Monday, April 13, 2026
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Mother, Who Called Court Minutes After Rights Terminated, Not Entitled to Rehearing—C.A.
While Acknowledging Significance of Parental Rights, Opinion Says That Commissioner Did Not Impede Due Process by Declining to Reopen Case
By a MetNews Staff Writer
A mother who called into court 25 minutes after the time scheduled for the proceedings, just after oral findings were made and her parental ties to her child were severed, was not denied due process by virtue of the commissioner’s decision not to reopen the hearing, Div. Five of this district’s Court of Appeal has held.
Presiding Justice Brian M. Hoffstadt authored Thursday’s unpublished opinion, joined in by Justices Carl H. Moor and Lamar Baker, acknowledging that a “parent’s interest ‘in the companionship, care, custody, and management of [her] children’ is ‘among the most basic of civil rights,’ ” but declaring:
“We conclude the mother was afforded the opportunity to be heard; her failure to take that opportunity is not a basis for reversal.”
Appealing the decision was a mother, identified in the opinion only as “Mariah V.,” who gave birth to her son, Amari M., in September 2021. He was found to have methamphetamine in his system and struggled with withdrawal.
Amari M’s paternal grandfather and his wife took custody when the child was five weeks old, became legal guardians in April 2022, and applied to adopt him in February 2025. In May, after Mariah V. opposed the application, they petitioned to have Amari M. declared free from parental custody under Family Code §7822(a)(2), which provides for such a remedy if:
“The child has been left…in the care and custody of another person for a period of six months without any provision for the child’s support, or without communication…, with the intent on the part of the parent…to abandon the child.”
On May 21, the trial court issued a “Citation Freedom from Parental Custody and Control (Abandonment) (Re: Adoption)” to mother, notifying her that she “may appear” on July 21, 2025 at 11:00 am “to show cause…why [Amari] should not be declared free from the control of his[] parents according to the petition on file herein.” She was personally served with the document, which also notified her of the right to have court-appointed counsel.
Hearing Convened
The hearing was convened as scheduled, and the attorney for the prospective adoptive parents appeared remotely. After determining that Mariah V. was not present in the courtroom at 11:10 a.m., the court entered her default.
Los Angeles Superior Court Commissioner Nichelle L. Blackwell swore in the grandfather and his wife, whose testimony substantiated the allegations in the petition. Blackwell made oral findings, including that the mother had “abandoned” Amari M and that it was in the best interests of the child to be adopted by the petitioners, and “terminate[d] parental rights.”
After being informed that the mother had “just called into court” shortly after the decree was announced, Blackwell placed her on speaker phone and informed her of the rulings. When the mother told the court she was “literally down the street,” the commissioner told her that she had “failed to show up” and advised her of the right to appeal.
Due Process Claims
Hoffstadt noted:
“Mother frankly acknowledges that it ‘appears that she may well have abandoned’ her son and that it ‘may well be in [his] best interests to be adopted by’ his grandparents, but asserts that her right to due process was violated…due to the trial court’s refusal to conduct the termination-of-rights hearing anew when mother called in after it ended.”
He pointed out that “that “[t]he Family Code erects several procedures, including the requirement that a court must issue a citation advising the party of the “time and place” of the hearing and that she has the right to have counsel appointed if she cannot afford to hire an attorney, and that “procedural due process requires that a parent whose rights may be terminated be given ‘adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard.’ ”
Turning to the circumstances at issue, he declared:
“Mother received notice of the termination hearing that accorded with due process. She was personally served with the citation seven weeks before the hearing, and the notice advised her that (1) a petition had been filed to declare Amari ‘free from the control of his[] parents,’ (2) the petition ‘re[garded] adoption,’ (3) the petition would be heard on July 21, 2025 at 11:00 a.m., and (4) mother had the right to have counsel appointed if she could not afford it. This suffices.”
Designated Time
Saying that “[t]he hearing was conducted at the time and place designated in the citation,” he opined that the mother “received the opportunity to be heard that due process secures.” He continued:
“This outcome dovetails neatly with the framework of procedural due process, which is a ‘flexible’ standard that balances the ‘private interest[s]…’ against the…‘risk of an erroneous deprivation’ of rights….A person’s parental rights are undeniably weighty, but the ‘public policy of expediency and finality’ is ‘unusually strong in custody and adoption matters, as uncertainty is detrimental to a child’s development and well-being’…. a parent who elects not to show up at the time and place designated for a hearing was not denied that opportunity—they simply chose not to take it.”
As to the mother’s assertion that an order terminating parental rights only becomes immune from modification after entry of judgment, he acknowledged that Family Code §7894 specifies that a “court has no power to…modify” an “order and judgment” that declares a child “free from the custody and control of a parent” after it has been “ma[de].” However, he remarked:
“But this language has not been construed to divest courts of their power to revisit those judgments….More importantly, whether a trial court has the power to modify its orders and judgments does not mean that a litigant who did not appear at the hearing has a due process right to a new hearing as long as they call in at some point prior to the time when the trial court loses the power to modify. To the contrary, trial courts generally have discretion whether to reopen proceedings…; mother’s argument, if accepted, would obliterate that discretion and obligate that it always be exercised in favor of a new hearing.”
The case is Adoption of A.M., B349060.
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