Wednesday, August 19, 2026
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Court of Appeal:
O.C. Firm’s Suit Over Ex-Client’s ‘Defamatory’ Post Is SLAPP
Opinion Says Review Calling Lawyers ‘Crooks’ Is Opinion-Based Protected Speech, Rejects View That Court’s Reading of Law That Bars Contractual Bans on Critiques Turns Section Into Immunity From Defamation
By Kimber Cooley, associate editor
An anti-SLAPP motion was properly granted as to an Orange County firm’s complaint asserting defamation and breach of contract claims against a former client over a Yelp review calling the lawyers “scam artists,” Div. Three of the Fourth District Court of Appeal has held, rejecting the contention that the name-calling amounted to disprovable statements and that the court’s reading of a law barring contractual terms that foreclose criticism “immunizes” libel.
Justice Nathan R. Scott authored Monday’s unpublished opinion, joined in by Acting Presiding Justice Martha K. Gooding as well as Orange Superior Court Judge Walter P. Schwarm, sitting by assignment. Scott declared that the lawsuit fails to withstand scrutiny under California’s anti-SLAPP law, found at found at Code of Civil Procedure §425.16, which provides:
“A cause of action…arising from any act…in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech…in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that…there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.”
Scott cited jurisprudence establishing that online reviews meet the definition of protected activity under the statute and said that the firm had failed to show a probability of prevailing on its claims, reasoning that the challenged remarks are hyperbolic comments that are not provably false statements of fact as required for the defamation cause of action.
As to the breach of contract claim, based on a provision in the fee agreement (referred to in the opinion as “Section 16”) which provides that the parties “agree not to directly or indirectly disparage each other either electronically or otherwise,” he said the term is unenforceable as it violates Civil Code §1670.8. That section specifies:
“A contract…for the sale or lease of consumer goods or services may not include a provision waiving the consumer’s right to make any statement regarding the seller or lessor or its employees or agents, or concerning the goods or services.”
Complaint Filed
LS Carlson Law P.C., which has an office in Aliso Viejo and boasts on its website that that the firm’s founder, Luke Carlson, “wrote the book on bad HOAs,” filed a complaint against former client Katie Sedgwick in 2025, asserting that the relationship between the firm and the defendant soured after it became clear other residents in Sedwick’s community did not wish to participate in litigation against a homeowners’ association.
Sedgwick allegedly terminated the relationship between the parties in 2024 and, on Jan. 18, 2025, posted a review on Yelp.com that said, among other allegations:
“Do not be fooled by this law firm’s website. They are either scam artists or complete crooks.”
Orange Superior Court Kimberly A. Knill granted Sedgwick’s motion to specially strike the complaint on July 25 of last year. LS Carlson appealed and, in a reply brief filed in January, argued:
“This case is not merely one where a client leaves online comments expressing disappointment with the outcome of her matter or the legal services provided. Respondent…falsely accus[ed] Appellant of malpractice and criminality. This includes making statements such as that Appellant is a ‘scam artist,’ ‘complete crook,’ and ‘will rob you blind,’ among other things.”
The firm added:
“Under Respondent’s reading of Civil Code section 1670.8, the statute would negate existing law and permit consumers to defame businesses they contract with for the sale or lease of consumer goods or services with impunity….
“This is not the intent of Civil Code section 1670.8….[T]he limited case law dealing with section 1670.8 involve contracts of adhesions and where the consumer is using a business’s online services….There is no contract of adhesion issue presented here….Section 16 of the Fee Agreement is not void under Civil Code section 1670.8.”
Totality of Circumstances
Scott pointed out that courts are directed to apply a “totality of the circumstances” test to determine whether a challenged remark is a statement of fact for which proof of falsity is possible as required for a defamation cause of action. Noting that mere rhetorical language is not considered defamatory, he opined:
“[W]e agree with the trial court that, as a matter of law, none of Sedgwick’s challenged statements are provably false statements of fact.”
Rejecting the plaintiff’s assertion that the portion of the review that called the lawyers “scam artists” or “crooks” amounted to false statements accusing the attorneys of malpractice and criminal actions, he concluded that the comments were unactionable “hyperbole.” The jurist said that other statements highlighted in the complaint similarly simply expressed Sedgwick’s opinions about her experiences with the firm.
Addressing the breach of contract cause of action, he said:
“[T]he firm pleaded [this claim] in such a way that…it falls with the defamation claim. The firm alleged: ‘Sedgwick has materially breached the fee agreement by engaging in a campaign of disparagement against Plaintiff by posting false, misleading, and defamatory statements regarding Plaintiff and the services provided to Sedgwick.’ Because Sedgwick’s statements are not defamatory, they are not ‘false, misleading, and defamatory.’ The firm therefore had no probability of prevailing on its contract claim, as pleaded.”
He added that, “[b]ecause the trial court’s analysis was spot-on, it had no need to reach Sedgwick’s observation that Section 16 is unenforceable” but declared that the provision “violates Civil Code §1670.8.” He remarked:
“We do not share the firm’s concern that this statute ‘would negate existing law and permit consumers to defame businesses…with impunity.’…In our context, the statute does not prevent the firm from suing for defamation, if the firm could prove defamation sufficiently to survive an anti SLAPP motion. The statute merely prevents the firm from including Section 16 in its fee agreement—or thereafter enforcing it.”
The case is LS Carlson Law P.C. v. Sedgwick, G065811.
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