Monday, September 28, 2026
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Killing of Pig Belonging to Another for Food Is No Defense to Animal Cruelty Count—C.A.
By a MetNews Staff Writer
A homeless man who intruded upon school grounds at night and stole a pig which was slaughtered and partially consumed could not rely upon a provision providing an exception to the animal cruelty statute by recognizing the “right to kill all animals used for food,” the Sixth District Court of Appeal declared on Thursday.
Anthony Mark Owen Madruga was convicted by a jury of 10 crimes, including animal cruelty, in violation of Penal Code §597(a), based on his killing of a pig, Oakley, as well as a goat, Stetson, that was not carted off. Each animal was owned by a student at Hollister High School in San Benito County and was housed on school grounds as part of the Future Farmers of America program.
Madruga argued on appeal that San Benito Superior Court Judge Brian R. Aronson erred in not instructing, sua sponte, on a defense under Penal Code §599c which provides that §597 must not be “construed...to interfere with the right to kill all animals used for food.”
Danner’s Opinion
Justice Allison M. Danner said in Thursday’s opinion:
“We decide that section 599c’s exception does not extend to the killing of another person’s animal for food without the animal owner’s consent.”
She explained:
“By using the phrase “the right to kill,” the Legislature has described a claim to kill that is deemed just and proper….
“…[A] person acts wrongfully if he or she damages the property of another or interferes substantially with another person’s possession of their property, including animals.”
The jurist went on to say:
“If the Legislature had intended, as Madruga implicitly argues, for section 599c to apply broadly to all killings of animals used for food irrespective of the ownership of the animal, it could easily have done so. A carveout intended to apply broadly to all killings of animals used for food regardless of any legitimate interest or consent might, for example, have provided that no part of the title shall be construed ‘to interfere with any killing of animals used for food.’ The tethering of the exception to the ‘right to kill’ strongly suggests a narrower ambit than that urged by Madruga.”
Element of Malice
Sec. 597(a) pertains to a person who “maliciously and intentionally kills an animal.” The appellant argued that he “did not kill the pig with malice since killing an animal for food is an exception to the animal cruelty statute.”
Danner responded:
“[W]e do not perceive any inconsistency between section 597(a)’s requirement that malice be directed toward the animal killed…and the limitation of section 599c’s food exception to animal owners or those who act with the owner’s consent. Section 597(a) and 599c balance differing and potentially competing interests between the protection afforded animals and certain conduct toward animals otherwise considered proper. By focusing the requisite malice on the animal rather than the owner, section 597(a) broadly protects animals themselves. An understanding of section 599c’s exception tied to ownership and consent balances the protection of animals from malicious killing against an animal owner’s appropriate use of the animal for food.”
Child Cruelty
Madruga was also convicted under Penal Code §273a(b) which provides:
“Any person who, under circumstances or conditions other than those likely to produce great bodily harm or death, willfully causes or permits any child to suffer, or inflicts thereon unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering, or having the care or custody of any child, willfully causes or permits the person or health of that child to be injured, or willfully causes or permits that child to be placed in a situation where his or her person or health may be endangered, is guilty of a misdemeanor.”
The justice rejected Madruga’s contention that the elements of the crime were not satisfied. Pointing to the testimony of D.G., who owned the pig, and D.B., to whom the goat belonged, she said:
“Each student’s testimony provides substantial evidence of ‘mental suffering.’ The evidence shows the anguish, grief, and fright caused by the premature and traumatic death of the animals the students had left secured in a barn the night before the killings. Further, the students’ mental suffering was ‘unjustifiable’ because that suffering was not reasonably necessary and was excessive under the circumstances. There is no justifiable reason for an adult to place a minor student in the position of experiencing worry, sadness, fear, or nightmares due to an attack on a farm animal the student had kept safe and sound in a barn on a school campus.”
Madruga drew a total sentence of 11 years and six months in prison.
The case is People v. Madruga, H053381.
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