Tuesday, May 12, 2026
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C.A. Permits No Deviation From Direction of Remanding Court Despite New Case Law
Opinion Signals That Prerogative of Trial Judge to Follow Decision From Another Appellate District Does Not Extend to Disregarding Remittitur
By a MetNews Staff Writer
The prerogative of a trial judge to follow the dictates of an opinion from a court of appeal in a different district does not extend to skirting the holding and directions of a remanding panel, a Los Angeles Superior Court judge has been advised.
Div. Three of this district’s Court of Appeal on Friday declared that Judge Laura Laesecke was bound, on remand, by its Nov. 25, 2024 unpublished decision in which it held that defendant Luis Bazan—who was sentenced in 2009 to 80 years to life for crimes committed as a juvenile—was eligible for a resentencing under Penal Code §1170(d). Laesecke had ruled that resentencing was unavailable because the statute applies only to youths who were, unlike Bazan, committed to life without the possibility of parole (“LWOP”).
However, Presiding Justice Lee Edmon, in her 2024 opinion in the case, pointed to Div. Three’s Aug. 21, 2024 published opinion in People v. Sorto, by Justice Anne H. Egerton, which says:
“We reject the Attorney General’s arguments and conclude offenders sentenced to functionally equivalent LWOP terms—like Sorto—are entitled to section 1170(d) relief under the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.”
Edmon’s Conclusion
Edmon concluded on the basis of Sorto and a 2022 opinion from the Fourth District’s Div. One that “Bazan is eligible for relief under section 1170, subdivision (d),” and declared:
“The order is reversed and the matter is remanded with the direction to permit Bazan to file a corrected petition and to consider it in accordance with this opinion.”
On remand, Laesecke made note, at an Oct. 22, 2025 hearing, of an intervening Aug 29, 2025 decision from the Third District Court of Appeal in People v. Isayev which finds that a 50-year-sentence “is not functionally equivalent to LWOP” and rejects the reasoning of Sorto and two other opinions.
Laesecke announced that she “disagrees” with Sorto which was “repeatedly cited in the remittitur,” that she was “‘reading not only the remittitur but Isayev,” and would consider Edmon’s opinion “in conjunction with subsequent case law.” She again denied resentencing.
The California Supreme Court granted review in Isayev on Nov. 12, 2025.
Case Law Support
Laesecke’s view that she was at liberty to take into account the Third District’s opinion was not bereft of case law support. The California high court said in its widely cited 1962 decision in Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court that the rule of state decisis “has no application where there is more than one appellate court decision, and such appellate decisions are in conflict,” amplifying:
“In such a situation, the court exercising inferior jurisdiction can and must make a choice between the conflicting decisions.”
Div. Five of this district’s Court of Appeal observed in McCallum v. McCallum, a 1987 opinion by Justice David Eagleson (later a justice of the California Supreme Court, now deceased):
“As a practical matter, a superior court ordinarily will follow an appellate opinion emanating from its own district even though it is not bound to do so.”
Pro Tem’s Opinion
Friday’s opinion reversing Laesecke’s 2025 order was authored by Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Melanie Ochoa, sitting on assignment. She said that Laesecke “was not free” to deviate from Edmon’s decision.
In support of that proposition, she drew attention to the 2006 Third District Court of Appeal opinion in People v. Dutra which says that “[a] trial court may not disobey a remittitur, as that would amount to overruling the appellate court’s decision, thereby violating a basic legal principle,” quoting Auto Equity as setting forth:
“Courts exercising inferior jurisdiction must accept the law declared by courts of superior jurisdiction. It is not their function to attempt to overrule decisions of a higher court.”
The court in Dutra also said:
“[W]hether the trial court believed our decision was right or wrong, or had been impaired by subsequent decisions, it was bound to follow the remittitur.”
Remittitur ‘Directly Controls’
Ochoa wrote:
“The trial court correctly recognized that there exists a split of authority between the Courts of Appeal on the question whether a term of years sentence that is subject to section 3051 youth offender parole hearing is ‘functionally equivalent’ to a life without parole sentence for purposes of section 1170(d). However, the trial court acted outside of its jurisdiction when it decided to follow Isayev rather than the remittitur that directly controls this case.
“Accordingly, we reverse the order denying Bazan’s petition and direct the trial court to find that Bazan is eligible for relief under section 1170(d), as a juvenile sentenced to a term of years that is functionally equivalent to life without parole, and for further proceedings as necessary pursuant to that finding.”
The case is People v. Bazan, B346821.
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