Friday, August 28, 2026
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California Supreme Court:
Peremptory Strike May Not Be Contested Under RJA Scheme
Opinion Says 2020 Law Does Not Provide Avenue to Upend Conviction, Kicking Off Sole Juror of Suspect’s Race Is Insufficient by Itself to State Prima Facia Case of Bias Under Batson/Wheeler; Evans, Liu Dissent
By a MetNews Staff Writer
A divided California Supreme Court has held that the 2020 law aimed at eliminating racial bias in the criminal justice system does not provide an avenue to challenge a conviction based on the prosecutor’s use of a peremptory strike to dismiss a prospective juror, saying that the Legislature chose to create a different statutory scheme, found at Code of Civil Procedure 231.7, to address bias in the jury-selection system.
Although both pieces of legislation were enacted in 2020 to address concerns of unconscious bias, the distinction matters because the Racial Justice Act (“RJA”) provides for retroactive application while §231.7 is prospective only.
For older cases, courts must address asserted discrimination in voir dire through the old so-called “Batson/Wheeler” framework under which a defendant must raise a prima facie case of bias before the prosecutor is asked to provide racially-neutral reasons for the strike.
Saying that the RJA’s plain terms do not address circumstances in which bias is directed at parties other than a criminal defendant, Chief Justice Patricia Guerrero, writing for the majority, declared:
“[W]e conclude that the RJA does not apply to the questioning of or exercise of a peremptory challenge of a prospective juror. Both the language of the statute, and the Legislature’s intent, reflect that it chose to address peremptory challenges in a statutory scheme separate and apart from the RJA. We therefore conclude that defendant’s claim regarding the prosecutor’s questioning of a prospective juror and use of a peremptory challenge, standing alone, is not cognizable under the RJA.”
Joining in the opinion were Justices Carol A. Corrigan, Leondra R. Kruger, Joshua P. Groban, and Justice Carin T. Fujisaki of Div. Three of the First District Court of Appeal, sitting by assignment.
Dissenting Opinions
Justice Kelli Evans penned a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Goodwin H. Liu, writing:
“[T]oday’s opinion decides that what the Legislature actually intended was to create a silent, nontextual exemption under the RJA for discriminatory peremptory challenges. Under this exception, courts adjudicating RJA claims must turn a blind eye to discriminatory peremptories.”
She also took issue with the court’s finding that the challenged peremptory survived Batson/Wheeler scrutiny where the dismissed party was the only Black potential juror left after for-cause dismissals. Pointing out that the case involved the brutal murder and rape of a young White woman by a Black man, against whom the prosecution admitted evidence of racially-charged remarks accompanying purported previous sexual assaults by the suspect, she said:
“The prosecutor’s immediate removal of the lone Black prosecutive juror—in a case that was highly racially fraught with a special risk of discriminatory animus—raised an inference of discrimination….Thus, the trial court’s failure to require the prosecutor to state his reasons for the prospective juror’s removal violated [the defendant’s] right to a fair and impartial jury.”
Liu also wrote a dissenting opinion, with which Evans concurred, taking issue with the majority’s conclusion that the prosecutor’s references during the 2004 trial to the O.J. Simpson case, in responding during argument to defense accusations of tainted DNA evidence, either did not violate the RJA or were harmless. He said:
“Referencing the Simpson case so close to guilt deliberations and shortly after commenting on the racially charged nature of [the defendant’s] crimes significantly risked priming the all-White jury to not let another Black man accused of murdering a White woman ‘get away with it.’ This is precisely the kind of implicit appeal to racial bias that courts must no longer tolerate.”
First-Degree Murder
The questions arose in an automatic appeal from a judgment of death imposed on Larry Hazlett Jr. for the 1978 rape and murder of his Rosamond-area neighbor, Tana Woolley. After DNA evidence collected from the scene was tested in 1999, a jury found him guilty of first-degree murder and found true two special circumstance allegations.
Kern Superior Court Judge Michael Bush sentenced him to death in July 2004.
Addressing Hazlett’s argument that the prosecutor’s kicking of a potential panelist, who was identified in the opinion as “A.E.,” violated the RJA, Guerrero pointed out that the act only refers to bias exhibited toward a defendant and opined:
“Although the dissent finds this view to be ‘cramped’….[i]t is clear this language means such bias or animus was directed toward the defendant and by reason of the defendant’s race…rather than toward a prospective juror or by reason of the prospective juror’s race….Because a prosecutor’s exercise of a peremptory challenge is not an action taken against a defendant but rather against a prospective juror, we conclude that the exercise of a peremptory challenge, standing alone, does not exhibit the requisite bias or animus…within the scope of this provision of the RJA.”
She acknowledged that “legislative materials associated with subsequent amendments to the RJA include some references to discrimination in jury selection” but said “[w]e do not believe these references demonstrate that the Legislature intended for the RJA to apply to the exercise of peremptory challenges, in spite of omitting a subdivision that would expressly so provide.”
Death-Penalty Views
Considering the prosecutor’s exercise of the peremptory challenge against A.E. under the Batson/Wheeler framework, Guerrero pointed out that that the dismissed potential juror had made conflicting statements about the death penalty, at one point indicting a reluctance to vote in favor of such a sentence in light of cases in which later-discovered evidence has proven the innocence of some suspects who were sentenced to die. She wrote:
“Based on an independent review of the record, we conclude that the totality of the circumstances surrounding the prosecution’s excusal of A.E. do not support an inference of discrimination.”
In a footnote, she added:
“The dissent contends that, unlike ‘other courts,’ ‘this court has not yet had occasion to consider’ a ‘per se rule that striking the last remaining juror of a defendant’s race is unlawful.’…But we have adopted a well-established framework, and it does not treat any factor—including striking the last remaining juror of a defendant’s race—as dispositive. We see no basis to depart from our settled case law which considers whether a totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.”
Evan’s Dissent
Saying that “[t]he facts of this case provided fertile ground for the operation of either conscious or unconscious bias ‘towards the defendant,’ ” Evans argued:
“The Legislature unequivocally specified that its purposes in enacting the RJA was ‘to eliminate racial bias from California’s criminal justice system’ and ‘to ensure that race plays no role at all in seeking or obtaining convictions or in sentencing.’…Thus, any construction of the RJA creating a gap that allows a particular form of racial discrimination to persist should strongly be disfavored.”
She asserted that “[t]he particular exemption that the majority opinion creates—for discriminatory peremptory challenges—is even more difficult to accept” and said:
“In our democratic system, the significance of serving on a jury cannot be understated. ‘Other than voting, serving on a jury is the most substantial opportunity that most citizens have to participate in the democratic process.’…‘Taints of discriminatory bias in jury selection—actual or perceived—erode confidence in the adjudicative process, undermining the public’s trust in courts.’ ”
Addressing the Batson/Wheeler analysis, she pointed out that “sister states that have adopted a per se rule” and “there is ample federal case law recognizing the significance of striking the last remaining juror of a defendant’s race.” She added:
“[T]he prosecutor used his first peremptory strike to effectively remove all Black jurors from the venire and immediately accepted an all-White jury. While recognizing this factor as significant, today’s opinion fails to attribute proper significance to the prosecutor’s conduct….The prosecutor’s conduct raised an inference of a discriminatory motive: to achieve an all-White jury. The jury’s all-White composition ‘serves as standalone evidence to inform our step-one analysis,’ and it is ‘particularly germane where the case was racially charged.’ ”
The case is People v. Hazlett, 2026 S.O.S. 2702.
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