Wednesday, April 15, 2026
Page 3
Court of Appeal:
Error to Deny Court Fees to Grandmother Based on Equity
Opinion Says Judge Improperly Looked to Misdeeds of Party Seeking Costs of Litigating Visitation, Provision Ensuring Parity in Dissolution Proceedings Only Permits Consideration of Disparity in Access, Ability to Pay
By a MetNews Staff Writer
Div. Two of this district’s Court of Appeal held yesterday that a trial judge erred in considering equitable factors in denying a party’s request for attorney fees under a Family Code provision aimed at ensuring parity in access to legal representation, declaring that the section only permits consideration of disparity in access to counsel and ability to pay.
Justice Victoria M. Chavez authored yesterday’s unpublished opinion, saying that the jurist wrongly took into account allegations that the petitioning party, a grandmother who attempted to secure visitation rights with her grandchildren during dissolution proceedings between her daughter and her former son-in-law, siphoned money from the children’s college savings funds to pay for unrelated expenses.
At issue is Family Code §2030, which provides that, in dissolution proceedings, “the court shall ensure that each party has access to legal representation” by ordering one party to pay the attorney fees of the other “if necessary based on the income and needs assessments.” The provision further specifies:
“When a request for attorney’s fees and costs is made, the court shall make findings on whether an award of attorney’s fees and costs under this section is appropriate, whether there is a disparity in access to funds to retain counsel, and whether one party is able to pay for legal representation of both parties. If the findings demonstrate disparity in access and ability to pay, the court shall make an order awarding attorney’s fees and costs.”
Chavez opined:
“Nothing in the statute indicates such equitable factors may be considered in deciding if the moving party is entitled an award of attorney’s fees.”
Visitation Request
Seeking the fee award was Stephanie Kadivar, who moved to secure the visitation rights in 2024 after her former son-in-law, Houman Saedi, was awarded sole legal and physical custody of the two minor children he shares with his ex-wife, Khadijeh Kadivar. Saedi and Khadijeh Kadivar are both medical doctors.
In March 2025, the grandmother filed a request for attorney fees and costs under §2030 in connection with her efforts to secure visitation rights, attesting that she survives on public assistance totaling approximately $1,662 per month, while Saedi is a successful surgeon who earns approximately $800,000 a year.
Saedi opposed the request, asserting that a fee award would not be “appropriate” based on allegations that Stephanie Kadivar has only seen the children six times in nine years and purportedly stole hundreds of thousands of dollars from the minors, using it to pay her daughter’s mortgage arrears.
On April 25, Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Melissa C. Lyons denied the motion, finding that “[w]hile…there is a disparity in income,…Stephanie Kadivar’s request…is unreasonable as the [children’s college savings accounts] were misused by [her] and no significant relationship existed.”
Presiding Justice Elwood Lui and retired Justice Arthur Gilbert, sitting by assignment, joined in yesterday’s decision reversing the denial and declaring:
“On remand, the family court shall make each of the required findings under section 2030 and issue an award of attorney’s fees and costs consistent with findings demonstrating a disparity in access and ability to pay, if any.
Appropriate Nature
Chavez wrote:
“[A]lthough section 2030 requires a finding that a fees award is ‘appropriate,’ the next sentence of the statute states, ‘[i]f the findings demonstrate disparity in access and ability to pay, the court shall make an order awarding attorney’s fees and costs.’…Thus, the purpose of the ‘appropriate’ finding and the two other required findings is to determine whether there is disparity in access and ability to pay….The statute’s requirement of a finding that a fees award is ‘appropriate’ is therefore limited to factors relating to disparity to access and ability to pay for legal representation.”
Reasoning that the interpretation is “consistent with other provisions of the statute,” she remarked:
“[I]f a court could consider equitable factors unrelated to the parties’ disparity in access and ability to pay, this would contravene the statute’s express purpose. While the family court understandably considered appellant’s use of certain funds designated for the children and her relationship with them, such considerations went beyond the scope of section 2030.”
She pointed out that “the court made no finding as to whether one party was able to pay for the legal representation of both” and declared that the “appellant’s request for attorney’s fees and costs was improperly denied.”
The case is Marriage of Saedi v. Kadivar, B347642.
Yesterday’s decision is the second time an order denying a motion for fees brought under §2030 was reversed in the case. In 2024, Khadijeh Kadivar challenged Lyons’ denial of her request for litigation costs associated with her attempt to modify child support payments based on her incarceration for attempted kidnapping charges
Last June, Div. Two reversed the denial, saying that Lyons improperly applied fairness principles in declining to award fees and rejecting an assertion that use of the word “appropriate” in the statute opens the door to such considerations.
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