Friday, July 24, 2026
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California Supreme Court:
Violation of Conservatee’s Due Process Rights Not Structural
Opinion Says While Constitution Was Breached by Delay of Trial as to Ongoing Institutionalization Lasting for Almost All of Statutory Detention-Period, Release Not Required if Would Have Been Re-Committed Anyway
By Kimber Cooley, associate editor
The California Supreme Court held yesterday that a conservatee’s due process rights were breached by a delay in the trial on the determination of whether she continued to qualify for involuntary institutionalization that lasted nearly as long as the allowable term of detention under the governing statutory framework but declared that the violation does not qualify as structural error requiring dismissal of conservatorship proceedings.
Seeking vindication for the delay was a woman, identified in the opinion only as “E.A.,” who was placed in a conservatorship under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (“LPS Act”), found at Welfare and Institutions Code §5000 et seq., in 2020 after she was found near a public transportation station wearing only her underwear.
Under the statutory scheme, a party determined to be “gravely disabled” may be involuntarily placed under the authority of a county public guardian and institutionalized for one year. A conservator may petition to renew every 12 months, but a conservatee may request a jury trial on the issue of whether she continues to be “gravely disabled” within 10 days of a demand or, with consent, at most 25 days later.
E.A., who was diagnosed with a schizophrenic disorder, demanded a trial in December 2022 after the Contra Costa County Office of the Public Guardian filed its second petitioned for reappointment.
After delays largely due to court availability issues, the matter was called for trial on Nov. 28, 2023. At that time, she consented to the conservatorship on the condition that she would be housed at a less-restrictive placement.
Due Process Violation
Yesterday’s unanimous opinion, authored by Chief Justice Patricia Guerrero, declares:
“[W]e conclude that E.A.’s due process rights were violated by the nearly year-long pretrial delay. By extending almost the entire length of a one-year LPS conservatorship, the delay effectively nullified E.A.’s right to a meaningful opportunity to be heard prior to the deprivation of her liberty. Further, the delay was primarily caused by resource constraints and court congestion, and E.A. clearly and repeatedly insisted on her right to a timely trial.”
Acknowledging that the remedy for a speedy trial violation in the criminal context is dismissal, the jurist remarked:
“But this principle does not dictate the result in the context of LPS conservatorship proceedings, where the Sixth Amendment does not apply and dismissal or reversal may not be in the conservatee’s best interests. Based in part on these differences, we conclude that a due process violation based on pretrial delay in LPS conservatorship proceedings is not a structural error and may be found harmless on direct appeal under appropriate circumstances.”
Implicitly acknowledging that the decision opens the door to a constitutional violation without a remedy, Guerrero remarked:
“A proposed LPS conservatee who has suffered a due process violation might consider pursuing relief prior to trial, including a writ petition if appropriate, to avoid the possibility that the violation will be held harmless on direct appeal from a future conservatorship order.”
Justice Goodwin H. Lui penned a concurring opinion, joined in by Justices Leondra R. Kruger, Joshua P. Groban, and Kelli Evans, to “emphasize the weighty dignitary interests here.”
Order Affirmed
Div. One of the First District Court of Appeal affirmed the November 2023 order for conservatorship in an unpublished opinion filed on Aug. 28, 2024. In a footnote, Guerrero pointed out that the public guardian moved to terminate E.A.’s conservatorship in 2025, after the high court granted review, and commented:
“Because the underlying conservatorship has terminated, E.A.’s appeal challenging her conservatorship is now moot. We…exercise our discretion to consider the issues raised in this matter, notwithstanding its mootness, ‘[b]ecause the case raises important issues capable of repetition but likely to evade review.’ ”
One of the disputed issues on appeal was whether the four-part test, set forth in the 1972 U.S. Supreme Court opinion in Barker v. Wingo, for whether a criminal defendant’s due process rights have been violated applies to an LPS conservatee. Under that framework, courts consider the length and reason for the delay, the party’s assertion of her rights, and any resulting prejudice.
Rejecting E.A.’s view that the test does not give adequate weight to the dignitary interests of a party denied a timely opportunity to express her side in court, the jurist said:
“[T]he ‘broadly relevant set of functional, case dependent factors’ identified in Barker…should be applied to LPS trial delays as well. Again, to the extent the LPS context differs from either criminal trials or [other] proceedings, ‘the flexibility of the [Barker] test allows courts to account for those differences.’ ”
Finding a violation of E.A.’s rights under the framework, she remarked:
“E.A. has…failed to show that the delay hampered her ability to present a defense. Indeed, it does not appear she had any substantial defense to the Public Guardian’s allegation that she was gravely disabled….Even after the extensive delay at issue here, E.A. again voluntarily accepted a conservatorship in 2023. In other words, E.A. ultimately did not even contest the issue on which she demanded trial.”
Change of Placement
As to E.A.’s assertion that the violation caused a delay in her change of placement, Guerrero responded:
“The change in placement was the result of an agreement with the Public Guardian, not trial. E.A. could have pursued this agreement at any point following the Public Guardian’s reappointment petition.”
The jurist continued:
“[W]e emphasize…that the trial court has a ‘vital role…in safeguarding the timely trial right’ of LPS conservatees….State and local governments likewise have an obligation to devote sufficient resources to courts and counsel, as well as ancillary services, to ensure timely adjudication….[F]ailure to meet this responsibility not only runs afoul of the statutory timeline, but it may also violate fundamental principles of constitutional due process.”
She declared:
“[B]ecause subsequent events have rendered this appeal moot, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand with directions to dismiss the appeal as moot.”
In his concurring opinion, Liu said he agreed with the court’s conclusions but added:
“[A] proposed conservatee seeking to enforce her right to a timely trial may secure appropriate relief without demonstrating reversible error in other procedural postures, such as on a petition for writ of mandate after a trial court’s rejection of a speedy trial motion….In such cases, courts should accord proper weight to the denial of a proposed conservatee’s right to be heard. Giving substance to that right is at the heart of what it means for government to respect the inherent dignity of each person.”
The case is Conservatorship of E.A., 2026 S.O.S. 2159.
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