Wednesday, January 14, 2026
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Court of Appeal:
Notice of Availability to Pay Judgment Halts Interest Accrual
Opinion Says Judge Erred in Finding That Plaintiff’s Refusal to Accept Payment Until Court Ruled on Fee Motion Relating to Enforcement Justified Allowing Debt to Continue to Grow After Defendant Agreed to Release Funds
By Kimber Cooley, associated editor
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SANDRA MAAS |
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Div. One of the Fourth District Court of Appeal held yesterday that a trial judge erred in allowing interest to continue to accrue on a judgment after the defendant filed a “Notice of Availability of Funds on Deposit to Satisfy Judgment,” saying that the fact that the plaintiff would not accept payment until a fee motion relating to efforts to enforce the decree was resolved did not justify allowing the multi-million debt to continue to grow.
Noting that the defendant had deposited funds with the court to satisfy the judgment, a move made after the plaintiff discovered that the company was in process of being acquired by another entity, the court opined, in an unpublished opinion authored by Justice David M. Rubin, that Code of Civil Procedure §685.030 requires a court to halt the accrual of interest on the date of such a filing.
That section provides that “[i]f a money judgment is satisfied in full…,…interest ceases to accrue on the date the judgment is satisfied” by a tendering of the payment or by depositing the funds “in court for the…creditor.”
Declaring that the fact that another code provision might preclude the plaintiff from seeking post-judgment fees if she accepted payment is a separate question from whether the judgment had been satisfied for purposes of §685.030, Rubin said:
“[I]t is an intended consequence of these statutes that [the defendant] was able to protect itself from the further accrual of interest by depositing the funds in accordance with section 685.030, while Maas was able to protect her ability to seek additional fees under section 685.080 by refusing to accept the funds.”
Presiding Justice Judith McConnell and Justice Julia C. Kelety joined in the opinion.
Unequal Pay
The dispute erupted after a jury found in favor of Sandra Maas, who sued her former employer, McKinnon Broadcasting Company (“MBC”), based on allegations that the company paid her less than her male counterpart relating to a San Diego local news program that she co-anchored between 2010 and 2018 for the defendant’s affiliate station, KUSI-TV.
In the 2019 complaint, she alleged that her co-anchor, Allen Denton, was paid $200,000 per year while she earned between $120,000 and $180,000 in annual compensation during her time at the network. She asserted causes of action for failure to provide equal pay to women under Labor Code §1197.5(a), gender discrimination under Government Code §12940(a), and retaliation, citing a May 2019 decision not to renew her contract.
In 2023, a jury found in her favor as to the equal pay and retaliation claims, awarding her more than $1.7 million. After judgment was entered, San Diego Superior Court Judge Ronald F. Frazier awarded her approximately $2.4 million in attorney fees.
Shortly after the trial, Maas filed an ex parte application to alert the court that MBC was selling KUSI’s assets to another corporation. By stipulation, MBC agreed to deposit more than $6.3 million with the court and Maas agreed to delay enforcement until after the sale was completed.
Availability of Funds
On Feb. 14, 2024, MBC filed an “Amended Notice of Availability of Funds on Deposit to Satisfy Judgment,” stating the defendant “hereby makes the [funds] on deposit with the Court available to [Maas] to the extent needed to satisfy” its obligations. The company asserted that the total amount it owed was nearly $4.5 million and claimed that the filing operated to stop the accrual of interest under §685.030.
Maas refused to accept payment, citing §685.080, which provides that a party may recover costs for actions taken to enforce a judgment “before the judgment is satisfied in full.” The following month, she moved for $105,845 in additional post-judgment attorney fees.
On April 18, 2024, Frazier ruled that “interest on the judgment [would] cease” the following day, calculating the amount owed on the judgment as approximately $4.5 million, and awarding $51,172.50 in additional fees. The judge also said that the court would retain the balance of MBC’s deposit pending Maas’s appeal.
MBC appealed the judgment, the attorney fee award, and the April 2024 order. Maas challenged the amount of the initial costs award.
Date of Interest Cessation
After the appeals were consolidated, Rubin wrote:
“The trial court erred in determining the date of interest cessation. MBC’s February 14, 2024, notice made ‘the $6,331,910.15 on deposit with the Court available to [Maas] to the extent needed to satisfy the Judgment.’ MBC had already ‘deposited’ the funds with the court. It thus satisfied the plain language of the statute, and the funds were ‘deposited in court for the judgment creditor’ as of February 14, 2024.”
Rejecting the plaintiff’s assertion that MBC placed conditions on the payment, he remarked:
“The trial court found this notice was not sufficient to satisfy section 685.030 because MBC disclaimed Maas’s postjudgment fees and sought the return of the rest of its deposit. The notice purports to ‘reserve[] [MBC’s] right to obtain disbursement of all funds on deposit with the Court in excess all of the amount needed to satisfy the Judgment,’ but this is a reservation of rights with respect to funds not needed to satisfy the judgment, not a condition on the release of funds.”
Adding that “[w]e also fail to see how MBC’s refusal to pay additional postjudgment fees constituted a condition on the release of funds to satisfy the judgment,” he commented that “MBC (incorrectly) took the position its notice also cut off Maas’s right to seek additional attorney fees under section 685.080” but said that the question was separate from the one before the court. He declared:
“[T]he notice was sufficient to stop interest accrual under section 685.030. On remand, the court shall recalculate interest owed on the judgment with a cessation date of February 14, 2024.”
Addressing the retention of the balance of the deposit, he said that “[w]e have some concerns regarding the trial court’s order,” but concluded:
“[T]his issue is mooted by our resolution of the consolidated appeals. Whether or not the trial court should have retained MBC’s deposit is now legally irrelevant. The trial court retained the deposit because it reasoned ‘the relief afforded to [Maas] in awarding a lodestar multiplier on the original fees motion would constitute part of the original judgment.’ We have determined Maas is not entitled to a multiplier on her attorney fee award. Therefore, the trial court will release the balance of MBC’s deposit on remand.”
The court rejected the remainder of the defendant’s challenges.
The case is Maas v. McKinnon Broadcasting Company, D082767.
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