Admitted Killer’s Conviction Upended Due to Bias Ruling

Tuesday, April 7, 2026

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Admitted Killer’s Conviction Upended Due to Bias Ruling

Supreme Court Opinion Says Judgment of Death Undermined by Judge at Competency Phase Applying Too Narrow View of Disqualification Analysis in Denying Challenge for Cause to Juror Who Was Friend of Deceased

By Kimber Cooley, associate editor

The California Supreme Court yesterday reversed the conviction and judgment of death of a man who admitted to killing his mother and a local police chief in 1998, declaring that the judge overseeing the competency phase of the criminal trial erred in denying a defense challenge for cause to a juror who disclosed a friendship with the slain officer and that he had worked for a neighboring agency until about five months before the deadly incident.

Justice Carol Corrigan authored the opinion for the unanimous court, saying that Imperial Superior Court Judge Jeffrey B. Jones erred in determining that he was bound to consider only whether the potential panelist harbored implied bias, as strictly defined by statute, due to the fact that the juror denied harboring any actual prejudice based on his time in law enforcement or his relationship with the slain chief that would impair his ability to be fair.

Declaring that it was an error to fail to consider whether the panelist harbored actual bias based on the juror’s self-assessment, the justice wrote:

“[T]he court must be…attuned to the practical constraints of human nature and empanel a jury whose members can reasonably be expected to act in accordance with their oath. A given panelist may very well want to be fair and follow the law….They may also hesitate to say otherwise….[T]hese concerns are amplified in a death penalty case where the prospective juror might be called upon to decide between the death penalty and life imprisonment….At the end of the day the ‘line’…is an objective determination to be made by the court based on the totality of circumstances.”

Court of Appeal Justices Gregory Weingart of this district’s Div. One and David M. Rubin of the Fourth District’s Div. One, each sitting by assignment, joined in the opinion. Chief Justice Patricia Guerrero did not participate in the decision.

Concurring in full, Justice Joshua P. Groban penned a separate opinion, joined in by Justices Goodwin H. Liu and Kelli Evans, expressing concern over whether executing someone, like the defendant, who has been diagnosed with schizophrenia comports with constitutional standards but saying that “[s]ince defendant’s death sentence was vacated…, we do not need to decide this issue here.”

Shooting Deaths

Challenging his conviction on automatic appeal from a judgment of death was Omar Deen, who was sentenced to death in 2000 after a jury found him guilty of the special circumstances murders of his mother, Rachel Deen, and of Calipatria Police Department Chief J. Leonard Speer.

According to testimony during the trial, Speer was at the location at the time of the shooting to try to serve the defendant with a temporary restraining order. Omar Deen wrestled a gun away from the police chief and fired fatal rounds at his mother and the officer.

Omar Deen was apprehended after the shooting and confessed to the killings. As he had been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, brain damage, and had a history of methamphetamine abuse, the criminal case against him proceeded in four phases—competency, guilt, sanity, and penalty.

A jury was empaneled for the competency phase, including a 60-year-old former civilian employee of the El Centro Police Department, identified as “Juror No. 5,” who was selected as a potential panelist after the defense had exhausted its allotted peremptory challenges.

He expressed concerns that his ability to serve might be impeded by the fact that he had “known Chief Speer for [a] number of [years],” had business dealings with him, and had heard details about the case from members of the law enforcement community. When pressed, he said he could be fair, impartial, and decide the matter only on the evidence presented.

The defendant challenged him for cause, expressing concerns about bias. Jones declined to excuse the panelist in October 2000, saying:

“[The] juror said they could be impartial, follow the law, that’s good enough. I understand the defense’s concern….It appears from the examination of the appellate cases in death penalty cases that for cause means [the factors listed in Code of Civil Procedure 229 for implied bias]…and that sort of thing, but not reasonable suspicion or possibility.”

Statutory Authority

Corrigan acknowledged that §229 sets forth that “[a] challenge for implied bias may be taken for one or more of the following causes, and for no other,” and lists several disqualifying circumstances, including “[t]he existence of a state of mind…evincing enmity against, or bias towards, either party.”

However, she opined that Jones ignored the fact that a juror may be excluded for actual bias under Code of Civil Procedure §225 even if no implied prejudice is present. That section defines the term as “the existence of a state of mind on the part of the juror in reference to the case, or to any of the parties, which will prevent the juror from acting with entire impartiality, and without prejudice to the substantial rights of any party.”

The jurist remarked:

“[E]ven when a panelist does not overtly express bias or otherwise manifest statutorily defined implied bias, they may be properly excused for cause based on the court’s finding of actual bias under section 225.”

Saying that “[t]he court understood its role and its responsibility too narrowly,” she opined:

“[E]ven when a panelist says they want to be fair, and believes they can be, the ultimate question remains with the court….Of course, even the wisest of trial judges cannot predict the future with certainty. Resolution of the question may often turn on case specific matters of degree: just how much information the panelist has been exposed to; the source of the information; the closeness of relevant relationships; the intensity of their views on matters at issue; and the source of those views. All are relevant, and none is necessarily dispositive.”

She declared:

“A ruling on a challenge for cause should proceed as follows. If, taking into account the panelist’s statements and demeanor, the trial judge finds that circumstances such as the panelist’s relationship with the parties or potential witnesses, or any other factors bearing on potential bias, would prevent or substantially interfere with the panelist’s ability to follow their oath and base their decision solely on the evidence, follow the law as instructed, and decide the case with ‘entire impartiality, and without prejudice to the substantial rights of any party’…, the challenge should be granted.”

Corrigan continued:

“Conversely, if the panelist says they can and will be fair, the court accepts that assessment as honestly held, and the court objectively finds the panelist can act impartially as the law requires, the challenge should be denied. Here the trial court could not discern the standard, ‘the line,’ between granting or rejecting the challenge. Instead, it considered itself ‘stuck’ with the juror’s self-assessment, even though the court itself harbored substantial misgivings. It misunderstood existing precedent to rigidly hold that if a ‘juror said they could be impartial, follow the law, that’s good enough.’ ”

Adding that “we include the following observations for guidance going forward,” she commented:

“In applying sections 225 and 229(f) the court applies an objective standard, taking into account the totality of circumstances. When a panelist has been personally acquainted with a party, victim, or witness, or has received detailed information about the case from prospective witnesses, those circumstances are particularly significant and merit close consideration.”

The case is People v. Deen, 2026 S.O.S. 945.