Tuesday, May 12, 2026
Page 3
Court of Appeal:
Public Records Act Sets No Time Limit on Production
By a MetNews Staff Writer
State and local agencies in California must adhere to statutory deadlines in saying whether they will or won’t produce public records but are under no compulsion to provide them promptly, Div. One of the Fourth District Court of Appeal held yesterday, affirming a trial court determination that no writ relief lies even where there are delays of weeks or months.
Justice Truc T. Do wrote for the panel in rejecting the contention of Voice of San Diego, an online service, that the California Public Records Act (“CPRA”) requires swift disclosure of information.
The opinion upholds the ruling by then-San Diego Superior Court Judge Keri G. Katz (now retired) that the Voice’s taxpayer action against the San Diego Unified School District (“SDUSD”), pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §526a, to enjoin use of taxpayer funds in conducting an illegal activity, must fail.
Government Code §7922.530 (a) provides that agencies shall, within 10 days, respond to those making public records requests whether disclosable records exist. The statute goes on to say that in “unusual circumstances,” the time period may be extended by 14 days.
As now worded, §7922.530 (a) says that “[i]f the agency determines that the request seeks disclosable public records, the agency shall also state the estimated date and time when the records will be made available.” However, in 2024, when Katz granted SDUSD judgment, it provided that the agency “shall make the records promptly available to any person upon payment of fees covering direct costs of duplication, or a statutory fee if applicable.”
Do’s opinion points out:
“By its plain text, section 7922.530. subdivision (a), does not set any deadline expressed in number of days for the actual production of records.”
Appellant’s Contention
The Voice argued on appeal:
“Federal courts, under the analogous Freedom of Information Act…have found prompt disclosure to typically require public records be made available in a few days or weeks, not months or years after determining responsive records exists….SDUSD averages 399 days to disclosure. This is not, as SDUSD claims, mere bureaucratic oversight to be explained away as one-off situations, but a pattern and practice which thwarts public accountability. Notwithstanding this, the trial court denied Appellants’ § 526a claims, holding SDUSD is authorized to delay and obstruct record production to Petitioners subject to factors found neither in statute nor precedent. This is plain error and an abuse of the court’s discretion.”
The brief accuses SDUSD of “placing its CPRA duties on pause as it sees fit,” adding:
“Each time SDUSD makes such a violation, it concomitantly wastes public funds whether by attempting to cover-up its deficiencies, or by using agency resources in violation of the law. This Court should enjoin SDUSD’s violative and wasteful policies and practices with respect to its duty of determination.”
Do’s Opinion
Do disagreed, declaring:
“The CPRA does not precisely define the timeframe for the actual production of requested records, and we cannot graft a ‘within days or a few weeks’ requirement onto section 7922.530. subdivision (a). Whether an agency has promptly produced records is to be determined case-by-case considering the scope and burden imposed on the particular agency by the particular request. We further conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court’s factual findings that the District did not maintain an unlawful practice of violating the CPRA. Because there is no basis for a taxpayer action where the challenged governmental conduct is legal, the trial court properly denied the petition for writ of mandate.”
Alluding to the pre-2025 version of §7922.530(a) requiring that an agency shall make records “promptly available,” she said that “the Legislature has opted for a deliberately flexible term, not a fixed time frame.”
Taxpayer Action
The jurist acknowledged that a taxpayer action may be brought “to prevent fiscal waste from the implementation and enforcement of policies and practices alleged to be violative of the CPRA,” adding:
“The mere expending of time by any paid public employee in the performance of illegal and unauthorized acts may constitute unlawful use of public funds, warranting an injunction under Code of Civil Procedure section 526a.”
However, she wrote:
“On the whole, our review of the record finds substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the District did not employ a practice or policy of unlawfully delaying production of records for Voice’s requests. Rather, as California’s second largest unified school district, the District is an agency of sprawling size, managing a high volume of CPRA requests for records that, by their nature, routinely implicate student and employee privacy interests.”
The case is Voice of San Diego v. San Diego Unified School District, D084327.
Copyright 2026, Metropolitan News Company