Friday, July 31, 2026
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Losing Party May Be Ordered to Pay Fees of Disbarred Lawyer in Role of Paralegal—C.A.
Justices Uphold Ruling Saying That $500-Per-Hour Rate L.A. Attorney Charged Prior to Being Shorn of Law License Is No Longer Reasonable Amount
By a MetNews Staff Writer
Div. One of the Court of Appeal for this district has affirmed an award of $356,223 in favor judgment creditors to compensate them for fees and costs they have paid in an effort to get the defendants to pay up on some of the more than $2.6 million awarded in 2021 in a fraud action, rejecting the contention that the trial judge impermissibly ordered remuneration for work done by a disbarred lawyer.
Wednesday’s opinion by Presiding Justice Frances Rothschild upholds a ruling that some payment for services by a person stripped of a law license, acting under supervision of an attorney, is appropriate, but at a reasonable rate for a paralegal, not at the $500-per-hour level that was charged by the then-attorney in Los Angeles County prior to his disbarment.
Spouses Sammy and Anke Ciling, each acting in pro per, argued on appeal that Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Alison Mackenzie abused her discretion in ordering that they pay fees and costs to Seyedjalil Firoozabadi and his company, Hope and Trust Trading, Inc., with 54% of the sum being attributable to efforts by Michael P. Rubin, whose disbarment by the California Supreme Court was ordered on June 21, 2021.
The award was made pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §685.040 which provides:
“The judgment creditor is entitled to the reasonable and necessary costs of enforcing a judgment. Attorney’s fees incurred in enforcing a judgment are not included in costs collectible under this title unless otherwise provided by law. Attorney’s fees incurred in enforcing a judgment are included as costs collectible under this title if the underlying judgment includes an award of attorney’s fees to the judgment creditor….”
A component of the $2,640,584.84 judgment in 2021 was an award of attorney fees, pursuant to a fee-shifting agreement.
Trial Court Ruling
Mackenzie ruled on Nov. 12, 2025, that while the plaintiffs are “permitted to recover fees for services Rubin performed” under Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 5.3.1—which says that an unlicensed person may help a lawyer “perform research, drafting or clerical activities—“such services are not attorney services, but paralegal services.”
She continued:
“Therefore, the Court finds Rubin’s requested rate of $500 an hour unreasonable. As Rubin acknowledges, that was his rate when he was a licensed attorney, authorized to practice law….As a paralegal, the Court concludes that a reasonable hourly rate is $200 per hour….
“The billing records…show that Rubin billed a total of 969.70 hours. Applying a paralegal rate of $200 per hour, this yields $193,940 in fees (down from $484,850).”
Reasonableness of the $500 per-hour fee of the plaintiffs’/respondents lawyer, Debbie Sutz of Hidden Hills, a sparsely populated city in the San Fernando Valley, was not in dispute.
Appellants’ Contention
The Cilings maintained on appeal that Mackenzie erred in referring to Rubin as a “paralegal.”
They argued:
Business and Professions Code sections 6125 and 6126 prohibit unauthorized practice of law.
Although limited clerical or preparatory assistance may be permissible under Rule 5.3.1 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, the record reflects far more extensive litigation participation than purely clerical support.
“A disbarred or resigned attorney may not continue to perform services that amount to practicing law under another label….Thus, the issue is not merely the hourly rate assigned to Rubin, but whether the compensated work crossed the line from permissible clerical assistance into legal work.
“The record further reflects Rubin’s substantial involvement in litigation activity connected to the enforcement proceedings, including extensive strategic and litigation-support functions over nearly one thousand billed hours.
“Appellants repeatedly advised the trial court that Rubin personally appeared at hearings, participated alongside counsel, attended proceedings remotely, and engaged in extensive litigation-related activities extending beyond ordinary clerical support.”
The appellants cited authority for the proposition that fees charged for legal services by a person who is not licensed to practice law are not recoverable.
Firoozabadi and his corporation countered:
“Here, the court accepted Respondents’ showing that Rubin’s compensated activities were limited to preparatory, research, drafting, and other support tasks permitted under Cal. Rules of Prof. Conduct, rule 5.3.1. It then assigned those tasks a paralegal rate. That is an ordinary fee-setting determination, not a legal error.”
Rothschild’s Opinion
Rothschild wrote:
“As relevant here. Sutz attested that Rubin had ‘performed investigation, research, and extensive writing,’ and that his ‘services ha[d] been performed under [Sutz’s] supervision’ ‘in strict compliance with California State Bar rules.’ Rubin submitted a declaration in which he likewise attested: ‘I have assisted Ms. Sutz in this case from the time she was initially hired.... As an unlicensed attorney, I am authorized, under State Bar rules, to conduct support work like investigation, legal research, and waiting. The work I performed in this case has been limited to those areas.’ ”
She went on to say that “the Cilings cite no specific entries in the billing records (or any other specific portions of the appellate record) supporting that Rubin’s work for” the respondents “constituted the unauthorized practice of law.”
The presiding justice quoted a 1998 Court of Appeal opinion from the First District’s Div. Three in Estate of Condon as saying: “Nonmembers of the California State Bar may recover fees for sendees that nonattorneys may legally perform, and made reference to Rule 5.3.1(c).”
The case is Hope and Trust Trading v. Ciling, B351756.
In 2018, a jury acquitted Sammy Ciling on 17 counts of money laundering and six counts of grand theft.
The State Bar Court, in recommending the disbarment of Rubin, pointed to two incidences of prior discipline that did not prove effective in deterring his misconduct and, presently, “multiple acts of misconduct, including failing to pay and report judicial sanctions, threatening to report suspected immigration status, failing to maintain client funds, failing to promptly pay client funds, commingling, and failing to avoid adverse interests.”
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