Tuesday, February 17, 2026

Page 8

EDITORIAL

Robert S. Draper

Los Angeles Superior Court Office No. 2

os Angeles Superior Court Judge Robert S. Draper has drawn two election opponents. The seminal question is: Does the incumbent warrant another term? Plainly, the answer is “no.”

Why, then, would we urge his reelection?

Simple. Neither of his challengers is worthy of the office.

Formal proceedings have been brought against Draper by the Commission on Judicial Performance (“CJP”). It is inevitable that the judge will be removed from office, whether on the basis of misconduct or disability. While Gov. Gavin Newsom has made some questionable judicial appointments, any selection by him would follow scrutiny by the State Bar’s Commission on Judicial Nominees Evaluation and would be bound to result in Draper’s successor being someone with greater potential than either of the election challengers.

t is true that Draper on Feb. 4 filed an answer to the commission’s Jan. 18 notice of charges denying the bulk of the allegations, and the validity of them has yet to be determined. However, it is a fact that the Court of Appeal for this district on April 7 of last year, in an opinion by then-Justice Elizabeth A. Grimes of Div. Eight (now retired), reversed a judgment based on Draper’s conduct, saying:

Defendants appeal from a judgment on a jury verdict awarding $10 million to plaintiff on her claims for sexual harassment, retaliation and related claims. We reverse the judgment, not for lack of substantial evidence, but for prejudicial errors in the admission of irrelevant and damaging “me-too” evidence from a witness who was not similarly situated to plaintiff, and for the equally prejudicial and erroneous admission of 20-year-old newspaper articles and other evidence of the alleged harasser’s misdemeanor convictions.

This is an unusual case, due to the significant arbitrary and prejudicial evidentiary rulings of the judge presiding over the trial. After the judgment was entered, defendants filed motions for a new trial (or in the alternative a remittitur) and for partial judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) (or in the alternative for remittitur). At the hearing on those motions, which were denied, the trial judge initiated extended, bizarre personal comments on racial matters with newly substituted defense counsel (the only Black woman in the courtroom), despite there being no racial issue of any kind in the case. Defendants filed a motion to disqualify the judge for cause and to void his rulings on the motions. After writ proceedings and referral to a neutral judge, the trial judge was disqualified and his rulings on the postjudgment motions were voided.

On this appeal from the judgment, we need not decide whether the trial judge’s prejudicially erroneous evidentiary rulings during the trial were motivated, in part, as defendants contend, by “persistent racial and gender bias.” It seems clear the judge’s rulings were motivated by personal opinions untethered to the rules of evidence. Whatever his motivations may have been, the judge admitted inflammatory evidence without consideration of the evidentiary rules, with undeniable prejudicial effect, thus preventing a fair trial. We accordingly reverse the judgment and order a new trial.

Grimes went on to comment:

“[W]hile we do not know whether, as defendants contend, Judge Draper’s ‘persistent racial and gender bias’ motivated his rulings at trial, we cannot rule out that possibility in light of the extreme and bizarre comments he made at the posttrial motions hearing and his ensuing disqualification for cause. We need not decide whether bias was the reason for his arbitrary and capricious evidentiary rulings; the rulings were an abuse of discretion irrespective of his motivations. One thing we can say for sure is, the rulings were not motivated by a devotion to the law of evidence.”

The CJP’s notice of charges quotes from a transcript of the hearing referenced by Grimes. There are rambling discourses by Draper on irrelevant matters relating to race, touching on the South, baseball, and President Lyndon Johnson. In his answer, Draper says he “admits the accuracy of the portions of the dialogue quoted from the partial record of the February 15, 2023, hearing” but asserts, without elaboration, that “[t]he quoted portion of the dialogue is taken wholly out of context and does not accurately depict the nature of the conversation.”

The judge does not deny in the answer that he was under the care of a psychiatrist; that he said in an April 26, 2022 email to the court’s presiding judge and its assistant presiding judge that “the psychiatrist supposedly helping me overcome my Parkinson’s symptoms has instead been poisoning me”; that, to show injuries, he sent a court employee a photograph of himself, from behind, unclothed; and that, following a court investigation into his conduct, he was, on June 1, 2023, relegated to “chambers work only.”

ne judicial officer remarks: “Draper was a great attorney and good judge. Unfortunately his time has passed.”

Admitted to practice in 1968, he was appointed to the bench in 2012.

The commenting jurist says of Draper:

“I hope he will just decide not to return his nomination papers, and let the seat reopen for new challengers. I have concerns about the current challengers.”

If an incumbent who has filed a declaration of intent to run does not perfect the candidacy by filing nominating papers, a five-day window opens within which any eligible person other than the incumbent may file a declaration of intent and nominating papers.

Should Draper not file his nominating papers—and he had not done so by mid-afternoon on Friday—it would mean that funds will not be diverted from the Los Angeles Judges Election Protection Committee’s coffers to his campaign fund, reserving those monies for candidates more deserving of support.

Dropping out of the race would benefit Draper, sparing him considerable embarrassment. Intensified public awareness of the allegations against him would inevitably result from an election contest in which he was a candidate.

However, signaling an intention not to bow out, he declares in his answer to the CJP charges:

“I now have the privilege of standing for one last 6-year term, and I intend to do so, because I have not been able to complete the changes in how our Court operates that I believe are necessary to effectively serve the people of Los Angeles County.”

The judge adds that he “has taken and continues to take all reasonable measures to sustain his health and remain up to date on the evolving law which he looks forward to interpreting and applying as soon as he has successfully defended these charges and placed the question of his continued service before the people of the County of Los Angeles in the upcoming election.”

Another judicial officer observes: “Some might say that it would be far better that Draper be re-elected than the success of either of his challengers.”

We look at it somewhat differently. It’s not that Draper’s future performance on the bench—assuming he were ever to be extricated from chambers-only work—would be superior to that which his opponents would be apt to provide. It’s that he would be bound to be a temporary officeholder, until removed by the CJP, while either of his challengers, if elected, would have the job for six years.

•Allan L. Dollison, a private practitioner, has entered the public arena by filing his declaration of an intent to seek election to office yet, incongruously, he has gone into hiding. He refuses to respond to questions to which the electorate has the right to expect answers.

The State Bar on Jan. 22, 2001, reported that Dollison had “stipulated to 16 counts of misconduct in four consolidated cases: three counts each of failing to perform legal services competently or respond to client inquiries and improperly withdrawing from representation, and two counts each of failing to return client files, refund unearned fees and cooperate with the bar’s investigation.”

That misconduct, committed in the period from 1997-99, was serious—he received an actual suspension of two months, which came after an involuntary inactive status of nearly five months—but this does hark to what Dollison did and failed to do as a young lawyer more than a quarter of a century ago.

Of present concern is that the State Bar noted that Dollison “suffered from depression and is under the care of a psychiatrist,” giving rise to a question as to whether he remains under the care of a psychiatrist and, if not, when the treatments ended. Arrogantly, he won’t say.

He boasts of his military career and notes that the Veteran’s Administration has proclaimed him to be a disabled veteran. While his military service is commendable, it has no bearing on his fitness for judicial office, but the disability might.

There are some disabilities that would impede, or preclude, his capacity to function as a judge. So, what is the nature of the disability? Again he is silent.

Running for office is sort of a hobby for Dollison, being trounced at the polls in each effort.

In 1994, then a law clerk, he ran for an Orange County state Assembly seat. In that campaign, he proclaimed:

“We must…reform the juvenile justice system, and require boot camps for all young offenders. These camps would concentrate on military-style discipline and education.”

He ran for the Democratic nomination for an Orange County seat in the state Senate in 2004 and in 2014 for the office of district attorney of Humboldt County.

•Talha M. Khan-Valbuena, running as Tal K. Valbuena, is a young deputy district attorney who, like Dollison, is elusive.

Notwithstanding that the race is a nonpartisan one, Valbuena’s campaign is being run by the Mosaic Political Action Committee which guides and funds Democratic candidates.

He declares on his campaign website:

“I’m running for Judge because too many people no longer believe equal justice exists in our courts—in part because the judiciary does not always reflect the communities it serves.”

Valbuena points out that he would “be among the first openly gay people of color elected to the Los Angeles Superior Court.”

While ethnicity and sexual orientation should never be viewed as a disqualifying factor for public office, we see no merit in the contention that someone should be elected because of such considerations.

Valbuena simply does not inspire confidence.

hat Draper has demonstrated that he is no longer capable of functioning as a judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court would point to the need to elect one of his two challengers were there not substantial doubt as to their abilities to assume that role.

The only reasonable course for voters is to cast ballots for Draper and hope that the CJP will proceed at other than its usual sluggish pace in its proceedings against him and, once he is ordered removed (with scant prospect that the California Supreme Court would grant review) that Newsom will act wisely in appointing a replacement.

Accordingly, we suggest that votes be cast for Robert S. Draper for Office No. 2.