Thursday, April 23, 2026
Page 4
Court of Appeal:
Judge Erred in Denying Diversion Based on Death of Victim
By a MetNews Staff Writer
Div. One of the Fourth District Court of Appeal held yesterday that a judge erred in denying a request for misdemeanor diversion to a party charged with vehicular manslaughter based on the fact that the defendant’s negligence in running a red light caused the death of another person, saying that it was an abuse of discretion to foreclose the relief based on a fact inherent in a qualifying underlying offense.
At issue is Penal Code §100.95, which provides that “[a] judge in the superior court in which a misdemeanor is being prosecuted may, at the judge’s discretion, and over the objection of a prosecuting attorney, offer diversion to a defendant” and dismiss the case after a period of supervision so long as the accused “has complied with the imposed terms and conditions.” Certain domestic violence and sex offenses are statutorily excluded from consideration.
Yesterday’s opinion, authored by Justice Martin N. Buchanan and joined in by Presiding Justice Judith McConnell and Justice William Dato, acknowledges that the statute grants discretion to judges in determining suitability for the program, but declares:
“The court made no connection between the victim’s death…and the goals of the misdemeanor diversion statute: to treat, restore, and rehabilitate the defendant….The trial court therefore abused its discretion by denying diversion based solely on facts inherent in the charged crime without connecting those circumstances to the purposes of the statute.”
Victims’ Views
Rejecting the prosecutor’s “alternative reason why we should conclude the trial court’s ruling was not an abuse of discretion,” that the judge also relied on an opposition to diversion expressed by family members of the victim, Buchanan wrote:
“We agree that in deciding whether to grant diversion, the court should consider the victims’ views to the extent they are in harmony with…the applicable diversion statute. But nothing in the California Constitution allows a court to give weight to the preferences of crime victims when they clash with the legislative policy of the diversion law the court is bound to apply.”
The question as to the limits on a trial judge’s discretion arose after Aimee Bobo was charged with misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter after she ran a red light, collided with another vehicle, and killed the other driver, Mary Donato, in November 2024. Bobo was 50 years old at the time, showed no signs of intoxication, and had no criminal record.
She requested diversion under §100.95, submitting character references describing her as a kind and caring grandmother. Prosecutors with the San Diego City Attorney’s Office filed opposition papers, citing the circumstances of the offense and two letters from members of the victim’s family expressing concern that the defendant might only face minor consequences for causing the death of their loved one.
After the trial judge sided with the prosecutors, Bobo filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the appellate division of the San Diego Superior Court. In a decision signed by Presiding Judge Albert T. Harutunian III and Judges Frank L. Birchak and Maryann D’Addezio, the division summarily denied the petition last year.
Bobo then filed a petition for writ relief in Div. One.
Not Excluded
Pointing out that “the Legislature decided not to make misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter one of the specifically excluded offenses listed in section 1001.95,” Buchanan remarked that, “[i]n denying diversion, the trial court relied solely on the fact that Bobo’s negligent conduct caused the death of another person,” a “necessary element of the charged crime.” Finding the denial to be an abuse of discretion, he wrote:
“[Bobo] contends the trial court’s ruling was antithetical to the Legislature’s purpose in making misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter a qualifying offense for misdemeanor diversion. We agree the trial court abused its discretion by relying solely on facts inherent in Bobo’s commission of the charged offense without connecting them to the underlying principles and purpose of the misdemeanor diversion statute.”
Addressing the victims’ preferences, he said:
“[I]t would not have been proper for the court to deny diversion based on the prosecutor’s argument that the victim’s family would otherwise never hear ‘the most powerful words family could hear in a case like this: guilty.’ The whole purpose of the misdemeanor diversion statute is to provide an alternative resolution that avoids prosecution, conviction, and a potential jail sentence.”
Preferences for Verdict
The jurist continued:
“Although Donato’s family members understandably prefer a guilty plea or verdict and a criminal sentence, their preferences do not override the controlling legislative policy. The court’s discretion must instead be guided ‘by an appreciation for the crucial role of the Legislature in setting criminal justice policy.’…We therefore conclude it would have been an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny diversion based on the preferences of the victim’s family for criminal prosecution and a guilty plea or verdict.”
Buchanan declared:
“Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing respondent appellate division to vacate its order summarily denying Bobo’s petition for writ of mandate and issue a peremptory writ in the first instance directing the superior court to vacate its order denying misdemeanor diversion and reconsider Bobo’s suitability in conformity with the views expressed in this opinion.”
The case is Bobo v. Appellate Division, 2026 S.O.S. 1076.
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