Metropolitan News-Enterprise

 

Wednesday, July 29, 2026

 

Page 1

 

Panel Revives Disability Discrimination Action Filed by Inmate With Mobility Issues

 

By a MetNews Staff Writer

 

The Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has reinstated a lawsuit by an inmate of the Butte County jail who alleges disability discrimination based on his impaired mobility which necessitates a use of a wheelchair or cane, with two instances recounted in the complaint where, because he was deprived of those aids and could not walk but short distances on his own, he was dragged on the ground.

A panel comprised of Circuit Judge Mark J. Bennett and Senior Circuit Judges Richard A. Paez and Richard C. Tallman on Monday reversed the Sept. 3, 2024 dismissal by District Court Judge Dale A. Drozd, of the Eastern District of California, of a complaint by inmate Michael Ernest Mitchum Jr. against Butte County and individual defendants under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Mitchum alleged violations of Title II of that act which proscribes “discrimination on the basis of disability.”

Drozd, in ordering entry of judgment in favor of the county, adopted the Ju1y 15, 2024 findings and recommedations by Magistrate Judge Carolyn K. Delaney,

A key issue is whether Mitchum—who has sued for $21 million—is entitled to any damages, at all. An award in any amount would depend on whether a “deliberate indifference” had been manifested by the defendants as to a need for accomodation of Mitchum’s disability.

While the allegations of Mitchum being dragged, much of the focis of the complaint is on the lack of bathroom handrails, resulting in alleged falls by the plaintiff.

He averred, in a hand-written complaint, that on Jan. 24, 2020, two deputy sheriffs dragged him from the maximum security area where he was housed, taking him to a medical examination room. While he was undergoing an examination, he set forth in the pleading, a correctional officer walked in, carrying Mitchum’s cane, and queried: “Since inmate Mitchum doesn’t like following our rules, can we finally take his cane from him?” Jane Doe 1, a nurse, purportedly responded, “I don’t care if you take his cane.”

Michum’s pleading says that after medical clearance was granted, a deputy sheriff attempted to force him “to walk without his cane until plaintiff couldn’t walk anymore, at which point” the deputy “attempted to drag plaintiff down the hallway before finally calling on the radio for a wheel chair to be brought to wheel plaintiff the rest of the way” to his cell.

The following day, the complaint asserts, he was provided a wheelchair to go to and from court but when he returned, the mobility device was taken away and he was compelled by two deputies “to try, and walk the rest of the way” to his cell. Asking why he could not remain in the chair, he recounts, he was told “it came from the top, straight from Honea”—referring to Butte County Sheriff Kory L. Honea, a defendant in the case, along with the deputies nd others.

Continuing, the pleading asserts that when he “could no longer walk, and began falling,” both deputies “proceeded to drag plaintiff down the rutuda [sic], through hallways, through denatal area, past inmate housing, and recreation areas, through dental, and medical offices, past jail deputy cafetera” to the destination.

Magistrate Judge’s View

Delaney said in her findings and recommendations—without specifically referencing the alleged dragging incidents—that “[u]nder the facts alleged, the court cannot find that any injury suffered by plaintiff was caused by the deliberate indifference of Butte County Jail employees….”

The Ninth Circuit panel disagreed, saying of those incidents:

“Such abrupt terminations of accommodations and the subsequent affirmative action of physically dragging a person unable to walk plainly evince ‘an element of deliberateness,’ rather than proper consideration of whether the requested aid ‘would be unreasonable or could not be accommodated.’…The Complaint thus plausibly alleges more than ‘bureaucratic slippage that constitutes negligence rather than deliberate action or inaction.’ ”

Pleading Flaw

Delaney found that Mitchum “does not adequately identify a qualifying disability” explaining:

“Plaintiff indicates he has ‘mobility limitations’…, but that is not sufficient. Generally, it is required that a plaintiff claiming that they are disabled under the ADA plead the disability with specificity.”

She quoted a 2015 District Court decision from the Northern District of California as saying that “a specific, recognized mental or physical illness” must be identified.

The Ninth Circuit panel disagreed, saying:

“A plaintiff is not required to name a specific diagnosis to state a claim under the ADA. Instead, the ADA defines disability in relation to limitations on specific life activities.”

The judges elaborated:

“Adopting a broad reading of disability (as the ADA requires…) and construing all facts in the light most favorable to Mitchum (as this court’s pleading standards require…), the Complaint plausibly alleges a physical impairment that substantially limits Mitchum’s major life activities. The Complaint alleges that Mitchum suffered mobility limitations for more than four years, that both his knees dislocate spontaneously, and that he cannot walk distances without a cane or a wheelchair. The Complaint also alleges that Mitchum’s knee impairment affects his ability to shower safely. The Complaint thus plausibly alleges that Mitchum’s knee impairment limits his ability to care for himself, perform manual tasks, stand, and walk—qualifying major life activities under the ADA.”

Bathroom Facilities

Delaney also ruled:

“…Title II forbids the denial of or exclusion from programs, services, etc. Here plaintiff was not denied a shower, nor, under the facts alleged, even constructively denied a shower so there is no violation of the ADA.”

Finding that wasn’t sufficient, the panel declared:

“[T]he ADA mandates more than bare access to a public entity’s facilities. The ADA requires meaningful access to ‘assure’ individuals with disabilities receive ‘equality of opportunity’ and ‘full participation’…and establishes that such access may be achieved through ‘reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices’ or ‘the provision of auxiliary aids and services.’ ”

The judges said Mitchum’s complaint “plausibly alleges denial of meaningful access to showering, toileting facilities, and elementary mobility within the Jail, which constitutes a denial of services under the ADA.”

Mitchum pled that he was required, as an inmate, to perform janitorial services. No mention was made of his receiving monetary recompense for carryng out those duies, but Delaney inferred that he was, in essence, a jail employee, precluding recovery under the ADA.

The Ninth Circuit opinion says:

“Even assuming without deciding that employment status in carceral settings could bear on an inmate’s ability to state a claim under the ADA, the district court should have adopted the inference in Mitchum’s favor that the Jail imposed a general duty to maintain the cleanliness of communal spaces on detainees, not that Mitchum was employed.”

The panel recited that all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the validity of a complaint.

The case is Mitchum v. Honea, 24-5777.

 

Copyright 2026, Metropolitan News Company