Evidence Properly Barred That Man Hit by Bus Was Drunk

Wednesday, June 24, 2026

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Court of Appeal:

Evidence Properly Barred That Man Hit by Bus Was Drunk

Justices Reject Defendant MTA’s Contention That Judge Erred in Keeping From Jury Coroner’s Report Showing That Decedent Had Twice the Blood Alcohol Content Required for DUI; $6.5 Million Judgment Is Affirmed

By a MetNews Staff Writer

Div. Seven of the Court of Appeal for this district has affirmed a $6.5 million judgment against the Los Angeles County’s public transit agency stemming from the death of pedestrian struck by a bus, rejecting the contention that the trial judge erred in barring any evidence that the decedent was drunk at the time he attempted to cross Sunset Boulevard at an unmarked intersection despite the approaching vehicle.

There was, Justice Gail Ruderman Feuer of Div. Seven said in Monday’s unpublished opinion, a lack of a foundation for such evidence based on the absence of relevant expert testimony tying intoxication to the injury. She found no merit in the contention of defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (“MTA”) that lay jurors do not need an expert to explain the effects of over-consumption of alcohol.

Feuer said that Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Ernest M. Hiroshige did not err in granting a motion in limine brought by the plaintiffs in a wrongful death action precluding evidence of possible intoxication on the part of decedent Nelson Pineda at the time of the accident. That evidence included a coroner’s report, by criminalist Eucen Fu, showing the blood alcohol content (“BAC”) in Pineda’s heart to have been no less than .16%.

For motorists, a reading of .08% constitutes driving under the influence.

Hiroshige also excluded testimony by a “human factors” expert, psychologist David A. Krauss, that Nelson’s behavior was “inconsistent with” that of “an attentive, sober pedestrian.”

The jury assessed total damages for the wife, mother, and two children of the deceased at $6.65 million but found that Pineda was 10% at fault. Hiroshige ordered entry of judgment for $6.53 million.

The accident took place at Sunset and Custer, just east of Beaudry, west of the Los Angeles Civic Center.

MTA’s Position

MTA argued in its opening brief on appeal:

“A jury does not invariably need the help of an expert to determine alcohol impairment….

“As settled California law confirms, understanding the effects of alcohol falls within the realm of jurors’ common experience. Indeed, unlike asking the jury to determine the various possible effects of consuming an unlawful drug that most jurors have never tried or seen the effects of, lay jurors generally know exactly what happens when someone has had one too many drinks….”

The brief quotes Div. One of the Fourth District Court of Appeal as saying in its 1990 opinion in People v. Cox that “being drunk from ingestion of alcohol is a condition subject to common knowledge.” It also points to the 2013 statement by Div. One of this district’s Court of Appeal in Pedeferri v. Seidner Enterprises, with emphasis added, that “[t]he probable effect of intoxicants other than alcohol is a topic ‘sufficiently beyond [the] common experience’ of most jurors that expert testimony is required.”

MTA’s lawyers—Paul O’Reilly of O’Reilly & McDermott and Edward L. Xanders and Marco A. Pulido of Grimes, Martin, Stein & Richland—added:

“Indeed, a lay jury can find intoxication just based on (1) knowing that a person ingested alcohol, and (2) considering that person’s subsequent behavior.”

Feuer’s Opinion

Feuer responded:

“But the only evidence that Nelson consumed alcohol prior to the accident was the coroner’s lab report reflecting the BAC levels in his body….[T]he jury would have needed to interpret those BAC levels to determine the level of Nelson’s impairment. None of the cases cited by MTA stands for the proposition that a jury may determine alcohol impairment and its effects from forensic lab results absent an opinion from a qualified expert.”

She continued:

“There was no evidence that Nelson was drinking alcohol before the accident; rather, MTA sought to rely on the results from the forensic lab report to show Nelson was intoxicated. However, a layperson would not understand what the percentage BAC reflected in the lab report meant in terms of impairment and how those levels would have affected Nelson’s conduct in crossing the street as the bus approached.”

‘Beyond Common Experience’

The justice explained:

“The interpretation of the results in the county coroner’s forensic lab report to determine Nelson’s level of impairment during the accident was a topic sufficiently beyond common experience such that expert testimony was required. It is undisputed that Fu. MTA’s designated expert from the coroner’s office who analyzed Nelsons blood samples, admitted he did not analyze Nelson’s impairment. Further. MTA offered no other witness who could opine on what the coroner’s blood test results meant with respect to Nelson’s impairment and conduct during the accident”

Feuer added:

“[E]ven if Fu had testified regarding the collection of the blood samples, how the samples were analyzed, and what the results were, the jury would have been left to speculate about what the results meant for Nelson’s level of impairment during the accident given his height, weight, and alcohol tolerance and how the blood alcohol levels affected Nelson’s ability to see. hear, and assess traffic as he crossed the street. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding testimony and evidence regarding Nelson’s intoxication based on the county coroner’s lab report.”

She found no error in excluding testimony by Krauss that the described conduct on the part of Pineda was inconsistent with sobriety, saying:

“Given his lack of expertise to determine an individual’s alcohol impairment from lab results, Krauss had no basis to conclude Nelson’s behavior was due to his lack of sobriety absent evidence establishing Nelson’s impairment and its effects on his conduct.”

She also said that Hiroshige properly excluded MTA’s evidence pursuant to Evidence Code §352 which says:

“The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.”

Feuer wrote:

“Because MTA did not offer testimony or evidence tending to show the alcohol present in Nelson’s body caused impairment or contributed to the accident, evidence that there was alcohol in Nelson’s blood at some unexplained level and Kraus’s opinion that Nelson did not walk consistent with a sober person had minimal, if any probative value with respect to Nelson’s comparative negligence. Moreover, any probative value was diminished by the fact the jury could observe the videos from the bus’s on-board system showing Nelson’s behavior as he crossed the street. MTA’s proffered evidence also created a substantial risk of prejudice to plaintiffs because it could cause the jury to be biased against Nelson and his family based on his alleged alcohol consumption and impairment or to speculate about whether the alcohol in his system contributed to the accident without any foundation for whether the alcohol levels caused impairment.”

The case is Caceres v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority, B341068.

Pineda’s mother, Rosa Caceres, was the lead plaintiff in consolidated proceedings. She was represented on appeal by Todd F. Nevell and Daniel G. Sheldon of Scolinos, Sheldon & Nevell and by Jeffrey I. Ehrlich.

Ehrlich also acted for the widow, Guadalupe Elizabeth Cruz De Pineda, and the children, Kevin Pineda and Kayla Pineda, who reside in El Salvador.

Additional counsel for the widow and children were Gary A. Dordick and Dylan J. Dordick of Dordick Law Corporation and Daniel O. Setareh.