Monday, September 14, 2026
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Court of Appeal:
Litigant Had No Standing to Seek Ouster of Rival’s Lawyer
Presiding Justice Hoffstadt Says Impermissibility of Deputy Alternate Public Defender Representing Plaintiff in Lawsuit Does Not Have an Impact on Cognizable Interests of Defendant in That Action
By a MetNews Staff Writer
The defendant in an action against it by a former employee who alleges fraud and unfair business practices had no standing to move for the disqualification of the plaintiff’s lawyer on the ground that, as a deputy Los Angeles alternate public defender, he was impermissibly representing a private client, Div. Five of this district’s Court of Appeal has declared.
Presiding Justice Brian M. Hoffstadt authored the unpublished opinion, filed Thursday. It reverses an order by Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Rupert A. Byrdsong.
Hoffstadt set forth:
“For 20 years, attorney Ilya Alekseyeff has been representing private clients in civil matters while employed as a deputy alternate public defender in Los Angeles County. In so doing, he has persistently violated the law. Worse yet. he has repeatedly lied about it. reporting to the Alternate Public Defender’s Office that he was not engaged in outside employment.”
Both Government Code and the County Charter bar a deputy public defender from handling outside cases, and the Los Angeles County Municipal Code provides that a deputy alternate public defender (“DAPD”) “shall have the same qualifications required by law for comparable deputy public defenders,” the presiding justice pointed out.
Byrdsong, last Oct. 20, disqualified Alekseyeff from continuing to represent Nicolie Lettini in a lawsuit against her former employer, Cherry Bekaert Advisory LLC. He acted on motion of Cherry Bekaert.
Nine days later, Alekseyeff resigned from the Alternate Public Defender’s Office.
Respondent’s Brief
Arguing for an affirmance, Cherry Bekaert maintained that it “appropriately moved for and had standing to seek Alekseyeff’s disqualification because his continued participation in this lawsuit would…threaten cognizable injury.” Explaining the nature of that injury, it said:
“…Lettini does not dispute that she—through Alekseyeff—has been uncooperative and caused delay in these proceedings….The record provides multiple examples of how Lettini, through Alekseyeff, delayed and obstructed proceedings before the Trial Court, citing his busy criminal practice but failing to disclose his employment as a DAPD.”
It added:
“Cherry Bekaert should not be forced to countenance Alekseyeff’s repeated delay and increased costs because Alekseyeff is required to devote his full time and attention to his criminal defense clients….In engaging in civil litigation, he either had to neglect his criminal defense clients (in violation of the law) or neglect his duties to his civil clients, causing delay and additional expense to Cherry Bekaert.”
Hoffstadt’s Opinion
Rejecting the respondent’s position, Hoffstadt wrote:
“Although Alekseyeff’s conduct in violating the statutory prohibition and then lying about it impugns the judicial process, standing exists only if that besmirchment impacts the movant’s interests—and Cherry Bekaert has shown no adverse impact beyond the dismay felt by any other member of the legal profession upon learning of Alekseyeff s brazen conduct.
The jurist found no merit in the contention that Cherry Bekaert was, in fact, caused injury, saying:
“The delay and expense to one party that arises when the opposing party’s counsel is overly busy is not a cognizable injury sufficient to confer standing to disqualify that counsel; if it were, disqualification motions would be a dime a dozen.”
He acknowledged that there is broad language in cases as to standing to seek the disqualification of opposing counsel, but said that “all arose in scenarios where the attorney’s continued representation had a cognizable impact on the opposing party in that case,” remarking:
“We decline to decouple the broad language in these cases from their facts. Doing so would effectively eradicate the standing requirement anytime a court disqualifies counsel at a party’s suggestion (whether formally by motion or application, or informally), thereby undermining the standing requirement’s purpose of preventing litigants from bringing disqualification motions and applications for strategic gain.”
Hoffstadt went on to say:
“[T]rial courts have the authority to disqualify an attorney on their own motion…This sua sponte authority to disqualify is necessarily narrow; were that authority much broader, it could swallow the standing requirement whole, for a party lacking standing could simply ask the court to exercise its own authority to disqualify and. if exercised, sidestep any need to show standing. Thus, a court’s authority to disqualify may well reach no further than those very rare situations where a positive statutory provision erects a per se prohibition on counsel’s representation in a case, for it is in those situations that continued representation is an unassailable affront to the integrity of the court. This would include the statutory bar on practicing law without a license….It would also include the situation present in this case, where state and County law together prohibit deputy alternate public defenders from representing civil litigants.”
He declared:
“In this case, the trial court did not purport to sua sponte exercise its authority to disqualify Alekseyeff; the court’s order referred solely to Cherry Bekaert’s application. We accordingly remand for the trial court to consider whether it wishes to exercise its inherent authority after giving the parties an opportunity to respond, and. possibly, to consider whether Alekseyeff’s resignation from the Alternate Public Defender’s Office renders any basis for disqualification moot.”
The case is Lettini v. Cherry Bekaert Advisory, B350508.
Alekseyeff, who has a workspace in downtown Los Angeles, represented Lettini. Derek S. Hecht of the Irvine office of Littler Mendelson and James A. Becerra of the firm’s downtown Los Angeles location acted for Cherry Bekaert.
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