Highly Deferential Review for Federal Habeas Relief Survives

Friday, May 15, 2026

Page 4

Ninth Circuit:

Highly Deferential Review for Federal Habeas Relief Survives

Opinion Rejects Assertion That Recent Decision Gives U.S. Courts Power to Make Independent Assessments of State Cases, Says Trial Judge Wrongly Assumed Bound by Inmate’s Allegations in Granting Petition

By a MetNews Staff Writer

The Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals yesterday reaffirmed that federal courts reviewing state criminal proceedings relating to petitions for habeas corpus must apply a highly deferential standard, rejecting an inmate’s assertion that the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2024 decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, which overruled jurisprudence demanding that agency interpretations be given weight, calls the principle into question.

That deference is rooted in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which specifies that relief is only appropriate if the state court’s denial of the claim involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the U.S. Supreme Court or an irrational determination as to the underlying facts.

Circuit Judge Daniel P. Collins authored yesterday’s opinion, joined in by Circuit Judges Ronald M. Gould as well as Milan D. Smith, reversing a grant of habeas relief by Senior District Court Judge Terry J. Hatter Jr. of the Central District of California and saying:

“Contrary to what [the defendant] contends, AEDPA’s deferential standards present no constitutional difficulty under Loper Bright. Bradford wrongly equates the ‘collateral review process Congress has prescribed’ for administrative-law review of federal executive agency decisions…with collateral review, on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, of state court judgments….Deferential collateral review of state court judgments under AEDPA does not present similar concerns….”

The case marks the second time in a two-week span that the Ninth Circuit has reversed a grant of habeas relief to a death-row inmate by a federal judge. On April 29, the court reversed an order by District Court Judge Otis D. Wright II of the Central District of California that vacated the conviction and death sentence of a California man who admitted to setting a woman on fire.

Murder Charges

Seeking relief in the federal courts was Mark Alan Bradford, who was convicted in 1990 of the 1988 rape and first-degree murder of Lynea Kokes, a 28-year-old woman who had been hired, together with her husband, to manage the Panorama City apartment building in which he resided. He admitted to police officers that he returned to the scene of the assault to stab her to death after he realized she was unlikely to die from the assault.

Bradford’s attorney, Dennis Cohen, argued at trial that his client’s alcohol consumption on the night of the incident sufficed to create a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant acted with the premeditation and deliberation required for first-degree murder.

The jury rendered a guilty verdict and found true a special circumstance that he had murdered Kokes for the purpose of preventing her testimony. Then-Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Michael J. Farrell (now deceased) sentenced Bradford to death in July 1990.

After the California Supreme Court affirmed the judgment on the murder charge in 1997, and the U.S. high court denied a petition for writ of certiorari, he filed petitions for habeas corpus in both state and federal court, citing, among other things, alleged Brady violations by prosecutors, who he said never turned over exculpatory blood alcohol test results, and ineffective assistance claims relating to the failure of Cohen to request the information.

On Aug. 29, 2001, the California Supreme Court summarily denied the petition.

He followed up with a federal request, and Hatter granted his petition as to those two claims in May 2023, ordering that “the State of California shall…either…[g]rant Petitioner a new trial on the murder or the murder with a special circumstance allegation or…[r]e-sentence Petitioner” on the remaining charges.

Standard of Review

Addressing Bradford’s standard of review argument, Collins pointed out that “Bradford’s argument overlooks a ‘foundational principle of our federal system,’ namely, that ‘[s]tate courts are adequate forums for the vindication of federal rights.’ ” He wrote:

“Nothing in Loper Bright supports Bradford’s premise that, in addition to the Supreme Court’s direct review of state criminal judgments and state habeas rulings (which is unaffected by AEDPA), the Constitution requires federal courts conducting collateral federal habeas review to provide an additional layer of de novo or independent review of state court judgments.”

He continued:

Applying the highly-deferential standard, he said that “the petitioner must show that ‘there was no reasonable basis’ for the state court’s decision and explained:

“[W]e cannot read Bradford’s petition de novo and analyze it as we might have if we were the California Supreme Court. Instead, we must consider how the California Supreme Court, in summarily denying Bradford’s petition, may reasonably have construed the adequacy of his allegations under California law.”

He commented that Hatter erred in finding that the high court was obligated to accept as true Bradford’s allegations that blood-alcohol testing was performed on a sample collected from the defendant, despite prosecutors disputing this assertion, and that his attorney was not provided with those results and failed to request them.

Adequately Pled

Collins said that prosecutors “either affirmatively concede[d] or cannot reasonably contest” that the petition adequately pled that a sample of Bradford’s blood was placed in a container consistent with those used for alcohol testing and that the tube had preservatives generally used when preparing to perform such an analysis. However, he wrote:

“[T]he California Supreme Court could reasonably have concluded that Bradford failed to support his petition’s allegation—made on ‘information and belief’—that blood-alcohol-content testing of Bradford’s blood had in fact been done.”

Saying that “No other evidence in the record suggests that blood alcohol-content testing was ever performed on the blood sample,” he opined:

“[W]e conclude that the district court erred in holding that ‘the California Supreme Court was obligated to accept…as true’ Bradford’s information and-belief allegation that his blood sample had been tested for blood-alcohol content and that those actually-existing results were not provided to defense counsel.”

Remarking that “the California Supreme Court could also reasonably have concluded that Bradford’s relevant ineffective assistance claim…fails to the extent that it rests on defense counsel’s asserted failure to request blood-testing results that had actually been done,” and declared:

“[W]e reverse the district court’s grant of habeas relief…and remand with instructions for the district court to enter an order denying Bradford’s habeas petition in its entirety insofar as it challenges (1) his judgment of conviction for first-degree murder, rape, and sodomy; (2) the special circumstance findings; and (3) the judgment of conviction on the special circumstances. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, with proceedings to be limited solely to the resolution of any remaining aspects of Bradford’s [other claims that were mooted by the District Court’s decision].”

The case is Bradford v. Vang, 23-99005.