Tuesday, September 15, 2026
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C.A. Says Allegation That Defendant Blocked Exit Suffices for Pleading False Imprisonment
Opinion Says It’s Not Necessary to Set Forth Length of Detention or That the Purpose Was to Confine Plaintiff, in Particular
By a MetNews Staff Writer
A nurse at a hospital successfully pled a cause of action for false imprisonment based on an allegation that an administrative assistant-secretary who was under her supervision blocked her from exiting her office, even without a specification as to the duration of the detention and the apparent purpose having been to prevent a third party from leaving, the Sixth District Court of Appeal has held.
The opinion, filed Friday and not certified for publication, reverses a judgment of dismissal by Santa Clara Superior Court Judge William J. Monahan which followed his sustaining demurrers to the first amended complaint (“FAC”) filed by Valarie Phillips who worked as director of Care Coordination Department at Kaiser Hospital Santa Clara. The Superior Court is instructed to overrule the demurrer to the cause if action for false imprisonment but, again, to axe claims of defamation and false light based on statements by other employees.
Santa Clara Superior Court Judge Frederick S. Chung, sitting on assignment, authored the opinion. Chung was confirmed by the Commission on Judicial Appointments as a member of the Sixth District but his term of service will not commence until Jan. 4, assuming voters give him the nod in the Nov. 4 general election.
Allegations of Complaint
In March 2023, defendant Yvette Carpenter allegedly blocked the exit from Young’s office with a chair in order to interrogate a resource manager who was in the office with Young. The encounter was said to have lasted “several minutes.”
The FAC also avers that Carpenter on Feb. 26, 2023, temporarily blocked the exit from Phillips’s office of a hospital information technology (“IT”) employee who had come to pick up a cellphone that had been taken away from the secretary.
In their brief on appeal, the defendants/respondents, addressing the March encounter, said:
“Respondents, in their demurrer brief, established this claim fails because the FAC did not allege facts showing for how long Carpenter allegedly confined Phillips or facts showing Carpenter intended to confine Plaintiff….Further, the alleged conduct occurred during workplace communications and is thus privileged under Civil Code section 47.”
That section renders privileged certain communications “without malice, to a person interested therein.”
No Minimum Duration
Chung wrote:
“…Defendants cite no authority for the proposition that a specific length of time must be alleged to state a cause of action for false imprisonment. To withstand a demurrer, Phillips need only allege the ultimate facts, not any evidentiary facts….In addition, the case law establishes that there is no minimum length of time for the cause of action.”
He said that in its 1994 opinion in Fermino v. Fedco, Inc., the California Supreme Court “cited 15 minutes as an example” of a detention of sufficient length to constitute false imprisonment but, he noted, “it did not hold that such a duration was a minimum.” The jurist pointed out that the opinion refers to any “appreciable length of time, however short” and that “[t]he Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines ‘appreciable’ as ‘capable of being perceived or measured.’ ”
An “appreciable” period, Chung reasoned, would be one that Phillips and Carpenter, along with the person who picked up the cellphone and the resource manager “could have perceived.” He declared:
“Here, the FAC alleges that Carpenter blocked the path for ‘several minutes.’ Construing the allegation in Phillips’s favor as we must on demurrer, that is more than sufficient.”
Intent to Confine
The respondents’ contention that Phillips was required to show that Carpenter “intended to confine Plaintiff” was rejected. Chung said:
“With regard to whether Carpenter intended to confine Phillips as opposed to someone else, that question is not relevant.”
He wrote that under Fermino, the only intent that need be shown is that of confining “a person.” The justice-designate said:
“Whether Carpenter intended to confine the IT staff member, the resource manager, Phillips, or all three of them is not determinative.”
Civil Code 47
Chung went on to say:
“Carpenter’s conduct involved more than workplace ‘communications’: she allegedly used either her body or a chair to block the movements of IT personnel, a resource manager, and Phillips. We take no position as to whether any communications by Carpenter would have been privileged in these circumstances. We conclude only that her conduct in confining Phillips was not protected under Civil Code section 47.”
The case is Phillips v. Young, H053018.
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