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Court of Appeal:
No Carve-Out to Claim Presentation for Vehicle Code Cases
Opinion Says Fact That Section Provides Independent Basis for Public-Entity Liability Does Not Remove Cause of Action From Government Claims Act’s Rules for Suing State Agency
By a MetNews Staff Writer
The Third District Court of Appeal has rejected the view that causes of action asserted against the state under a Vehicle Code section that imposes liability for the negligent driving of public employees are immune from the Government Claims Act’s requirement that a party wishing to sue a governmental body must submit a written claim to that agency before seeking redress in court.
At issue is Vehicle Code §17001, which specifies:
“A public entity is liable for death or injury to person or property proximately caused by a negligent or wrongful act or omission in the operation of any motor vehicle by an employee of the public entity acting within the scope of his employment.”
Justice Aimee A. Feinberg authored the opinion, filed on Aug. 31 and certified for partial publication yesterday as to the portion of the decision interpreting the interplay between the Government Claims Act and §17001.
Feinberg acknowledged that the Vehicle Code section provides a basis for liability distinct from Government Code §815.2, which imposes vicarious responsibility on the state for the actions of its workers unless the “employee is immune from liability.”
However, she opined that a claim asserted under §17001 still falls within the broad language of Government Code §905.2, which applies the claim-presentation requirement to “all claims for money or damages against the state” relating to “an injury for which the state is liable.”
Complaint Filed
Seeking to avoid the claim-presentation requirement was Caryl Weston, who filed suit against the California Department of Transportation (“Caltrans”) and its employee Mark Lawson in March 2019, asserting negligence and other claims based on an April 2018 car accident.
Weston alleged that she was driving on a state highway in Butte County when a Caltrans truck being driven by Lawson purportedly “made an abrupt and/or illegal left turn,” forcing her to lose control of her own car, collide with the work vehicle, and suffer a broken knee, among other injuries.
The plaintiff had submitted a claim to the California Department of General Services (“DGS”) in May 2018, providing a traffic collision report as the only explanation of why the state was responsible for damages. That document was prepared by a Highway Patrol officer, who concluded that Weston was “the cause” of the collision because she had tried to pass the truck while it was in the process of making a slow-speed turn into a driveway.
A few months later, DGS notified Weston that her claim was rejected because “[t]he State does not appear liable.”
After Weston filed a second-amended complaint in July 2024, asserting causes of action including negligence and negligent entrustment based in part on allegations that Lawson was under the influence of a prescription opioid at the time of the collision, Butte Superior Court Judge Stephen Benson sustained the defendants’ demurrer to all causes of action in October 2024.
Fundamentally Different
Benson agreed with the defendants that all of the plaintiff’s causes of action were barred due to a material variance between the facts asserted in the DGS claim and those alleged in the operative complaint such that the state agency could not be said to have been put on notice as to the theory of liability. Noting that he had made earlier findings relating to a previous pleading, the judge declined leave to amend.
On appeal, Weston pointed to the 1978 California Supreme Court decision in Brummett v. County of Sacramento, which held that, even though public entities enjoy derivative immunity whenever the employee is shielded from liability under §815.2, §17001 provides an independent basis for holding the agency legally responsible regardless of any protections afforded to the individual tortfeasor.
She argued that the case and its progeny establish that the section operates independently from the Government Code and is not subject to the claim-presentation requirement set forth in that scheme. Feinberg responded:
“We do not disagree, but the interaction between Vehicle Code section 17001 and the Government Claims Act’s immunity and liability provisions does not resolve whether the Act’s claims presentation requirements apply to causes of action under Vehicle Code section 17001.”
The jurist continued:
“While Weston does not dispute that her suit is one ‘for money or damages,’ she maintains that her cause of action under Vehicle Code section 17001 is not one ‘for which a claim is required to be presented…’ [under] the relevant division of the Government Code….[W]hile limited exceptions have been recognized, Weston identifies none that would apply to claims under Vehicle Code section 17001.”
Material Variance
In an unpublished portion of the opinion, Feinberg considered “whether Weston complied” with the claim-presentation requirements. The defendants did not dispute that she had set forth a facially sufficient claim in her May 2018 DGS submission but argued that the operative pleading materially varied from that filing.
Citing case law holding that the pleading may not shift the allegations to premise liability on facts that fundamentally differ from those at issue in the government claim, the jurist wrote:
“Weston contends that the trial court wrongfully credited the truth of the collision report’s conclusions to contradict the well-pleaded factual allegations of her complaint, but the record does not support this assertion. The court explicitly stated that the issue was ‘not whether the police report is true or accurate’ but ‘whether the contents of the claim, whether true or not, are consistent’ with the complaint’s allegations….Weston herself cited and presented the collision report as the sole factual basis for her government claim.”
She opined:
“The trial court…did not err in concluding that Weston’s second amended complaint materially varied from her government claim. The complaint alleges that Weston was ‘lawfully’ passing Lawson and that Lawson acted negligently by turning left in violation of Vehicle Code section 22107….[T]he claim said that the incident involved instead: Weston speeding in a construction zone, trying to pass Lawson illegally, and causing the accident while Lawson drove slowly and made a legal left turn. Those facts ‘do not correspond with the facts alleged in the amended complaint.’ ”
Feinberg rejected Weston’s contention that “any variance should have been saved by the doctrine of substantial compliance,” adding:
“By presenting a claim that asserted no clear basis for the State’s liability, Weston ‘thwarted the purpose of the claims act.’…Accordingly, there is no basis for application of the doctrine of substantial compliance in this case.”
The case is Weston v. Department of Transportation, C102683.
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