple-murder special circumstance is unconstitutional as applied to him. In the absence of such a showing, I see no way that the alleged error in relieving counsel could have been prejudicial. Sending this case back to the trial court with directions to reappoint counsel will lead to the same conclusion that the trial court already reached: Flores’s request for a Franklin hearing will be denied, and the matter will be taken off calendar.”
The case is People v. Flores, E084536.
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