Friday, February 20, 2026
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Court of Appeal Lauds Judge Kalra Over His Handling of Default Judgment Proceeding
By a MetNews Staff Writer
Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Upinder Kalra received a commendation yesterday from this district’s Court of Appeal based on his alertness in handling a default judgment proceeding.
“This case provides an example of an attempted abuse of the default process, only prevented by the diligence of the trial court,” Presiding Justice Helen Zukin of Div. Four said in an unpublished opinion.
Kalra spurned the bid by plaintiff Jose Ayala to obtain a default judgment of $9,878,446.80 against his former employer, Somatdary, Inc., instead awarding only $3,869.39 in costs. The judge acted after requiring testimony, having spotted a disparity between any losses reflected in documentary evidence and the amount claimed as damages.
Zukin wrote:
“When a defendant defaults, legal proceedings cease to be adversarial because there is only one side active before the trial court.,,, Other courts of appeal have cautioned attorneys against treating a defendant’s default as an ‘unalloyed gift.’…Similar warnings apply to the use of requests for admission, served after the defense has abandoned litigation, to manufacture evidence….Trial courts have an obligation to act as vigilant gatekeepers, preventing plaintiffs from taking advantage of the absence of an opponent.”
More than 90 requests for admissions were served on Somatdary and on co-defendant Abbas Pournahavandi, Ayala’s former supervisor. Zukin noted that Somatdary and Pournahavandi were defendants/respondents in LCPFV, LLC v. Somatdary Inc., decided by Div. Eight of this district Court of Appeal in 2024, and had served roughly the same number of requests.
In that case, then-Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Mark Mooney, now an arbitrator/mediator, found that the deemed admissions had “no evidentiary value” and, Zukin noted, the Court of Appeal affirmed. She said:
“LCPFV governs here, and the trial court correctly followed it.”
Attorney Fees Denied
Kalra denied the request for an award of attorney fees. The presiding justice remarked:
“[T]he court did find that the value of counsels services was zero. Counsel were unable to obtain damages for their client, other than reimbursement of court costs. Counsel prepared detailed declarations for Ayala that were contradicted by his live testimony, and signed their names to pleadings asking for damages amounts that were both inflated and contradictory. We will not disturb the trial court’s conclusion that such services provide no real value to the client or the court.”
Zukin remarked that Kalra “properly fulfilled” his “ ‘serious, substantive’ role in the default process” when he “denied Ayala’s inflated request and awarded costs only.”
The case is Ayala v. Somatdary, B345789.
Scott O. Cummings, Lee Franck and Andrew Butzen of the Gardena firm of Cummings & Franck represented Ayala on appeal. No respondent’s brief was filed.
Trial Court Attorneys
Ayala was represented in the Superior Court by Franck and Butzen. Kalra ordered both lawyers to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed on them, in an amount up to $1,500, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §177.5.
That section authorizes imposition of monetary sanctions “payable to the court, for any violation of a lawful court order by a person, done without good cause or substantial justification.”
The judge said in his minute order of last May 2:
“[T]he misconduct here was not isolated. Rather, the extent of misconduct in this case is extraordinary, egregious, and part of a pattern….[T]heir malfeasance demonstrated a concerted effort to exploit the default judgment process by turning what started off as an otherwise unremarkable wage and hour case into a fabricated disability case potentially worth millions.”
He declared that an assertion by Butzen under penalty of perjury “is demonstrably false.”
Sanctions Not Imposed
Nonetheless, he did not impose sanctions, explaining:
“[T]he Court expressed its profound disappointment in counsels’ conduct. Nonetheless, the Court discharged the OSC pursuant to CCP § 177.5 because while each counsel clearly violated the Duty of Candor on numerous occasions, they had not violated any valid court order. In addition, while the conduct constituted violations of CCP § 128.7, the Court failed to issue an OSC on that basis before Judgment entered. As such, the Court believed it lacked authority to notice and thereafter impose sanctions under that section. As to an OSC re: contempt of Court, the Court discharged that OSC….
“Upon reflection on the entire record, the Court believes that the facts of this case call out for the Stale Bar to be notified. Accordingly, the Clerk is directed to transmit a copy of this order and the February 21, 2025, Default Judgment and OSC to the State Bar.”
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