Thursday, March 19, 2026
Page 1
C.A. Says Apple Pay App Is ‘Financial Account’ Excluded by Probationer’s Search Conditions
Opinion Says Judge Erred in Finding That Officers Were Entitled to Inspect Program on Probationer’s Phone Where Monetary Records Were Specifically Exempted
By a MetNews Staff Writer
Div. Three of the Fourth District Court of Appeal held yesterday that Apple Pay, a mobile payment service which allows users to transfer funds without physical cards or cash, is a “financial account” within the meaning of an exclusion from probationary search terms and, as such, a motion to traverse a warrant, that sought records from bank accounts only discovered by clicking on an app on the probationer’s phone, should have been granted.
Declaring that the “warrantless probation search of [the] Apple Pay account exceeded the scope of the probation search terms,” the court found that it was “reckless” of the officer who prepared the warrant application to omit the existence of the exclusion while including the term under which the defendant consented to the search of his electronic devices.
Yesterday’s opinion, written by Acting Presiding Justice Thomas A. Delaney and joined in by Justices Martha K. Gooding and Nathan Scott, acknowledges that the excluded materials are not defined in the probation conditions but rejects an assertion that the term refers only to traditional banking endeavors.
Saying that “we conclude an Apple Pay account is a ‘financial account’ as stated in the probation search terms, when interpreted ‘on the basis of what a reasonable person would understand from the language of the condition itself,’ ” Delaney added:
“Given that the only evidence that [the defendant] used [the banks in question] was the ‘fruit’ of [an] illegal warrantless search, it is material information that should have been presented to the magistrate when seeking a search warrant directed to [those financial institutions].”
That Investigation
The question arose after police in Orange County began to look into reports that the defendant, Scott Meiner, was stealing from a business by directing customers to send money to him rather than to the company. After discovering that Meiner was on probation and had agreed, as a condition of his release, to submit his electronic devices to search at any time without a warrant, the officers went to his apartment, arrested him, and seized his cell phone.
They searched the device and reviewed his Apple Pay account, which showed two linked debit cards, one with Chase and another with Credit One Bank. A warrant for those accounts was obtained, and the records revealed that Meiner had transferred funds obtained from customers using Venmo, another online mobile payment service, to his Chase account.
Meiner eventually admitted that he had instructed customers of the business to pay him cash or through his personal banking applications, including Venmo. On May 22, Meiner was charged with three counts of grand theft.
Two weeks later, the defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence under Penal Code §1538.5 and to quash a warrant based on the suppressed evidence, arguing that excising the illegally obtained information from the statement of probable cause would leave no reason to suspect evidence would be available from Chase or Credit One.
Attorneys with the Orange County District Attorney’s Office opposed the requests, arguing that the motion was, at its heart, one seeking to traverse the warrant and, as such, required a preliminary showing that the officer’s affidavit included a false statement that was necessary to the finding of probable cause and made “with reckless disregard for the truth.” They asserted that Apple Pay is not a “financial account” because the technology giant is not a bank.
Motions Denied
Orange Superior Court Judge Lewis W. Clapp denied the motions to exclude and to quash the warrant, declaring that the search was permissible under the defendant’s probation conditions. Last July, Meiner filed a petition for a writ of mandate, seeking an order directing the superior court to vacate its order.
Noting that Clapp had failed to rule on the proper vehicle for making the defendant’s challenge, Delaney agreed with prosecutors that the requests “should be deemed a motion to traverse” as they involved accusations that the accompanying affidavit recklessly omitted material information about the probationary search terms.
Addressing whether Meiner had made such a showing, the jurist remarked:
“[E]ven if there is some confusion on whether a ‘financial account’ is limited only to bank accounts, it was, at a minimum, reckless for the officer to omit the evidence that the Apple Pay account might not be subject to warrantless probation search….Given that the only evidence that Meiner used Chase and Credit One, instead of the numerous other banks, was the ‘fruit’ of this illegal warrantless search, it is material information that should have been presented to the magistrate when seeking a search warrant directed to Chase and Credit One. In sum, Meiner has met his burden of proof.”
He added:
“Turning to the merits, we conclude an Apple Pay account is a ‘financial account’ as stated in the probation search terms.…As commonly used, ‘financial’ means ‘relating to finance.’…Apple Pay is licensed in California as a money transmitter…and regulated by the Department of Financial Protection and Innovation. Additionally,…Apple Pay links to other financial accounts and has the ability to store cash within the application for immediate use. A reasonable interpretation of ‘financial account’ would therefore include an Apple Pay account. Thus, the warrantless probation search of Meiner’s Apple Pay account exceeded the scope of the probation search terms.”
The case is Meiner v. Superior Court (People), 2026 S.O.S. 729.
Copyright 2026, Metropolitan News Company