Judge’s Past as Prosecutor Disqualifies Her From RJA Matter

Friday, April 17, 2026

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Court of Appeal:

Judge’s Past as Prosecutor Disqualifies Her From RJA Matter

Opinion Says Jurist’s Time in Homicide Unit of Riverside D.A.’s Office Might Lead Person to Reasonably Doubt Impartiality Relating to Claim That Former Employer Seeks Death Penalty More Often for Black Defendants

By Kimber Cooley, associate editor

SAMAH SHOUKA
Superior Court judge

Div. Two of the Fourth District Court of Appeal yesterday vacated an order denying a request to disqualify a judge, who previously worked in the Homicide Unit of the Riverside County District Attorney’s Office, from hearing a special-circumstances murder case in which the defendant claimed that statistical evidence showed that the prosecutorial office disproportionately pursued the death penalty at higher rates for Black suspects.

Yesterday’s opinion, written by Acting Presiding Justice Douglas P. Miller and joined in by Justices Carol D. Codrington and Frank J. Menetrez, acknowledges that “[o]ur conclusion does not mean that…any…judge who is a former prosecutor…must be recused in every case involving” claims of racial discrimination under the Racial Justice Act (“RJA”), codified at Penal Code §745.

But it points out that Riverside Superior Court Judge Samah Shouka “made recommendations as to filing charges in homicide cases during the relevant period of time involved in the RJA motion, and was present at staffing meetings where decisions were made in other cases as to the charges to be filed.”

It declares that “a person aware of these facts might reasonably entertain a doubt as to whether Judge Shouka could be impartial in determining if the” Riverside County District Attorney’s Office “had a pattern of institutional bias, explicit bias, or historical and systematic bias in filing homicide charges, when she was personally involved in these decisions….”

2018 Murder

The question arose after Russell Austin was arrested for the 2018 murder of his pregnant girlfriend, Erica Johnson, who was found dead in her bed with her throat ripped apart. Her unborn child did not survive, and her living son was found sitting next to her body.

Austin was charged with first-degree murder with special circumstances, and prosecutors with the Riverside County District Attorney’s Office filed notice of intent to seek the death penalty.

He filed a claim under §745(a)(3), which specifies that “[t]he state shall not seek…a sentence on the basis of race” and that “a violation is established if the defendant proves” that he was charged with “a more serious offense than defendants of other races…who have engage in similar conduct…, and the evidence establishes that the prosecution more frequently sought…convictions for more serious offenses against people who share the defendant’s race.”

In support of his claim, the defendant provided statistical information about the county’s homicide filings for the years between 2006 and 2019 that he claimed showed bias against Black defendants. Shouka was assigned to the case for all purposes.

Seeking Disqualification

It was prosecutors with the Riverside County District Attorney’s Office, and not the defendant, who sought to disqualify Shouka under Code of Civil Procedure §170.1(a).

The section provides that “a judge shall be disqualified” if “[a] person aware of the facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that [she] would be able to be impartial,” she “has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts,” or she “served as a lawyer …or gave advice to a party in the present proceeding.” In an amended statement of disqualification (“ASD”) filed last July, prosecutors argued that she met all three conditions.

After Imperial Superior Court Judge Jeffrey B. Jones was assigned to the request for disqualification, Shouka filed an opposition, acknowledging that she worked for the homicide unit from 2015-18 but saying that none of the matters with which she was involved were among those cited by the defendant as comparable case studies and that her recusal would not serve the interests of justice.

On Aug. 12, Jones ruled against the prosecutors, saying that “none of the contentions” in the ASD “appear logically related to the impartiality of Judge Shouka, and thus would not cause a reasonable (logical) member of the public to suspect bias or prejudice.”

Two weeks later, the prosecutors filed a petition for a writ of mandate, seeking vacatur of Jones’ order.

Little Case Law

Saying that “there is little case law discussing whether a former employee of a district attorney’s office can serve as a judge on a case involving an RJA motion,” Miller cited an advisory opinion issued by the California Supreme Court Committee on Judicial Ethics Opinions on Aug. 7.

That opinion indicates that a jurist need not recuse himself or herself “merely because the judge, while working as a deputy district attorney, handled cases involving elements that may be subject to discovery under a motion pursuant to the Racial Justice Act” but advises:

“Nevertheless, disqualification is required if the judge’s prior prosecutorial involvement was such that a reasonable person, aware of the circumstances, could justifiably doubt the judge’s ability to remain impartial.”

Filing Decisions

Highlighting that Shouka was involved in filing decisions on murder cases as well as collaborative discussions involving charges, legal theories, and strategies, the justice opined:

“[T]he issue raised by Austin is how the [county] chooses to file murder charges and seek the death penalty, and whether there is implicit or explicit bias. Judge Shouka was present at staffing meetings where these decisions were being discussed, and she regularly recommended charges that should be brought in homicide cases. Her role was more than just following ‘office policy’; she was directly involved in making charging decisions.”

Remarking that “[t]he People only had to show in the ASD that a person ‘might’ reasonably entertain a doubt that Judge Shouka would be able to be impartial,” Miller said:

“[T]he record was sufficiently developed to show that Judge Shouka may have been personally involved in the cases that will be examined during the evidentiary hearing. Further, she was involved in filing decisions made by the [district attorney’s office] in death penalty cases, which may be a part of the evidentiary hearing in relation to a pattern of institutional bias….We will direct the superior court to vacate its August 12, 2025, order denying the People’s ASD against Judge Shouka and enter a new and different order granting the People’s ASD.”

The case is People v. Superior Court (Austin), 2026 S.O.S. 1045.