Thursday, July 16, 2026
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C.A. Says DVRO Asserting ‘Financial Abuse’ by Mother Against Adult Son Rightly Denied
Opinion Rejects Claim That Refusing Support Was Domestic Violence Due to Bare Assertion That Mental Health Issues Made Him Dependent
By a MetNews Staff Writer
Div. One of this district’s Court of Appeal has held that a trial judge did not abuse her discretion in denying a request for a restraining order sought by an adult son who claimed, among other things, that his mother “financially abused” him by cutting him off from continued support payments in light of asserted mental health issues that he said rendered him a dependent under the law.
Tuesday’s unpublished decision, authored by Justice Michelle C. Kim and joined in by Acting Presiding Justice Helen I. Bendix as well as Justice Gregory Weingart, acknowledges that the statutory scheme at issue defines “domestic abuse” justifying a protective order as including “depriving the other party of basic necessities” but declares:
“Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the court’s decision, as we must, the evidence showed [that the son] repeatedly initiated contact with [his mother] to demand money from her, which resulted in arguments and claims by [the son] that [his mother] was financially, psychologically, and emotionally abusive toward him. The trial court did not exceed the bounds of reason in declining to grant…a DVRO on this record.”
Domestic Abuse
At issue is what qualifies as “abuse” justifying a domestic violence restraining order (“DVRO”) under Family Code §6200 et seq., which applies to mother-and-child relationships as well as romantic pairings. Under the statutory scheme, “disturbing the peace” is sufficient, which, in turn, is defined to include “coercive control” in “[d]epriving the other party of basic necessities.”
Seeking protection under the law was Josh Morrow, who claimed, in his second unsuccessful request for a DVRO against his mother, Laurie Metcalf, that she caused him to default on a loan and fall behind on rent payments, under a lease that she cosigned, when she cut off financial support in April of last year. He also alleged a history of purported verbal abuse by Metcalf, dating back to 2004.
Morrow asked the court to issue a stay-away order and to direct his mother to pay $3,950 for past-due rent plus $1,000 per month toward his ongoing monthly rent obligation.
Dependent Adult
In papers supporting the May 29, 2025 request for a DVRO, he said that he “depends on” his mother for financial support because he is a dependent adult under the law due to a mental health condition and submitted documents from the Social Security Administration indicating that he had been rendered disabled as of October 2018 and that his condition was “continuing” as of April 2024. He cited Family Code §3910, which provides:
“Each parent of a child has an equal responsibility to maintain, to the extent of their ability, their child of whatever age who is incapacitated from earning a living and without sufficient means.”
In June 2025, Los Angeles Superior Court Erin Reed, then sitting as a judge pro tempore, denied the DVRO request following a hearing, saying that “[t]his is not a small claims courtroom” and “[t]he petitioner has not met his burden of proof to show the existence of domestic violence warranting a restraining order.”
Morrow appealed, arguing that Reed had “dismiss[ed] uncontradicted evidence of abuse” and failed to consider an alleged historical pattern of abusive behavior by both of his parents.
No Court Finding
Pointing out that “[n]othing in the record before us indicates any court has made a finding” that Morrow is a “dependent adult” as defined in the Welfare and Institutions Code or that Metcalf owes him a duty of support, Kim wrote:
“Even assuming Morrow could show he was a ‘dependent adult,’ if he wanted the trial court to make a finding of duty—and assuming for purposes of his argument that a DVRO proceeding was an appropriate forum to adjudicate such a claim—he did not present sufficient evidence or argument, as a matter of law.”
She continued:
“To the extent [§3910] could be employed to compel Metcalf to pay Morrow’s expenses, Morrow did not present evidence, or even claim, that at the time of the DVRO hearing he was incapacitated from earning a living due to his mental health condition. He testified that he was employed, and he blamed his recent past inability to hold a job on a lack of financial and emotional support from Metcalf, not his mental health condition.”
As to an argument that Reed erred in excluding evidence of past abuse, she remarked:
“[H]e asserts [excluded] documents show that Metcalf conditioned her financial support on him taking medication for his mental health condition. Even if this were true…, it does not establish Metcalf had a duty to support Morrow financially or that she committed an act of abuse by declining to continue to pay his way.”
The case is Morrow v. Metcalf, B348925.
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