Friday, February 13, 2026
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Woman Who Aided Boyfriend in Killing Family as Teenager Was Rightly Denied Relief—C.A.
Opinion Says She Was Properly Precluded From Resentencing Based on Intent to Kill, Trial Judge Need Not Expressly Consider Youth in Analyzing Mental State
By a MetNews Staff Writer
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MONICA DIAZ defendant |
Div. One of this district’s Court of Appeal has held that a woman who was convicted of aiding and abetting her then-boyfriend in the murder of her family members in 2000, when she was 16 years old, was properly denied resentencing based on a finding that she acted with an intent to kill.
Rejecting her assertion that the trial judge erred in failing to make express findings as to how her youth played into the determination of her mental state, the court, in an opinion filed on Jan. 28 and certified for publication Wednesday, acknowledged case law establishing that age may be relevant to whether a defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life but declared that a case involving express malice does not present the same concerns.
The question of the defendant’s mental state at the time of the crime was central to her resentencing bid under Penal Code §1172.6, which was enacted to make changes to the Penal Code, restricting the application of the natural and probable consequences doctrine of liability, retroactive by allowing a party who was convicted of felony murder to petition the court to have her conviction vacated and to seek resentencing.
Under the statutory scheme, the petitioner must show that she “could not presently be convicted of murder” because of the 2019 amendments, which limit liability for felony murder to the actual killer, one who aided and abetted in the killing with express malice, or a major participant in certain enumerated crimes who acted with reckless indifference to human life.
Pico Rivera Murder
Appealing the denial of her resentencing petition was Monica Diaz, who was convicted in 2004 relating to allegations that she let her 17-year-old boyfriend, Michael Naranjo, into her Pico Rivera home on July 21, 2000, and hid in the bathroom while he stabbed her uncle, Richard Flores, and three minor cousins to death.
Her aunt, Sylvia Flores, was also stabbed but managed to fight Naranjo off before he handed his knives off to Diaz and fled. At trial, Diaz testified that she moved in with the family after her mother died, and she feared that her aunt and uncle were going to separate due to increased arguments in the home.
According to the defendant, the couple planned to stage a burglary in an effort to bring the family closer together, but she had no idea that Naranjo planned to kill anyone. Naranjo backed up her story in his own testimony.
At trial, prosecutors presented a letter from Naranjo to Diaz saying that he wanted to kill a large number of people. Diaz also wrote messages indicating an affinity for murder, saying in one note, dated March 9, 1999, that “[t]he best job is to kill people professionally.”
In 2024, then-Los Angeles County Superior Court Judge John A. Torribio (retired) sentenced her to 25 years to life in prison for each of the four deaths. She was resentenced to four concurrent sentences of 25 years to life in prison after certain other counts and allegations were reversed on appeal.
Resentencing Petition
In 2020, she filed a petition for resentencing under §1172.6, arguing that she did not harbor the intent to kill her family members and that the evidence did not establish that she acted with the requisite reckless indifference to human life by participating in the alleged burglary ploy.
On May 24, 2024, Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Maria Davalos denied the request, saying that the teens “had been fantasizing about” the murders for “months before the actual killings.” She concluded that Diaz was a direct aider and abettor in the killings who acted with the intent to kill.
Wednesday’s opinion, authored by Justice Gregory Weingart and joined in by Presiding Justice Frances Rothschild and Justice Helen I. Bendix, affirmed the denial.
On appeal, Diaz faults Davalos with not taking her youth at the time of the murders in determining whether she harbored an intent to kill on the night in question.
Weingart acknowledged that, since 2021, courts have recognized that a defendant’s youth is a relevant factor in determining whether a suspect acted with reckless indifference to human life in committing a crime for felony murder cases as well as criminal proceedings involving allegations of implied malice homicides.
Consideration of Youth
He explained:
“Based upon these legal developments—all of which occurred before the evidentiary hearing here, and of which the trial court was thus presumably aware—Diaz argues the trial court erred in not considering her youth.”
Addressing her contentions, Weingart remarked:
“The trial court found Diaz ineligible for resentencing relief [because] she was a direct aider and abettor who acted with express malice….The court was aware of Diaz’s age at the time of the offense; the trial record was rife with references to her youth, and her counsel at the section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing argued that her age meant there was not a ‘thought through’ plan to murder anyone. The court rejected that claim, found the ‘bring[ing] the family together’ excuse not credible, and found Diaz intended to kill her family members and helped Naranjo accomplish that goal.”
Saying that “the court admittedly did not expressly reference Diaz’s age,” he opined:
“But Diaz cites no case—and we are aware of none—suggesting that a court hearing a section 1172.6 petition must expressly state that it has considered the defendant’s youth in evaluating whether he or she had the express intent to kill.”
Reasoning that a finding of “express malice does not implicate…the concerns that arise when evaluating whether a youthful defendant’s perception of risks supports a finding of reckless indifference or implied malice,” he faulted the defendant, who was represented by attorneys with Loyola Law School’s Juvenile Innocence & Fair Sentencing Clinic, for citing cases relating only to a reckless indifference determination and with misquoting jurisprudence.
As to Diaz’s contention that she was “peer pressure[d]” into participating in the scheme by Narjano, Weingart said that “the letters between the two support the conclusion that Diaz was well aware of Naranjo’s propensity for violence and desire to murder, shared it, and wanted to participate in such a crime along with him.” He added:
“Because the trial court’s finding that Diaz was a direct aider and abettor with the intent to kill is a sufficient basis to have denied her section 1172.6 petition, we need not also consider Diaz’s argument that the trial court erred in not considering her youth in determining whether she acted with reckless indifference to human life.”
The case is People v. Diaz, B339253.
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