Wednesday, April 22, 2026
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Bumping Prospective Juror Leads to Reversal of Conviction
Court of Appeal Says Code of Civil Procedure §231.7 Required Better Explanation by Judge Than Was Given of Why Challenge Was Allowed Where Venireman Said He Had Been Unfairly Arrested, but Still Could Be Fair
By a MetNews Staff Writer
The Sixth District Court of Appeal has reversed the felony conviction of a man for driving under the influence based on the prosecution’s peremptory challenge to a Hispanic prospective juror who recounted a negative experience with law enforcement but said he would be fair and impartial, finding inadequate the judge’s explanation of why he was honoring the challenge.
At issue in the unpublished opinion, filed Monday, was whether Code of Civil Procedure §231.7, enacted in 2020, requires invalidation of the conviction of Michael Alex Solis. Under the statute, any error is deemed to be prejudicial, requiring reversal.
Sec. 231.7(a) declares:
“A party shall not use a peremptory challenge to remove a prospective juror on the basis of the prospective juror’s race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national origin, or religious affiliation, or the perceived membership of the prospective juror in any of those groups.”
Subd. (e) says:
“A peremptory challenge for any of the following reasons is presumed to be invalid unless the party exercising the peremptory challenge can show by clear and convincing evidence that an objectively reasonable person would view the rationale as unrelated to a prospective juror’s race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national origin, or religious affiliation, or perceived membership in any of those groups, and that the reasons articulated bear on the prospective juror’s ability to be fair and impartial in the case:”
One of the prohibited reasons is “[e]xpressing a distrust of or having a negative experience with law enforcement or the criminal legal system.”
‘Unfair’ Arrest
During voir dire, the prosecution used a peremptory challenge to excuse Juror 59 who said he was “unfairly” arrested 10 years earlier, but remarked:
“It was a bad experience, but I’m not one to say just because it was a bad experience. Tin going to be judging everyone. I’m not making sense, but the credibility for everyone will be the same. Doesn’t matter if it’s a witness, cop. police officer.”
Explaining her challenge, the prosecutor pointed to the venireman’s experience with law enforcement, remarking:
“He did say that he could be fair, but he—even though he said that, it’s—how do I word it. It’s not only what he says, your Honor, but how he says it, and the followup stuff that he said, that kind of led me to believe that he wouldn’t be fair to the People.”
Trial Judge’s Reasoning
Monterey Superior Court Judge Mark Hood allowed the challenge, saying:
“The People have set forth what I see as the basis for excluding this juror is because of his experience with law enforcement….
“His words were consistent with what the Court wanted to hear, but the Court could see he was struggling in some fashion with explaining how he could be fair and neutral, despite this.
“Although I cannot agree or disagree with the People’s assessment of that, it appears Although I cannot agree or disagree with the People’s assessment of that, it appears that he was having some struggle. There was clearly some struggling, some hesitation, some pausing in between answering the question and saying that he could be fair and impartial, so it is in fact a reasonable inference that he was uncomfortable with the concept of being fair and reasonable.”
The judge went on to say:
“Although there is a presumption that a bad experience with an officer is an insufficient basis alone. I find that the People have overcome that presumption based upon the juror’s own responses and based upon the Court’s observation of that juror’s response, and based upon a comparative analysis. I do not find that this juror’s race played a factor—not even a substantial factor. I do not find it played a factor in his exclusion, the exercise of the peremptory challenge.”
Appeals Court’s Decision
The explanation wasn’t good enough, Justice Charles E. Wilson said. He wrote:
“The court’s comments do not appear to have been a confirmation of the reason given by the prosecutor under section 231.7. subdivision (e) because the court stated it could not ‘agree or disagree with the People’s assessment’ of Juror 59’s behavior. Because the trial court’s comments were not directed at confirming a proper basis asserted by the party exercising the peremptory challenge, they do not satisfy section 231.7. subdivision (e).”
Wilson said that Hood’s “comments did not reflect an analytical framework consistent with the statute or more specifically how there was ‘clear and convincing evidence’ ” that the average person would not perceive the challenge to be race-related. The jurist continued:
“In its analysis, we note that the trial court appears to have been focused on indications that the prosecutor’s challenge was motivated by purposeful discrimination, thereby failing to appreciate the fact that section 231.7’s purpose is to combat both purposeful discrimination as well as unconscious bias.”
He commented:
“In reaching our conclusion that the relevant standards have not been met under section 231.7. we also find it necessary to indicate that our determination is not equivalent to a finding that the prosecutor was in fact motivated by racial or ethnic bias in using the peremptory challenge related to Juror 59. Rather, our decision is a reminder to practitioners of the importance of making an appropriate and complete record of reasons for exercising a peremptory challenge under section 231.7. subsection (c). It is also a reminder to the trial courts that the Legislature has set forth a very specific process and framework when an objection to the exercise of a peremptory challenge is made under the statute.”
Solis had pled guilty to a second count: the misdemeanor of driving with a license that had been suspended due to a previous drunk-driving conviction. Wilson said that if the defendant is retried on the felony count, the trial court is to reinstitute the misdemeanor conviction.
The case is People v. Solis, H050913.
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