Monday, June 15, 2026
Page 3
Court of Appeal:
Black Prospective Juror Bumped for Impermissible Reason
Dissatisfaction With Sentence in Unrelated Case Was Presumptively Not Cause for Peremptory Challenge
By a MetNews Staff Writer
Div. Three of the First District Court of Appeal on Friday reversed the conviction of a Black male for human trafficking and pimping because a venireperson, who is of the same race, was excused primarily based on having voiced during voir dire his disgruntlement that the assailant of his son and grandson had received only a light jail sentence.
That, Justice Carin T. Fujisaki said in an unpublished opinion, was violative of Code of Civil Procedure §231.7 which renders certain reasons for peremptory challenges presumptively invalid. One of those reasons, under subd. (e)(1), is that the prospective juror “[e]xpressing a distrust of or having a negative experience with law enforcement or the criminal legal system.”
The prosecutor, in responding to defense counsel’s objection to the challenge, said her “main” reason was that the prospective juror, “R.M.,” was dissatisfied with the outcome of a criminal proceeding, but also cited his failure to disclose, in response to the jury questionnaire, that he had been the defendant in three criminal cases.
San Mateo Superior Court Judge Amarra Lee noted that R.M. appeared to be of the same race as defendant Dwayne Robinson but that there was no “substantial likelihood that an objectively reasonable person would view cognizable group membership as a factor in the use of this challenge.”
The jury convicted Robinson and Lee sentenced him to 14 years in prison for human trafficking count, with the pimping count drawing a three-year concurrent sentence.
Presumption Not Rebutted
In her opinion reversing the conviction, Fujisaki said that Lee “erred in overruling the objection because the record did not contain clear and convincing evidence rebutting the presumptive invalidity of the challenge.”
She wrote:
“[T]he prosecutor’s exercise of a peremptory challenge against R.M. was based explicitly and (primarily on his past negative experience with the criminal justice system, a presumptively invalid reason under section 231.7(e)(1), and the record lacked clear and convincing evidence that the challenge was not due to conscious or unconscious bias but instead bore on his ability to be a fair and impartial juror. That the prosecutor offered a secondary and facially neutral reason for peremptorily challenging R.M. is beside the point because she did not overcome the statutory presumption of invalidity of her primary reason….Thus, Robinson’s objection to the peremptory challenge was erroneously overruled, and prejudicially so.”
Mandatory Reversal
Reversal is mandated by subs. (j) of §231.7 where provisions of the statute are violated. Fujisaki observed in a footnote that the Attorney General’s Office is not contesting, in the present case, the automatic-reversal proviso, but said:
“We note, however, that certain individual justices believe the methodology of section 231.7. subdivision (j). is unconstitutional because it ‘usurps’ our state constitutional ‘miscarriage of justice’ standard which requires an examination of the entire record before reversal.”
Art. VI, §13 of the state Constitution provides:
“No judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted, in any cause, on the ground of misdirection of the jury, or of the improper admission or rejection of evidence, or for any error as to any matter of pleading, or for any error as to any matter of procedure, unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.”
That issue is presently before the California Supreme Court which on Dec. 18, 2024, granted review in People v. SanMiguel. On Oct. 8, 2024, Court of Appeal Justice Kenneth Yegan of this district’s Six on Oct. 8, 2024, in a concurring opinion in that case, said:
“The legislative attack upon the California Constitution and the separation of power theory of government continues. This time, the Legislature dictates, in the context of empaneling a criminal jury trial, that the dismissal of a juror for perceived racial basis, is to be viewed wearing ‘horse blinders.’ The ‘micromanagement’ of section 231.7, subdivision (j) violates separation of powers jurisprudence. It is akin to statute telling a plumber how much torque is required when using a pipe wrench.”
Racial Justice Act
The 2020 Racial Justice Act—which prohibits convictions and sentences based on “race, ethnicity, or national origin” (while §231.7 is confined to juror disqualifications)—was augmented by a 2021 law providing for automatic reversal. However, on June 2, the California Supreme Court narrowed the rule somewhat, saying:
“We conclude that, at least with respect to cases tried to judgment before the RJA took effect, the use of language that implicitly appeals to racial bias is not grounds for reversal if People can show that the use of such language was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Friday’s decision came in People v. Robinson, A170472.
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