Judge Declines to Revive Lawsuit Over Homeless Relocations

Wednesday, September 2, 2026

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Judge Declines to Revive Lawsuit Over Homeless Relocations

District Court Denies Reconsideration of Dismissal of Case Asserting That L.A. Violates Property Owners’ Rights By Moving Unhoused Parties Nearby, Says Newly-Filed Declarations by Displaced Persons Do Not Save Claims

By a MetNews Staff Writer

A judge of the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California has declined to revive a putative class action against the City of Los Angeles and its police department over claims that the defendants engage in a practice of relocating homeless people from encampments to areas surrounding plaintiffs’ properties in violation of the Constitution, denying a request for reconsideration of an earlier order of dismissal based on purported new evidence.

District Court Judge Cynthia Valenzuela acknowledged in Monday’s order that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) permits a party to seek relief from a judgment or order if the parties shows “newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered” earlier but said that the plaintiff’s submission of four declarations by unhoused individuals who allegedly support the plaintiff’s allegations fails to meet the standard.

Addressing the plaintiff’s argument that he had made efforts to obtain the evidence earlier but that he was unsuccessful because the unhoused persons near his property were unresponsive, adversarial, and would “never voluntarily provide” their names until an unnamed employee with good community relationships stepped in, she wrote:

“Plaintiff is correct that reasonable diligence does not require perfect diligence….But Rule 60(b)(2) requires more than a general statement that evidence was difficult to obtain. The movant must show that the evidence could not have been discovered and presented earlier through reasonable diligence….The importance of new evidence does not displace the diligence requirement.”

Complaint Filed

Seeking revival of his claims was Adom Ratner-Stauber, a property owner with multiple properties in Pacoima and the operator of a management company with ownership stakes in other parcels across the city. He filed the putative class action in August 2024, asserting, under 42 U.S.C. §1983, that the defendants have committed a taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment.

In the operative pleading, he asserted that by “moving homeless encampments from…one neighborhood to another…, and more particularly to and around Plaintiff’s property (and other private property similarly situated),” the defendants “have effectively taken…property…by rendering it materially and substantially less valuable and, in some instances, entirely unfit for its intended and legal use.”

Ratner-Stauber added:

“For instance, Defendants cleared homeless encampments around Sofi Stadium before the recent 2022 Super Bowl because it created a ‘safety issue’ for visitors and simply moved them such that they were relocated on private property, such as Plaintiff’s….Defendants knew or should have known that moving these homeless…would result in trespass, arson, theft, physical threats to Plaintiff and his tenants, and other harms to Plaintiff and his property….”

Motion to Dismiss

Monday’s order follows a June 30 decree in which Valenzuela granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of standing. She agreed with the city that the plaintiff did not meet his burden under Article III because he failed to show that his injuries are fairly traceable to the defendants’ conduct.

She recognized that District Court Judge Josephine L. Staton had previously found, before the case was reassigned to Valenzuela, that the plaintiff’s unconstitutional taking claim survived a pleading challenge, writing:

“The Court previously held that Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants physically relocated unhoused individuals to and around his properties and ‘informed them they had the legal right to remain there’ were sufficient to withstand a facial challenge to standing….The question now is different: whether Plaintiff has produced evidence sufficient to permit a reasonable factfinder to find that Defendants exerted a ‘determinative or coercive effect’ on the third-party conduct that directly caused his alleged injuries.”

Noting that “[t]he prior order…resolved only whether the [operative pleading’s] jurisdictional allegations were facially sufficient” and “did not decide whether Plaintiff could prove traceability as a factual matter,” she pointed out that the “[d]efendants now support their factual challenge to standing with declarations,…policy and municipal-code materials, and public records.”

Traceability Issue

Under those circumstances, she opined that the jurisdictional issues are “intertwined with the merits” such that the “court must treat the motion like one for summary judgment” and ruled that the plaintiff had not produced evidence sufficient to create a genuine dispute as to Article III traceability.

Ratner-Stauber moved for reconsideration, submitting the four declarations by unhoused parties that all allegedly aver that city personnel had told them to vacate the area during encampment-cleanup operations but that they could return after several days. The plaintiff also submitted a declaration indicating efforts to interview homeless individuals living near his property in early 2025 but that he was unsuccessful in eliciting responses.

Rejecting his request, Valenzuela declared:

“Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration…is DENIED. The Court’s Order dismissing this action…remains in effect, and this case remains closed.”

She pointed out that “[a] movant seeking reconsideration based on newly discovered evidence must show reasonable diligence” and wrote:

“The Court does not minimize the difficulty of obtaining testimony from unhoused witnesses. But Rule 60(b)(2)’s diligence requirement is mandatory, and Plaintiff bears the burden to satisfy it. Here, Plaintiff has not shown that the declarations could not have been discovered and presented earlier through reasonable diligence. The Motion therefore fails.”

Lack of Diligence

Saying that “[t]he chronology here reflects a lack of diligence,” she remarked that the “[p]laintiff and his counsel state that the search efforts described in the reconsideration papers began in approximately March or April 2025” and “do not explain why the search could not reasonably have started sooner.”

The jurist continued:

“The record also does not explain why the method that ultimately succeeded could not reasonably have been tried earlier….Plaintiff does not identify the employee, describe the employee’s efforts with any detail, or explain why that approach could not reasonably have been used before the Court ruled.”

Under those circumstances, she concluded:

“Plaintiff…knew, long before the Court ruled, that this category of evidence was central to his response to Defendants’ factual jurisdictional challenge. Rule 60(b)(2) does not permit a party to use reconsideration to supply evidence after judgment when the party knew the evidence was critical and has not shown that reasonable diligence could not have produced it earlier.”

In a footnote, she added:

“Because Plaintiff has not satisfied the diligence requirement, the Court need not decide whether the declarations otherwise qualify as newly discovered evidence, whether they would have changed the Court’s ultimate standing analysis, or whether they would have warranted limited jurisdictional discovery had they been presented before the Court ruled.”

The case is Ratner-Stauber v. City of Los Angeles, 2:24-CV-07043.