Tuesday, October 6, 2026
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Felony-Murder Conviction Stands in Slaying of Off-Duty L.A. Sheriff’s Department Deputy
Opinion Rejects View That Decedent Did Not Qualify as Peace Officer, for Purposes of Exception to 2018 Amendments Limiting Homicide Liability, Because She Served in Custodial Assignment
By a MetNews Staff Writer
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MARIA CECILIA ROSA decedent |
Div. One of this district’s Court of Appeal has affirmed an order denying a petition for resentencing filed by a man who aided in an attempted robbery during which a co-conspirator fatally shot an off-duty deputy, with the justices rejecting the contention that the decedent did not qualify as a “peace officer”—for purposes of a statutory carve-out to the legislation virtually abolishing the felony-murder rule—because she served in a custodial assignment.
Senate Bill 1437, adopted in 2018, limits liability for felony murder to cases in which the defendant was the actual killer, acted with the intent to kill, or was a “major participant” in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life. Those convicted under the old, broader felony murder rule can seek retroactive relief by filing a petition for resentencing under Penal Code §1172.6.
One exception to the legislative changes is set forth in Penal Code §189(f), which provides that the newly-adopted amendments do not apply “when the victim is a peace officer who was killed while in the course of the peace officer’s duties” if “the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the victim was a peace officer engaged in the performance of the peace officer’s duties.”
At issue is the interplay between the exception and §830.1(c), which clarifies the scope of peace officers’ duties in California. While subdivision (a) provides that the authority of a deputy sheriff “extends to any place in the state” for any “public offense committed…in the peace officer’s presence, and with respect to which there is immediate danger to person or property,” subsection (c) adds:
“A deputy sheriff of the County of Los Angeles…who is employed to perform duties exclusively or initially relating to custodial assignments with responsibilities for maintaining the operations of county custodial facilities…is a peace officer whose authority extends to any place in the state only while engaged in the performance of the duties of the officer’s respective employment and for the purpose of carrying out the primary function of employment relating to the officer’s custodial assignments….”
Presiding Justice Frances Rothschild authored Friday’s opinion, rejecting the defendant’s assertion that the statute excludes from the §189(f) exception any Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (“LASD”) deputy who was initially placed in a custodial assignment. Noting legislative materials finding that most deputies spend the first four-to-six years assigned to the jails, she opined that “the legislative history supports that ‘[t]he original purpose of [section 830.1,] subdivision (c)’ was to hire an entirely new category of modified deputies who would receive more limited training tailored specifically to a limited custodial assignment” and said:
“[N]othing in the legislative history supports that the Legislature believed that fully trained, regular deputies working in the jails should be stripped of their off-duty peace officer status.”
Acting as Lookout
Seeking to upend his first-degree murder conviction based on the 2018 amendment was Justin Ashley Flint, who was convicted of acting as a lookout for Frank Gonzalez while he attempted to rob Maria Cecilia Rosa, an off-duty LASD deputy, who was standing near the open trunk of her car in Long Beach during the 2006 fatal encounter.
After a jury found him guilty, then-Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Joan Comparet-Cassani sentenced him to 29 years to life in prison in early 2008, and Div. One affirmed the conviction but ordered the penalty reduced to 26 years to life.
Following the passage of Senate Bill 1437, Flint petitioned for resentencing. At an initial evidentiary hearing, prosecutors argued that Gonzalez fired the lethal shots after seeing Rosa’s badge, which was allegedly on top of a bag in the trunk, presenting jailhouse evidence purportedly revealing that both defendants said things consistent with knowing that Rosa was employed by LASD.
Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Daniel J. Lowenthal denied the petition, and Flint argued for the first time on appeal that Rosa was a deputy described in §830.1(c) and was not killed in the “course of her duties” for purposes of §189(f).
Following a 2024 remand from Div. One, directing the trial court to address the “course of her duties” argument, Lowenthal found that §830.1(c) was a “new classification of personnel” created to deal with “staffing shortages” and declined to construe the statute to “mean that any deputy who initially works in a custodial facility has limited power.” The judge denied the petition again on Sept. 18 of last year.
Meaning of Phrase
Rothschild wrote:
“The crux of the parties’ dispute concerns the meaning of the phrase ‘deputy sheriff…who is employed to perform duties exclusively or initially relating to custodial assignments.’…Flint contends the language means that any sheriff’s deputy whose first assignment is to the jails qualifies as a modified deputy who lacks off-duty peace officer authority ‘until she is reassigned to a role that involves the performance of general law enforcement duties.’ The Attorney General contends that the language means that only deputies hired, trained, and utilized for the limited purpose of working in the jails—whether exclusively or initially—qualify as modified deputies subject to section 830.1, subdivision (c).”
Concluding that “each construction” is “reasonable on its face,” the presiding justice turned to “other indicia of legislative intent to construe” the section.
She cited legislative analysis providing that the bill would “allow the county to provide part of the regular peace officer training—plus training for custodial personnel—to deputy sheriff[s] exclusively or initially assigned to custodial duties,” who “would then be required to complete the remainder of the basic peace officer training prior to being reassigned to regular peace officer patrol duties.” Based on this history, she declared:
“We therefore conclude that the Legislature intended section 830.1, subdivision (c) to apply only to deputies hired and utilized for the express purpose of serving as modified deputies and who, as a result, received the more limited training created for modified deputies.”
Rejecting the view that the court’s interpretation renders the word “initially” superfluous, she added:
“[U]nder the Attorney General’s reading, the word ‘initially’ retains independent significance: It refers to deputies originally hired and trained as modified deputies who may eventually be permitted to complete the full [Peace Officer Peace Officer Standards and Training] basic training required to become regular deputies.”
She noted that “Rosa’s performance evaluations reflect that she completed several field assignment rotations” and remarked:
“We therefore conclude substantial evidence supports that Rosa was not a modified section 830.1, subdivision (c) deputy, but rather a regular section 830.1, subdivision (a) deputy vested with off-duty peace officer authority. As such, Rosa was ‘killed while in the course of [her] peace officer’s duties,’ and Flint is ineligible for section 1172.6 relief….Accordingly, we affirm the denial of his resentencing petition.”
The case is People v. Flint, 2026 S.O.S. 3145.
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