Order Affirmed in Case Where Judge Accused Lawyer of Lying

Wednesday, January 28, 2026

Page 1

Court of Appeal:

Order Affirmed in Case Where Judge Accused Lawyer of Lying

Presiding Justice Elwood Lui Says He Won’t ‘Second-Guess’ Credibility Finding by Judge Martin

By a MetNews Staff Writer

The Court of Appeal for this district, acting in a case in which the judge ordered a dismissal after waiting 21 minutes for the plaintiff and her counsel to make remote appearances on the second day of trial, has rejected the contention that relief should have been granted based on the attorney’s declaration that that he couldn’t make a connection to the courtroom, deferring to the trial court’s impression that the lawyer was lying.

Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Lia Martin commented, after denying relief from the dismissal:

“I’ve just not seen this, I guess it’s unfortunate, I’ve just not seen this level of lack of candor and just blatant dishonesty.”

The lawyer for plaintiff Devindra Somadhi, in a wrongful discharge action against the City of Los Angeles, was Mansfield Collins, a West Covina practitioner.

In an unpublished opinion filed Monday, Presiding Justice Elwood Lui of Div. Two said that Martin found Collins to lack credibility and that “[i]t is not our place to second-guess the trial court in this regard.”

Attached Declaration

Martin dismissed the case on Jan. 4, 2022; on July 5 of that year, Collins moved for relief under Code of Civil Procedure §473(b) based on “excusable neglect,” setting a hearing on March 26, 2024; he attached to the motion a declaration in which he said that he tried to connect to the courtroom electronically at 10:25 a.m., with the proceeding set to begin at 10:30 a.m., but was dumped into a waiting room. He declared that he tried to reach the courtroom by phone but a county operator told him there was no Department 98 in the Mosk Courthouse, and another county operator told him the same thing later.

Although Collins made reference in the opening brief on appeal to “mandatory” relief having been sought under §473(b), that remedy is available only where there is an attorney’s affidavit of fault and he was accepting no blame; rather, the motion came under the discretionary-relief provision. (That portion of the statute refers to “excusable neglect” while the mandatory-relief part does not require that the lawyer’s neglect be “excusable.”)

Collins’s Contention

As Collins tells it in that brief:

“Appellant’s counsel, Mansfield Collins, submitted a declaration demonstrating excusable neglect, including multiple attempts to resolve the remote link connection issue in real time and immediate post-dismissal correspondence with opposing counsel. The trial court denied the motion and dismissed the case, despite a long record of compliance, active participation on day one of jury selection, and prompt efforts to seek relief. The court’s action violated principles of fairness and California’s liberal policy in favor of hearing cases on the merits.”

The brief adds:

“Here, Appellant’s counsel believed he was properly signed in. He had been told a special procedure would apply and that any problems would trigger a call or email from court staff. He immediately acted by calling the court, emailing opposing counsel, and attempting to reach the courtroom. His actions fall well within the standards of excusable neglect….”

City’s View

The city’s brief argues:

“This Court should affirm the dismissal of Plaintiff and Appellant Devindra Somadhi’s lawsuit against Defendant and Respondent City of Los Angeles because the trial court acted well within its discretion to dismiss the case after both he and his counsel failed to appear for the second day of trial, even though the City’s counsel and all prospective jurors appeared. To compound matters, Somadhi waited 182 days after the trial court dismissed the case to file a motion to set aside and vacate dismissal, and when he filed the motion, he set the hearing date for almost two years later, which was more than two years after the trial court dismissed the case. He also falsely blamed the trial court and its staff on his failure to appear and did not take any responsibility for his or his counsel’s failure to appear. This is not the work of a diligent party or his attorney.”

It goes on to say:

“Collins’ claim that he could not reach the trial court during the 21 minutes because the Los Angeles Superior Court operator told him Department 96 does not exist defies logic and commonsense and is not supported by substantial evidence. The Los Angeles Superior Court website has a directory which lists the phone number for every courtroom in the county and also lists the phone number for every judicial officer in the county.”

It notes that Martin, before ordering dismissal, contacted LACourtConnect, which then handled remote-appearance communications, and learned that no one had tried to get through to her department or to Department 16 where proceedings had been conducted earlier, and her judicial assistant went to Department 16 to see if Collins or his client had come there in person.

Lui’s Opinion

Lui, in addition to deferring to Martin’s assessment of credibility, made note of Collins’s lack of alacrity in seeking relief. He wrote:

“Although the trial court did not explicitly rely on the timing of the motion and hearing, we note that appellant’s counsel waited six months to file the motion to vacate, despite being informed of the dismissal only minutes after it happened, and that counsel proceeded to schedule the motion two years out from the date of dismissal, despite ample availability for the court to hear it years sooner. He cannot be said to have acted ‘within a reasonable time.’…These circumstances provide further support for the trial court’s determination that counsel lacked credibility in his declaration intended to show excusable neglect.”

The jurist said that “[a]lthough the parties did not brief the issue, there is an independent basis for affirmance,” namely that the action had been removed by the plaintiff to the U.S. District Court which dismissed the action without remanding it. That, Lui wrote, meant that the Los Angeles Superior Court exceeded its jurisdiction by accepting the case back.

The case is Somadhi v. City of Los Angeles, B339445.

On Feb. 24, 2005, a bankruptcy court, which had assumed jurisdiction over a malpractice action against Collins that had been filed in the Los Angeles Superior Court, found that the lawyer had agreed to handle a case for $10,000 but proceeded to exact from the clients an additional $258,000 and was claiming entitlement to $226,213.77 more. It ordered that he reimburse the clients for the excess fees they paid.

In 2010, he agreed in State Bar Court proceedings to a one-year stayed suspension from law practice, conditions of which included making the refund to the clients and three months of actual suspension. He repaid only a portion of the $258,000 plus interest and on Aug. 9, 2016, the State Bar Court Review Department declared “that Collins should be actually suspended for the longest period available, one year.”

He was placed on involuntary inactive status on Aug. 12, 2016; the suspension kicked in on Nov. 18, 2016; he regained eligibility to practice law on Aug. 12, 2017.