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Thursday, July 2, 2026

 

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Court of Appeal:

Error to Invalidate Mass Joinder Based on Judicial Economy

Opinion Says Judge Erred in Dismissing 435 Workers From Five Actions Asserting That Tesla Engaged in Pattern of Discrimination Based on Finding of Misjoinder, Decision to File Jointly Belongs to Plaintiffs

 

By Kimber Cooley, associate editor

 

Div. Five of the First District Court of Appeal has held that a trial judge erred in finding misjoinder and ordering the dismissal of a total of 435 Black plaintiffs from five lawsuits accusing Tesla Inc. of maintaining a practice of racial bias at the company’s Fremont factory based, in part, on concerns over case manageability given the need for individualized proof of discriminatory treatment.

Joinder is governed by Code of Civil Procedure §378, which provides that “[a]ll persons may join in one action as plaintiffs” if “[t]hey assert any right to relief…in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all these persons will arise in the action.”

Sec. 379.5 further specifies “the court may make such orders as may appear just to prevent any party from being embarrassed, delayed, or put to undue expense, and may order separate trials or make such other order as the interests of justice may require.”

Justice Danny Y. Chou authored Tuesday’s opinion, joined in by Presiding Justice Teri L. Jackson and Justice Mark B. Simons, acknowledging the “plight” faced by the trial court in dealing with more than 400 different incidents of alleged racial harassment but declaring that the decision to file jointly lies with the plaintiff and not the court. Chou wrote:

“While these statutes provide the court with wide latitude to sever the trials of parties or claims, they do not allow the court to usurp plaintiffs’ right to join their claims under section 378.”

Five Complaints

The question arose after five complaints were filed against Tesla on behalf of a total of 440 plaintiffs between July and August 2025, each asserting causes of action for racial discrimination, harassment, and failure to prevent discriminatory practices under the Fair Employment and Housing Act, found at Government Code §12900 et seq.

Each of the plaintiffs had been part of an earlier-filed putative class action, Vaughn, et al. v. Tesla, Inc., that asserted similar claims. In October 2025, Alameda Superior Court Judge Peter E. Borkon ordered a class decertified in that matter after the plaintiffs admitted they could not comply with discovery orders requiring them to obtain cooperation for depositions from 200 randomly selected members before trial.

A few weeks after the five new complaints had been filed, Borkon issued an order to show cause (“OSC”) why he should not dismiss all plaintiffs except the first one listed in each pleading based on a finding of inappropriate joinder, highlighting that he had already determined that “claims by 531 persons in a single complaint [was] improper” in the Vaughn matter when he declined to allow amendment to add individual claimants after the class was decertified.

Misjoinder Declared

Following a hearing, the judge found misjoinder and ordered that “all [p]laintiffs except for the first name on the complaint must be dismissed” in each of the five cases on Oct. 16, 2025.  He noted that the court “has experience in complex multi-plaintiff litigation” and “can anticipate the problems that [these] complaints will cause, and does not need to wait for the problems to arise.”

After the plaintiffs filed petitions for writ of mandate in each case, Div. Five stayed trial court proceedings and consolidated the requests. Tuesday’s decision declares:

“Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue, directing the trial court to vacate its October 16, 2025 order finding misjoinder and directing single plaintiff complaints to be filed, and enter a new and different order allowing the five originally filed complaints to proceed.”

Noting that Borkon had “jumped the gun and issued an OSC before Tesla filed a demurrer,” Chou commented that “[n]either the court nor the parties cite any precedent for this approach” but said:

“Regardless of whether an OSC was permissible here, we see no reason to treat the court’s order dismissing all of plaintiffs’ actions except for the actions of the first-named plaintiffs for misjoinder any differently than an order sustaining a demurrer on the same ground.”

Same Occurrence

Turning to the question of misjoinder, he wrote:

“Tesla contends that the trial court properly found misjoinder under section 378 because plaintiffs failed to allege that their claims arise from the same transaction or occurrence. Like the court, Tesla points out that the acts of discrimination and harassment ‘occurred at different dates and times in different locations’ at the Tesla factory. We are unpersuaded.”

Pointing out that “plaintiffs allege in their five complaints that Tesla engaged in a ‘common’ policy or practice that harmed all of them” and that they “all worked at the same Tesla factory,” he opined:

“Because we must liberally construe these allegations in favor of joinder…, they are sufficient to justify joinder based on a commonality of liability….That plaintiffs alleged racial discrimination and harassment occurring at different times…does not mean that their claims did not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence. The ‘salient point is that liability is amenable to mass action treatment.’ ”

Saying that, “[b]y requiring each individual plaintiff to file a separate complaint even though their claims meet the requirements of section 378, the trial court has adopted a procedure that conflicts with section 378,” the jurist remarked:

“[W]e find that the trial court erred in finding misjoinder under section 378. In doing so, we reject the argument that the court may consider case manageability or administration in determining whether joinder is proper….Although the court may address these practical concerns under section 379.5, they ‘do not furnish grounds for finding a misjoinder of plaintiffs’ under section 378….Indeed, under the language of section 378, ‘it is the plaintiffs,’ and not the court, ‘who make the initial decision to file jointly.’ ”

Sympathies Noted

He continued:

“Although we vacate the trial court’s order, we are sympathetic to its plight. There are 440 individual plaintiffs, and each plaintiff is alleging different incidents of racial harassment and different damages. Although there appears to be common questions of law or fact based on the pleadings, the claims of most, if not all, plaintiffs will likely have to be resolved separately. The court’s challenge is therefore formidable, and we commend it for its willingness to manage plaintiffs’ claims ‘as best [it] can with the available tools.’ ”

Commenting that “the trial court may order separate trials (by party or claim)” or require the plaintiffs to create tracking spreadsheets “to help alleviate the court’s administrative concerns,” he concluded that “[w]e are confident that there are other measures that the court may take to manage plaintiffs’ claims short of a blanket prohibition on their joinder in one action.” Chou added:

“To the extent that those measures prove inadequate, however, the solution would appear to lie with the Legislature….In the meantime, courts must follow existing law and utilize the tools that the Legislature has seen fit to provide thus far. A court may not, as the court did here, deny joinder of any claims under section 378 and dismiss the claims of all plaintiffs except for the first named plaintiffs in the five actions—435 plaintiffs in total.”

Rejecting the view that the trial court’s decertification order in the Vaughn case tips the scales against a finding of commonality, he said:

“Tesla provides no authority suggesting that plaintiffs are bound in any way by concessions made by different parties and different attorneys or rulings made in a different case.”

The case is Smith v. Superior Court (Tesla), 2026 S.O.S. 1929.

 

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