$25.2 Million Judgment Against CHP, Officer Is Overturned

Wednesday, September 23, 2026

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$25.2 Million Judgment Against CHP, Officer Is Overturned

Court of Appeal Says Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Violated Settled Law by Allowing Jury to Find Agency Liable for Death of Pedestrian Under Both Negligent Entrustment, Vicarious Liability Theories

By a MetNews Staff Writer

Div. Two of this district’s Court of Appeal has overturned a $25.2 million judgment in favor of the family of a pedestrian who was allegedly killed by a speeding California Highway Patrol motorcycle officer who was on his way to work, saying that a Los Angeles Superior Court judge failed to apply settled law establishing limitations on employer liability.

Citing the 2011 California Supreme Court case of Diaz v. Carcamo, which held that an employer’s admission of vicarious liability for an employee’s negligent driving in the course of employment bars a plaintiff from pursuing a claim for negligent entrustment, Presiding Justice Elwood Lui, writing for the court, said that the judgment based on the death of 24-year-old Cezannie Mount, allegedly caused by then-CHP Officer Alfredo Gutierrez, cannot stand. He declared in Monday’s unpublished opinion:

“Over appellants’ objections, the trial court allowed the jury to render verdicts against Gutierrez for negligence and CHP for negligent entrustment.

“The verdict is contrary to law. Once CHP admitted vicarious liability for Gutierrez’s negligence, it could not be found separately liable for negligent entrustment…Further, Mount cites no statutory basis for finding CHP liable for negligent entrustment. We reverse the judgment and remand the case for retrial.”

Lui also took issue with a decision by the trial judge, Michael B. Harwin, to admit postmortem photographs of the decedent during the trial, writing:

“On retrial, evidence showing or describing the nature and extent of decedent’s injuries must be excluded. The cause and mechanism of death are not in dispute. All parties agree decedent was struck from behind and was not suicidal. The only disputed issue is fault. Photographic and other evidence of injury is not relevant….”

2019 Collision

The questions arose after Gutierrez, while riding a department-issued motorcycle, collided with Mount during the early morning hours of Oct. 27, 2019. Mount, who was later determined to have been under the influence of alcohol and marijuana at the time, was walking in traffic on Del Amo Boulevard in Long Beach when he was hit.

In 2020, Mount’s parents filed a complaint, asserting wrongful death and negligence claims against Gutierrez and the agency. They alleged that the former officer was traveling in excess of the speed limit at the time of the accident and that CHP provided substandard training to its employees. During the 2024 trial, it was revealed that Gutierrez was under the care of an ophthalmologist at the time of the collision due to a disorder that caused him to see a dark spot and suffer blurred vision in one eye. Dr. Mitul Mehta had seen Gutierrez six days before the accident and prescribed him drops but did not impose any driving restrictions. Gutierrez testified that he had informed his supervisor about his diagnosis but insisted that was no longer having vision problems on the day of the fatal encounter. An expert opined that an attentive driver with normal vision could have seen decedent walking in lanes with sufficient distance to stop his vehicle.

Negligent Entrustment

Over the defendants’ objections, Harwin allowed the plaintiffs to add a claim for negligent entrustment after the parties rested, and the judge adopted a special verdict form calling for the jury to apportion fault between the decedent, Gutierrez, and CHP.

The panel found that Gutierrez was negligent and that CHP had negligently entrusted its motorcycle to him, apportioning 37% of the fault to Gutierrez, 26% to CHP, and the remaining percentage to the decedent. The trial court entered judgment against the defendants for $25.2 million in October 2024, and Harwin denied the defendants’ motions for a new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

Lui pointed out that the defendants had stipulated at trial that CHP was vicariously liable for any negligence on the part of the then-officer and said that “[t]he law is clear” that “[t]he jury could not find Gutierrez liable for negligence and find CHP liable for negligent entrustment to him once it admitted he was driving in the course and scope of his employment.” Based on the Diaz decision, the jurist opined:

“CHP could ‘not be mentioned on the special verdict form’; instead, the jury had to ‘divide fault for the accident among the listed tortfeasors, and the employer is liable only for whatever share of fault the jury assigns to the employee.’ ”

Prejudicial Error

He continued:

“CHP was prejudiced by the error. With the correct special verdict form, the jury would have assigned fault to Gutierrez and decedent. Though CHP was responsible for the share of fault assigned to Gutierrez, ‘the result would have been more favorable to [CHP], because [it] would have had no additional, independent liability.’…Liability for one share of fault (rather than two out of three shares of fault) would have benefited CHP.”

The plaintiffs asserted that the case falls within a carve-out for cases involving employer negligence that is independent of the actions of the employee. Unpersuaded, Lui wrote:

“Mount’s theory was that Gutierrez caused the accident by negligently driving too fast with impaired vision, and CHP negligently entrusted its motorcycle to an employee with impaired vision. CHP’s liability was derivative of Gutierrez’s negligence, not independent of it. A negligent entrustment claim is ‘superfluous’ when it arises from an employee’s negligent driving….If a jury found Gutierrez zero percent at fault for the accident, CHP’s share of fault would also be zero, even if it knew he was impaired.”

No Waiver

Rejecting the plaintiffs’ further contention that CHP waived or forfeited the right to assert the error on appeal, he remarked:

“Appellants objected before trial, during trial, and after trial that CHP is not liable for negligent entrustment. They cited Diaz in objections to jury instructions. They cited Diaz in opposition to Mount’s request to conform the pleading to proof by adding a claim for negligent entrustment. Diaz is not new authority because it was cited below.”

The presiding justice concluded that Harwin erred for “second reason,” noting that “[n]egligent entrustment is not a statutory basis for recovery” and “CHP has limited liability under the Government Claims Act, which ‘abolished all common law or judicially declared forms of liability.’ ” He added:

“Mount cites Government Code section 815.2…as the statutory basis for CHP liability. Section 815.2 creates public entity liability for injury proximately caused by an employee within the scope of his employment. It does not abrogate the rule [set forth in Diaz]. Thus, when the public entity admits liability under section 815.2, it cannot be found separately liable for the same employee acts.”

The case is Mount v. California Highway Patrol, B342089.

Acting for the plaintiffs were Orange County practitioners Annee Della Donna and Eric Dubin in addition to Claremont-based appellate attorney Jeffrey I. Ehrlich. Deputy Attorneys General Iveta Ovsepyan, Elizabeth Angres, and Joshua K. Bart represented the defendants.