Declaration of Jury Misconduct Inferably Lacks Credibility

Thursday, September 17, 2026

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Court of Appeal:

Declaration of Jury Misconduct Inferably Lacks Credibility

Justices Say That Where New Trial Is Denied Without Comment After Juror Told of Improper Discussions During Deliberations, It Must Be Assumed That Judge Determined, Despite Lack of Contradiction, Allegations Were False

By a MetNews Staff Writer

The Court of Appeal for this district has held that where the uncontradicted declaration of a juror told of persistent misconduct on the part of some other members of the panel during deliberations, and the judge made no findings with respect to the allegations in denying a motion for a new trial, it must be assumed that the account was determined to lack credibility, requiring an affirmance of the judgment for the plaintiff.

Justice Nicholas F. Daum of Div. Four authored the unpublished opinion, filed Tuesday, rejecting the appellants’ contention that Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Peter A. Hernandez committed reversible error in spurning the new-trial motion.

The dispute in the case is over a conservation easement granted to plaintiff/respondent Mountains Recreation and Conservation Authority (“MRCA”), a public agency, by defendant VMB, LLC, as a condition in purchasing land in Laurel Canyon, in the affluent Hollywood Hills area, just off Laurel Canyon Boulevard. The purpose of the easement is to preserve the wildlife habitat.

Michael Bykov, a principal of VMB, built two houses on the land, selling one of them and giving the other to his daughter, realtor Katya Bakalinskaya. MRCA sued VMB, Bykov, and Bakalinskaya alleging a breach of the covenant.

It explained in its brief on appeal:

“Instead of keeping the area in its open space condition to allow animals free movement through the area, Appellants clogged it with wildlife deterrents such as a fence, concrete patios, an extended driveway, a basketball court, artificial turf, and artificial lighting, all of which were forbidden by the conservation easement terms.”

Appellants’ Contentions

Arguing for reversal, the appellants pointed to the declaration of juror Maribel Garibay who swore that despite admonishments by her and one other on the panel that there had been an instruction not to consider the wealth of the defendants, that factor was repeatedly alluded to in discussions.

One juror, a lawyer, purportedly identified the firm representing the defendants as a “top Century City law firm,” remarking that the defendants had to be wealthy to afford its services.

“This focus on Defendants’ purported wealth prejudiced Defendants,” the appellants contended.

They set forth that “Plaintiff either did not object to or refute that the jury…improperly made repeated statements concerning Defendants’ purported wealth or socioeconomic status, including that they were ‘rich’ and ‘greedy’…relied on conjecture, which was both untrue and not in the evidence, insofar as Defendants received a big tax write-off…that Defendants’ home was worth $ 6 million (or more)” and otherwise committed misconduct.

The appellants maintained:

“Under settled California law, such misconduct gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of prejudice. Plaintiff did not rebut the presumption. The trial court nevertheless denied Defendant’s motion for new trial without making any findings or providing any analysis whatsoever…, an abuse of discretion requiring reversal.”

2001 Decision

MRCA, in its respondent’s brief, cited the 2001 Court of Appeal decision by this district’s Div. Three in Jie v. Liang Tai Knitwear Co. Justice H. Walter Croskey (now deceased) said in that opinion:

“Here, the trial court denied the motion for a new trial, without making any findings….Implicit in the order denying the motion for a new trial is a finding that the declarant was not credible. Such an implicit finding is sufficient to support the trial court’s order denying the motion for a new trial.”

The conservation authority urged:

“Just as in Jie, this Court may infer that the trial court found Ms. Garibay’s declaration not credible, and may affirm the trial court’s denial of the new trial motion based on juror misconduct on that credibility finding alone.”

Reply Brief

The appellants countered in their reply brief:

“[E]ven under Jie’s framework, the implied finding of incredibility must be ‘supported by substantial evidence.’…Here, there is no evidence—substantial or otherwise—contradicting Ms. Garibay’s factual assertions. MRCA points to no internal inconsistencies, no contradicting witnesses, and no impeaching evidence….An implied credibility finding unsupported by any evidence in the record is not entitled to deference.”

The brief asserts:

“If a trial court could always deny a new trial motion based on juror misconduct simply by ‘impliedly’ finding the only supporting declaration not credible—in the complete absence of contradicting evidence and without any stated rationale—then the statutory right to a new trial for juror misconduct would be rendered illusory. A movant could never succeed no matter how detailed, specific, or uncontradicted the supporting declaration, because the appellate court would always be able to ‘infer’ that the trial court disbelieved it. The law does not permit such a circular result.”

Daum’s Opinion

Daum, who joined the court on Aug. 6, said in his opinion affirming the judgment:

“Jie is on point here. Defendants present no compelling reason to depart from it. They argue that a trial court is required to believe uncontroverted testimony. But even when testimony is uncontroverted, the court must still assess credibility, since uncontroverted testimony may nevertheless be inaccurate….The trial court was entitled to make credibility determinations, and we do not second-guess those determinations.”

The appellants invoked the 1993 opinion by Div. One of this district’s Court of Appeal in Lankster v. Alpha Beta Co. There, an uncontradicted declaration of juror misconduct was held to have created a presumption of prejudice.

Then-Justice Miriam Vogel (now retired) wrote:

“As a general rule, a trial court’s decisions are presumptively correct and an appellant’s claim of error must be supported by a record sufficient to overcome that presumption….But where, as here, the error established by the appellant gives rise to a presumption of prejudice, the burden shifts to the respondent to overcome the presumption by presenting a record sufficient to sustain the trial court’s decision.”

Error Erroneously Assumed

Daum responded:

“But in citing Lankster, defendants assume the point to be proven—the presence of an error. We cannot make that assumption; error must be established before the burden shifts.”

Other contentions by the appellants were also rejected.

The case is Mountains Recreation and Conservation v. Bakalinskaya, B348171.

Jeffrey T. Harlan and Elizabeth M. Thompson of the Century City firm of Venable acted for the appellants. Michael F. Yoshiba, Samantha Marconi, and T. Peter Pierce of the downtown Los Angeles firm of Richards, Watson & Gershon represented the agency.