Union Hearing Is ‘Official Proceeding’ for Anti-SLAPP Law

Monday, June 29, 2026

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Court of Appeal:

Union Hearing Is ‘Official Proceeding’ for Anti-SLAPP Law

Opinion Rejects View That Private Nature of Disciplinary Process, Lack of Statutory Authority Renders Procedure ‘Unofficial,’ Says Fact That Regulations Call for Due Process Is Enough to Qualify

By Kimber Cooley, associate editor

Div. Five of this district’s Court of Appeal has held that union disciplinary hearings are “official proceedings” within the meaning of California’s anti-SLAPP law, rejecting the view that they are outside the ambit of “protected activities” under the scheme because of the private nature of labor groups and the absence of statutory authority for such procedures.

At issue is Code of Civil Procedure §425.16, which provides:

“A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech…in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.”

Subdivision (e) defines what qualifies as protected speech as including “any written or oral statement or writing” made before, or in connection with an issue under review by, a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or other “official proceeding authorized by law.”

Justice Dorothy C. Kim authored Thursday’s opinion, joined in by Presiding Justice Brian M. Hoffstadt and Justice Lamar Baker. She analogized the hearings to the hospital peer-review proceedings at stake in the 2006 California Supreme Court case of Kibler v. Northern Inyo County Local Hospital District, in which the court found that the internal proceedings are “official” because they are statutorily mandated and subject to judicial review.

She wrote:

“Notwithstanding plaintiffs’ attempt to distinguish union disciplinary hearings based on their private nature, we conclude the International Union judicial panel proceedings at issue here are sufficiently similar to the peer review proceedings discussed in Kibler,…and thus are ‘official proceedings authorized by law’ within the meaning of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2).”

Union Employee

The question arose after Adam Acosta, an employee of the Los Angeles-based Council 36 of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (“AFSCME”), a part of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, — filed a complaint against the labor group and its then-president, Andreas Jung, in August 2019, alleging discriminatory conduct. During mediation, Acosta submitted a brief with an exhibit containing images of text messages between Jung and his executive assistant, Maribel Alvarenga, which allegedly contained racist, sexist, and anti-LGBTQ statements. Between May and July 2021, the parties signed two confidentiality agreements covering mediation materials and a proposed settlement agreement.

Following execution of the settlement agreement, Acosta provided the exhibits to certain officers and affiliates of Council 36, who purportedly used the information to prepare union-disciplinary charges against Jung and Alvarenga.

In May 2022, the international union to which AFSCME belongs found Jung and Alvarenga guilty of violating anti-discrimination codes of conduct and ordered both parties removed from their positions.

On September 14, 2023, Jung and Alvarenga filed a complaint against Acosta and the other Council 36 affiliates, asserting, among other claims, breach of the confidentiality agreements, conspiracy, and intentional interference with contractual relations.

Then-Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Gail Killefer granted anti-SLAPP motions as to Alvarega’s breach of contract and intentional interference claims, as well as to the conspiracy cause of action asserted by both parties, and denied the request as to other claims in August 2024, finding that the union hearings qualified as “official proceedings” within the meaning of §425.16 but that the specially-stricken claims lacked minimal merit.

The plaintiffs appealed; the defendants did not challenge the portion of the order declining to strike remaining claims.

Extended Protection

Kim noted:

“In the context of nongovernmental entities, California courts have extended ‘official proceeding’ protection to quasi-judicial proceedings if they are part of a comprehensive statutory licensing scheme and ‘subject to judicial review by administrative mandate’ such as is the case with hospital peer review…, and to proceedings ‘established by statute to address a particular type of dispute’ such as occurs during an attorney fee arbitration mandated by law….”

Saying that the union hearings “were mandated” by the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (“LMRDA”), found at 29 U.S.C. § 401 et seq., she pointed out that the legislation provides that no member of a labor organization “may be…disciplined” absent “a full and fair hearing” after notice of the charges has been timely given.

She acknowledged that, unlike the Business and Professions Code sections governing peer-review procedures at hospitals, LMRDA does not compel a union to have a process for panel hearings on discipline. However, she opined:

“Although, as plaintiffs observe, labor unions adopt the required disciplinary procedures by ‘private contract,’ rather than by ‘statute,’ that distinction does not alter our conclusion that a judicial panel proceeding is an ‘official proceeding authorized by law.’ Those privately adopted procedures are subject to the federal statutory requirement that union policies comply with the due process rights guaranteed by the LMRDA….”

Rejecting the plaintiffs’ assertion that LMRDA does not “authorize” the proceedings, it merely regulates them, the jurist remarked:

“Plaintiffs suggest that, because a union may elect never to fine, suspend, expel, or otherwise discipline any of its members, the LMRDA due process guarantees for union members are not ‘authorized by law’ as that phrase is used in section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2). We disagree.”

She continued:

“Under our reading of that phrase, the LMRDA, through its guarantees of due process for union members before the imposition of discipline, endows unions with the authority to conduct, or otherwise sanctions their conduct of, disciplinary proceedings against members pursuant to a union’s constitutional procedures, as long as those procedures are compliant with those federal guarantees.”

Turning to the probability of success prong, Kim pointed out that Alvarenga’s breach of contract cause of action was based on a third-party beneficiary theory and said that she “does not explain how the parties to the agreement specifically intended to benefit her,” a non-party to Acosta’s action against Jung and Council 36.

As to allegations that the defendants conspired to violate the confidentiality agreement to pursue union disciplinary actions against Jung and Alvarenga, the justice pointed out that only tortious actions may support a conspiracy claim and “[a] breach of contract…does not ordinarily constitute a tort.”

Alvarenga’s intentional interference claims similarly failed to meet the standard because “resolution would require interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement between Council 36 and the Staff Union,” and federal law pre-empts state contract principles in such a scenario.

The case is Jung v. Acosta, 2026 S.O.S. 1861.

Acting for the plaintiffs were the Folsom-based attorney Robert W. Lucas and Wendell Brooks Phillips III
of the Malibu firm Phillips & Rickards.

Dan Stormer, David Clay Washington, and Kate McFarlane of the Pasadena office of Hadsell Stormer Renick & Dai LLP represented Acosta, and Joshua Adams and Emily Olivencia Audet of Gilbert & Sackman acted on behalf of the other defendants.